WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, KUWAIT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD:

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, KUWAIT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

KHALID ALI ABU ALKHAIR

Thesis submitted to the

University of Wales College of Cardiff in Candidature for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

1993

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this work is entirely the result of my own independent investigations. The various sources to which I am indebted are clearly indicated in the text or in the bibliography.

I hereby further declare that the work presented in this thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy has not been presented either wholly or in part for any other degree and is not being concurrently submitted for any other degree.

KHALID ALI ABU ALKHAIR

Candidate

KEVIN WILLIAMS

Supervisor

DEDICATION

I wish to dedicate this work to my father in his grave who was illiterate, but Who worked hard to develop the education of his nine children so that each one of them obtained a B. A. degree. This work is also dedicate to my mother who kept praying for my success and supported me morally and financially.

The work is also dedicated to my wife Manal, who sacrificed every thing to help me to finish my study. I believe that she is a great wife and a great mother. To my three children, Danyah, Moayad and Mojahid I also dedicate this work. I hope they obtain a better education and more greater success than l.

To my brothers, sisters and friends I dedicate this work thanking them for all their assistance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, my sincere thanks and deep gratitude go to Almighty Allah. without his help the completion of this work would not be possible.

I also wish to thank my supervisor Mr. Kevin Williams for his comments and advice. My thanks also go to everyone in the Centre of Journalism studies that helped me during my study at the Centre.

There are many people in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey that I would like to thank. Also, I am grateful to the leaders and the representatives of the Islamic movements for giving me the information and assistance that I needed to completa my study.

Finally, I would like to express my great appreciation to my mother, brothers, and sisters, my father, mother, brothers and sisters in law for their moral support and encouragement.

ABSTRACT

This study “The role of communication in the rise of the Islamic movements in the Muslim World” investigates the methods and the communication channels that helped in the rise of the Islamic movements in the Muslim world. It also tests the alternative communication channels that the Islamic movements use to avoid governments censorship. The study will also focus on how the western media helped in gaining the Islamic movements more publicity.

The thesis begins with a background study on explaining what Islam is? for Western, and for Muslims and the Islamic movements. We then look at how it has been practiced since it was founded in 622, and how Muslims distributed in the world after the end of the Caliphat in 1 924. From here we study the social movements and examine the role of the media in the creation of the social movements and if the Islamic movements are social movements or not.

The study also examines the role of the secular political systems, in the five countries of our study, in the creation of the Islamic movements because of their un-lslamic practice. After this, the study will examine the establishment, the development and the objectives of the sixteen Islamic movements of our study. The researcher then will explain the method used to collect the data from the five countries, followed by an analysis and the discussion of the findings.

The study concluded that Islam is misunderstood in the west and mis-practiced in the Muslim world which made the Islamic movements call for the return of Islam at the time of prophet Muhammad and the first four Chaliph’as. The western and the governments (of the five countries) propaganda against the Islamic movements helped in the rise of the Islamic movements and showed the movements as the defenders of Islam against Christianity and secularism. The study concluded that the Islamic movements succeeded in creating new communication channels to send their messages when their governments banned them from using the mass media channels.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Declaration

Dedication

Acknowledgments

Abstract iv

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Introduction: 1

Statement of the problem 2

The Study Case 3

The purpose of the study 6

The scope of the study 7

Hypothesis 8

The organization of the study 9

Chapter one: ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 1 1

Introduction 1 2

1.1. WESTERN MISCONCEPTIONS OF ISLAM 1 4

The Middle Ages 1 4

During the Crusades 1 5

Orientalism 1 8

The Image of Islam Nowadays 21

I .2. ISLAM AS A SYSTEM OF LIFE 24

Islamic Concept of Religion 25

Aquedah or Tawhid 26

The Effects of Tawhid on Muslim Life

Ibadat (the way of worship) 30

Sala (Prayer) 32

Seeyam (Fasting) 33

Zaka (Poor-due) 34

Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca). 34

Mua’ma]at (relationship, treatment) 35

The Islamic Social Order 36

Equality of the individual 36

The Islamic Family 38

Islamic community behaviour 40

The Islamic Political System 43

Tawhid (the Oneness of Allah) 43

Prophethood (Risala) 44

Consultation (Shor’a) 45

Caliph’a (the president of the Islamic state) 46

1.3 ISLAM IN PRACTICE 49

The Islamic state under the presidency of prophet

Muhammad and the four guidance Caliphs (622-661) The Islamic state during the Omaya and the Abasey	50
Caliphat (661-1258).	54
The Islamic state during the Ottoman Caliphat (1258-1924). The practise of Islam since the end of the Ottoman Caliphat	56
(from 1924).	59
1 .4. THE DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS IN THE WORLD	62
Conclusion	71
Chapter Two: The media and social movements	73
Introduction	74
Political and Social movements	75
Mass Media and the Communication Process	77
Media in our life	77
What is communication	79
Which channel, What Media	80
Communication and social movements Media structures in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait,	82
Pakistan and Turkey Radio in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan	86
and Turkey Television in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey Newspaper and Periodicals in Egypt, Afghanistan,	87
Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey Cinema in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan	92
and Turkey Conclusion Chapter Three: POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN EGYPT,	93
AFGHANISTAN, KUWAIT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY Introduction	96
The Political Structure in Egypt	98
Post war development	98
Constitution	104
Political parties	105
Opposition parties	1 06
The Political Structure in Afghanistan	1 07
Post war development	1 07
Constitution	1 13

Political parties	1 1 4
Opposition parties	1 1 5
The Political Structure in Kuwait	1 1 7
Post war development	1 1 7
Constitution	1 1 9
Political parties	1 20
The Political Structure in Pakistan	1 21
Post war development	1 21
Constitution	1 25
Political parties	1 26
Opposition parties	126
The Political Structure in Turkey	1 28
Post war development	1 28
Constitution	1 36
Political parties	1 37
Opposition parties	1 37
Conclusion	1 39
Chapter Four: The Rise of The Islamic Movements	1 39
in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan, and Turkey	1 45
Introduction	1 46
The Islamic Movements in Egypt	1 48
The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Egypt	1 49
Sufism	1 49
The Muslim Brotherhood	1 51
The Al Shari’ah Society	1 53
The Islamic Organization	1 53
The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Egypt	1 55
Sufism	1 55
The Muslim Brotherhood	1 56
The Al Shari’ah Society	1 57
The Islamic Organization	1 58
The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Egypt	1 59
Sufism	1 59
The Muslim Brotherhood	1 60
The Al Shari’ah Society	1 6 1
The Islamic Organization	1 61
The Islamic Movements and Politics	1 62

The Islamic Movements in Afghanistan The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in	1 66
Afghanistan	1 69
The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)	1 69
The Islamic Society	1 70
The Islamic Party (Khalise)	1 71
The Afghan National Liberation Front. The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in	1 72
Afghanistan	1 72
The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)	1 72
The Islamic Society	1 74
The Islamic Party (Khalise)	1 75
The Afghan National Liberation Front.	1 76
The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Afghanistan	1 77
The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)	1 77
The Islamic Society	1 77
The Islamic Party (Khalise)	1 78
The Afghan National Liberation Front.	1 79
The Islamic Movements and Politics	1 79
The Islamic Movements in Kuwait	1 85
The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Kuwait	1 85
The Organization of Social Improvement	1 85
The Organization of lhy’a Al Torath	1 87
The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Kuwait	1 88
The Organization of Social Improvement	1 88
The Organization of lhy’a Al Torath	1 90
The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Kuwait	1 9 1
The Organization of Social Improvement The Organization of lhy’a Al Torath	1 9 1
The Islamic Movements and Politics	1 92
The Islamic Movements in Pakistan	1 94
The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Pakistan	1 95
The Islamic Organization	1 95
The Organization of Ahlo Hadith	1 96
The organization of Islam’s Ulama.	1 97
The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Pakistan	1 98
The Islamic Organization	1 98
The Organization of Ahlo Hadith	1 99
The organization of Islam’s Ulama.	200
The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Pakistan	200
The Islamic Organization	200

The Organization of Ahlo Hadith 20 1

The organization of Islam’s Ulama. 202 The Islamic Movements and Politics 202 The Islamic Movements in Turkey 207

The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Turkey 208

The Nursi movement 208

The Sufi movement 21 3

The Welfare party 21 4

The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Turkey 2 1 7

The Nursi movement			21 7
The Sufi movement			21 8
The Welfare party			21 9
The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Turkey			221
The Nursi movement			221
The Sufi movement			222
The Welfare party			222
The Islamic Movements and Politics			223
Conclusion Chapter Five: Research methodology			224
Introduction			228
Research interviews			228
The methods and techniques of data gathering The difficulties of choosing the interviewees 233			230
Problems in translating the data			236
Conclusion Chapter Six: COMMUNICATION AND THE RISE OF			236
ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS			238
Introduction AUDIENCES: Recipients of Islamic movements			239
messages in Egypt The channels the Islamic movements in Egypt			239.
use to send their Messages.			242
Sufism			242
The Muslim Brotherhood			244
	The Al Shari’ah Society	249
	The Islamic Organization Similarities and the differences between the Islamic	251
	movements in using communication channels in Egypt. The Main obstacles that face the Islamic movements	252
	in Egypt and disseminating their messages.	254
	Political Obstacless.	254
	Financial Obstacles.	256
	Ideological Obstacles.	256

The main research methods the Islamic movements in Egypt use to assess the effectiveness of their messages 257

AUDIENCES: Recipients of Islamic movements messages

in Afghanistan. The channels the Islamic movements in	257
Afghanistan use to send their Messages. The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic	260
Society The Islamic Party (Khalise) and Afghanistan	261
National Liberation Front. Similarities and the differences between the Islamic movements in using communication channels in	263
Afghanistan. The main obstacles that face the Islamic movements	265
in Afghanistan and disseminating their messages.	266
Political Obstacles.	266
Financial Obstacles	267.
Social Obstacless.	268
Ideological Obstacles. The main research methods the Islamic movements in Afghanistan use to assess the effectiveness of	268
their messages.	269
The research methods.	269
The Traditional Methods.	270

AUDIENCES: Recipients of Islamic movements messages in Kuwait. 271

The channels the Islamic movements in Kuwait use to send their messages. 272 The Organization of Social Improvement 272

The Organization of lhy’a Al Torath Similarities and the differences between the Islamic	277
movements in using communication channels in Kuwait The main obstacles that face the Islamic movements in	278
Kuwait and disseminating their messages.	279
Political Obstacles.	279
Financial Obstacles.	280
Social Obstacless.	280
Ideological Obstacles.	280

The main research methods the Islamic movements in

Kuwait use to assess the effectiveness of their messages.281

The research methods.	281
The Traditional Methods. AUDIENCES: Recipients of Islamic movements messages	281
in Pakistan. The channels the Islamic movements in Pakistan use to	282
send their messages.	283
The Islamic Organization	283
The Organization of Ahlo Hadith	285
The organization of Islam’s Ulama Similarities and the differences between the Islamic	286
movements in using communication channels in Pakistan. The main obstacles that face the Islamic movements in	287
Pakistan and disseminating their messages.	288
Political Obstacles.	288
Social and Financial Obstacles.	289
Ideological Obstacles.	289

The main research methods that the Islamic movements in Pakistan use to assess the effectiveness of their

messages.	290
The research methods.	290
The Traditional Methods.	290

AUDIENCES: Recipients of Islamic movements messages in Turkey. 29 1 The channels the Islamic movements in Turkey use to send their messages. 292

The Nursi movement 293

The Welfare party	295
The Sufi movement Similarities and the differences between the Islamic	298
movements in using communication channels in Turkey. The main obstacles that face the Islamic movements in	299
Turkey and disseminating their messages.	300
Political Obstacles.	300
Financial Obstacles. Ideological Obstacles.	302
The main research methods that the Islamic movements Turkey use to assess the effectiveness of their	in
messages.	302
The research methods.	302
The Traditional Methods.	303
Conclusion	804
Conclusion	308
Discussion of the findings	309
Objectives	309
The nature of the Islamic movements	309
Media and the rise of the Islamic movements	31 0
Bibliography	31 9

x i i i

LIST OF TABLES

Page No.

Table (1) Muslims living in Muslim countries 65

Table (2) Muslims who live in countries where they are in a minority group

x i i i

INTRODUCTION:

Statement of the problem:

The media play an important role in the development of mass social movements. This has been examined by researchers in respect of the western countries. All these studies have examined the role of the media in the developments of the social movements in democratic countries. In the Muslim world where there are other political systems the role of the media in the development of the social movements in general and the Islamic movements in particular has not been discussed.

In recent years there has been a huge upsurge in the Islamic movements in the Muslim world. These have been described in the western commentators as “fundamentalist” movements that become a threat to the western interests in the Muslim countries in present and could be a threat to the western countries when these fundamentalist movements govern some countries of the Muslim world.

The same ideas that been seen in the western media, of the danger of the Islamic movements to the governments of the Muslim world, can also found in media of the Muslim countries. While the leaders of the Islamic movements claim that the western media and their governments media have created this image in order to use them as an absolute enemy to cover their unfair policies toward Islam and Muslims. In the mean time the leaders of these movements defend their objectives of the reformation of the Muslim society according to Islam by using the western and the Muslim countries governments analyses studies to prove the acceptance citizens in their countries to their ideas.

The thesis seeks to examine the religious, political, social and media factors which explain the rise of these movements and particularly the part the media have played. By examining the role of the media in the rise of the Islamic movements we can contrast the role that media has played in different Muslim states. We can also contrast the different uses of the media made by the Islamic movements in the Muslim countries. The thesis will also contrast the differences between the media channels that the legal Islamic movements use to send their messages and the channels that the illegal Islamic movements use to send their messages.

Finally, we can point out some of the common problems that faces the Islamic movements and disseminating their messages and whether their messages affected their recipients or not.

The Study Case•

There are more than fifty Muslim countries in the Muslim World and because the Muslim world is very wide that cannot be studied, we chose five countries to represent the Muslim world. To chose five out of the fifty, the researcher looked at the similarities and the differences between them. Some are very poor, that become the first or the second poverty country in the world such as Bangladesh. Others are very rich countries that became the first or second wealthy country in the world, as Kuwait. In politics, some are practicing democratic systems, others have communist systems, socialist systems, military dictatorship regimes and some have royal families ruling the country. That means that Muslims in some countries could chose whom they want to rule them, by elections and others could not. It also means that in some Muslim countries the Islamic movements are free to say what they want to say through their political parties or through any union or organization that they belong to, about any public case or they cannot practice that because there is no freedom in other countries.

In the Muslim world, the television and radio stations in some countries are owned by the governments and in others, they are owned by the public. Newspapers and magazines could be owned by individuals in some Muslim countries while in others, they could not be. Freedom of speech for newspapers or radio and television depends on the political system that rules this or that Muslim country.

Illiteracy has a high percentage in some Muslim countries while it has a low percentage in other countries. Some of the Muslim countries have a long history of industrial while other countries are still under development.

After the researcher studied the similarities and differences between the Muslim countries the researcher chose Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey. There are many reasons for choosing these countries:

Location:

Egypt is located in Africa while Afghanistan, Kuwait and Pakistan are located in Asia and Turkey of course, between Europe and Asia.

The political system:

Each one of these countries has a different political system. Egypt is a socialist country, Afghanistan has a communist government and Kuwait has a royal family to govern the country. Pakistan has a democratic system and in Turkey, there is a democratic system but with secularism. That means that no party could be a religious party in Turkey, so it is a democratic system but under secularism.

This difference between the political system in these five countries will show us how the Islamic movements present their public opinion under this or that regime. It will also show us the similarities and the differences between the methods that the Islamic movements use in presenting their public opinion in the five countries.

The study will focus on the political methods that the Islamic movements use under different political systems. It will also focus on the similarities and the differences between these methods.

Economic

Kuwait is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, and the person’s income in Kuwait is one of the highest income in the world. In the meantime Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. The person’s income in 1989 in Afghanistan was only 136 US dollars a year. The other three countries are between Kuwait’s and Afghanistan’s average. Industrial and manpower in Turkey made it one of the modern and industrial countries while Pakistan and Egypt still far away from being industrial countries.

Export is different between these countries. Kuwait’s only export is Oil while Turkey has different kinds of industrial exports. Egypt and Pakistan with Afghanistan exported vegetables, fruit and cotton. Import for Kuwait is almost everything because of its geographical location, while Turkey’s biggest import is Oil and so are Egypt and Pakistan.

The study will show us if poverty or wealth could play a role in the formation of the public opinion in those countries, or not.

Media:

Turkey is the only country of the five that have been chosen, which has a public ownership of its television and radio. All the other four countries’ television and radio are in the hands of the governments. The study will show us if the Islamic movements use the media to preserve their opinions or not, and if so, how they use it.

Population:

Pakistan has the largest number of population in this study, while Kuwait has the lowest number. Pakistan’s population is almost a hundred times more than Kuwait. Egypt’s and Turkey’s population are almost the same.

The study will focus on the effectiveness of the Islamic movements in countries which have small or large population.

Religion:

Islam is the religion of these five countries, but how much the governments of these countries are practicing Islam in their constitutions and their policies. This will be a part of this study.

Education:

Illiteracy has its highest level in Pakistan and Afghanistan while in Turkey it has the lowest level.

Education for males and females has a different percentage between these countries. Some have almost equal and others have a big difference.

The study will focus on how education can play a role in the formation of public opinion in these countries, and whether it is an effective element or not.

Social:

Afghanistan and Kuwait have a large number of their population belonging to tribes. Turkey and Egypt have few tribes and in Pakistan there is a large number of tribes belonging, but not as Kuwait or Afghanistan.

The study will focus on the methods that are used in these societies to present their public opinion and what are the different methods that are used by tribe societies and not used in the urban societies.

Language:

There are more than one language in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey there are five major languages in the five countries of our study: Arabic, Turkish, Urdu, Pushtu and Dari.

Islamic movements:

The Islamic movements in these five countries are the largest and the most famous Islamic movements in the Muslim World. The Muslim Brotherhood, Al Shar ^laih Society, Sufism and Al Jihad in Egypt, Mujahideen’s parties in Afghanistan, The Organization of Social Improvements and the Organization of lhya Al Torath in Kuwait, the Islamic Organization, the Organisation of Ahlo Hadith and the Organisation of Islam’s Ulama in Pakistan, and the Welfare party, the Nursi movement and the Sufi movements in Turkey are examples of some of the famous Islamic movements in the Muslim World.

Those are the reasons of choosing these five countries to be studied.

The purpose of the study:

The current study is pioneering in this field. To the best of the researcher knowledge no similar study of the same scope has ever been undertaken. The study will try to add valuable information to the field of media’s role in the development of the Islamic movements in the Muslim world.

Most of the previous studies described the Islamic movements as negative and extremist movements. The current study, on the other hand, will try to explore the positive side of the role of the Islamic movements in shaping the political policies in the Muslim world. Today the Islamic movements has gain a special place in the political arena in the Muslim world due to their expansion and changing demand. Which made them a necessary field of study for most media and politjcaJ studied in the Muslim world.

Even though the Islamic movements may differ in their religious preaching, they may hold similar political opinions in some issues such as the practise of Shar’ah in their countries and their status toward the West. Which made the differences between them very narrow and made the use of terms moderate for some of them and fundamentalist for others, that some writers use in their studies, does not exist.

Most governments in the Muslim world use such terms as; distortion and oppression when describing the Islamic movements. The study will examine the methods that the Islamic movements are using to present their ideas in their countries.

The scope of the study:

This study will examine ‘the role of the media in the rise of the Islamic movements in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey. The study will only focus on the Sunni Islamic movements in those countries.

Hypothesis:

In the objectives of the Islamic movements the study hypothesizes that;

-Although there are differences between the Islamic movements in methods in preaching Islam, there is a general agreement among them in the case of practicing Shari’ah in their countries.

-The Islamic movements have their political and economic programmes to practice them when they come to power and they tried to present them whenever their governments allowed them to do.

-The Islamic movements believe that their countries could be self-reliant if their governments used the sources of their countries in a planned and honset way.

In the nature of the Islamic movements the study hypothesizes that;

-The nature of the Islamic movements are public movements and they went secret when their governments banned them from working in public.

-The Islamic movement nature are peaceful religious social movements and they only react by using force when their governments made them do so by jailing and killing some of their members.

In the media channels that the Islamic movements use to send their messages, the study hypothesizes that;

-The Islamic movements are willing to use all kinds of mass media channels to present their ideas if their government allowed them to do so.

-Because the governments ban the Islamic movements from using some of the mass media channels such as television and radio, the study hypothesis that the Islamic movements succeeded in creating alternative media channels that helped them in spreading their messages such as the revolution of the Islamic books and cassettes in the last decade.

-The Working Units of the illegal Islamic movements are the best channels for the internal communication within these movements, because of the secrecy of these units.

-Letters, facsimiles, telephones, telegrams and telex as personal communication channels are used for internal communication between the headquarters of the movements and their branches and also for sending reports to the world-wide media for the legal Islamic movements, while they are used only for sending reports to the world-wide media for the illegal Islamic movements.

-Mosques as a channel of communication are the basis of all types of Islamic movements and through them they send their messages.

-Organizational communication, such as conferences and public meetings are only used by the legal Islamic movements

-The illegal Islamic movements use unions of students, teachers, labourers, farmers, engineers, lawyers and medics, through their members in these unions, as a channel to spread their messages to these kinds of recipients.

-The illegal Islamic movements use some of the legal political parties to elect some of their members to the National Assembly in their countries, in order to send more messages from this high position to more recipients.

-Government propaganda against the Islamic movements gain to the Islamic movements more recipients

-The western propaganda against the Islamic movements gain to the Islamic movements more recipients.

In the obstacles that faces the Islamic movements, the study hypothesizes that,

-The Islamic movements’ main obstacles are political and financial obstacles

The organisation of the study:

This Introduction has advanced a brief outline of the study; its main focus, significance, and the methods and techniques of data gathering, in chapter one Islam and the Muslim world we are going to study the misconception of Islam in the west and that the Islamic movements want to Practice. We will start with the western misconception of Islam through the ages and the role of the western media in this misconception of Islam. If the west misconception Islam then we should answer the question of what is really Islam? The answer of this question will be in the section of Islam as a system of life.

In order to find out why the Islamic movements are calling for the return of Islam as a system of life we will examine the practice of Islam since the time of prophet Muhammad until the present day. Because of the western fear of the return of the Islamic Caliphat that will gather all Muslims under one state we will present the distribution of Muslims in the world.

In chapter two the thesis will study the role of the media in the rise of social and political movements in the west It answer many questions such as the participation of social movements in the creation of the media and how they use the media to spread their ideas and whether the Islamic movement is a social movement or not. In the end of this chapter we will study the media in the five countries of our study.

To understand the development of the Islamic movements and the role of the media we need a basic background to the countries we are studying. In

chapter three, political structure in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey, will be provided.

The rise of the Islamic movements in the five countries will be studied in chapter four. The establishment of these movements, their objectives and nature of their movements. Chapter five will present the research methods that the researcher used to interview the leaders and key actors of the sixteen Islamic movements of our study. It will also explain the problems and difficulties as well as the limitations of the interviewing process.

Chapter six will analyses the interviews of the leaders and key actors of the Islamic movements to find out the role of communication in the rise of the Islamic movements. Conclusion of the findings of the role of communication in the rise of the Islamic movements and how important is the media to the Islamic movements will be provided also in chapter six.

CHAPTER ONE

ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD

Introduction

For many in the West, Islam appears as a homogeneous and threatening entity. This perception has developed over many centuries. Islam and Christianity were first thrown against one another when the forces of the prophet Muhammad did battle with the armies of Rome in the sixth century. From this time onwards, hundreds of conflicts have taken place between the two religions on the battlefield; sometimes when Islam tried to spread its influence throughout Europe, other times when Christians went to liberate what they saw as their Holy Land from the territories of the Islamic Empire. It was the rivalry of the Crusades and the Middle Ages that sowed the seeds of distrust and hatred between the Muslim World and the West. The direct threat from the armies of Islam was accompanied by the religious challenge from the Qur’an and the teachings of the prophet Muhammad. When the military threat receded in the fifteenth century the theological challenge continued to exercise Christian thinkers. However, from the end of the Renaissance Islam ceased to be the pressing concern that it had previously been.

The rediscovery of Islam came with the expansion of the western Empires into the Muslim World at the end of the eighteenth century. Distrust and hatred turned into contempt and denigration during this time. Initially, the renewal of contact was spasmodic, through the exploits of a few Westerners, such as the explorer Richard Burton. Orientalists such as Burton, the first European to visit Mecca, were not hostile to Islam and the Muslim World. However, they did promote a perception of Islam as part of the Orient; as exotic, corrupt, decadent, mysterious and full of latent power which has come to dominate western perceptions ever since. The image of sly, devious and untrustworthy Muslims was developed as the European imperialists used force to conquer the former Islamic empire. These images are still firmly entrenched in the modern West as the Oil Crisis of 1973 and the US hostages crisis during the Iranian Revolution of 1979 indicated. They are still very much part of the way in which the western media, press, broadcast and film represent the Islamic peoples and lands.

However, the Palestinian academic, Edward Said, has pointed out that “in no really significant way is there a direct correspondence between ‘Islam’ in common Western usage and the enormously varied life that goes on within the world of Islam” (Said, 1981: x). The world of Islam is richer and more varied than it is portrayed in the West. The Islamic view of life is fuller and more fulfilling than most Westerners know. Islam comprises many peoples, nations, races, cultures, histories and geographies. The Islamic World is a dynamic and developing world not the moribund and backward looking entity depicted in the West. It is this reality that this chapter seeks to describe and explain.

The chapter will examine the theory and practice of Islam. It begins with a brief outline of the West’s misconceptions of Islam; misconceptions heightened and reinforced by the recent war in the Gulf. It then discusses the theory of Islam. This section is entitled “Islam as a System of Life” and discusses the three main components of Islam. The first is the Aqueda, or the Oneness of Allah and its effect on the life of Muslims. The second is Ibadat, or the Way of Worship. We will define the meaning of Ibadat and focus on its four main principles – Sala, Seeyam, Zaka and Hajj. The third part of Islam is Mua’malat or Relationships. This is a very important part as it distinguishes Islam from other religions. It is the basis for social order and political behavior in the Islamic World which is significant in the context of this study. However, if the above discussion focuses on the theory of Islam we must also look at how Islam is practiced. Islam takes many forms throughout the world. To account for the deviations we will discuss what happened to Muslims during the Omaya, the Abasey and the Ottoman Caliphats. The break up of Islam in these periods is important in accounting for the variations today.

The differences throughout the Islamic world will be the final section of this chapter. These differences are important to any comparison we wish to make between the rise of Islamic movements in the Muslim World. This chapter then provides the necessary context if we are to examine the recent changes in Islamic countries, especially from the point of view of Islamic movements themselves. It will also interpret the slogan, that has been raised by the Islamic movements, “Islam is a System of Life “and how they see the practice of Islam today as different from the practice of it during the time of prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliph ^las.

I . Western Misconception of Islam

In this section we examine the image of Islam and the Muslim world in the west. Today given the globule dominant of the western media (see Boyd Barrett, 1974) the picture painted of Islam by the west is reproduced throughout the world. It even appears within the Muslim world. The west’s new of Islam has long historical out recedents which begin in the dark days of the middle Ages. This section traces the development of this new.

.1 . The Middle Ages:

For most of the Middle Ages (broadly from 476AD, the end of Roman Empire – to 1453AD, the end of the Hundred Years’ War) and during the early part of the Renaissance in Europe, Islam was believed to be an apostasy of Christianity, particularly the idea of the Oneness of God, which implied that Jesus was not God. During that time many wars (the Crusades of the 1 1th, 12th and 13th centuries) took place between Christendom and the Muslim world in the cause of religion. The image of Islam during that time was created by its opposition (the Christian states) as an enemy which could destroy what Christendom had built. The image of Islam was of a deformed mythical religion that “believes in thirty Gods, the biggest one of these Gods is Muhammad” (Alside, 1986: 28).

This image was drawn because, as Southern (1962: 4) believes, Western writers before 1 100 knew nothing about Islam as a religion. The picture painted of Islam was of violence, severity and harshness which became the common words used to describe Islam at that time. For example, Bede ^l, the great Biblical master of the early Middle Ages, as Southern (1962: 1) describes him, talked about Saracens ²who later became the Muslim Arabs – and explains that Saracens were descendants of Hagar³, the Egyptian wife of Abraham and the mother of Ishmail. In Christian symbolism, Ishmail and his descendants represented the Jews and later the Muslims. From the allegorical meaning of the events described in Genesis, Bede believed that Ishmail had been driven into the desert, that he was a wild man and was therefore outside the Covenant, which meant that his sons, Jews and Muslims, were similarly damned in Christian eyes. Southern says that

“Bede was the one who introduced this idea into the medieval tradition of biblical exegesis, and that after his day it was a commonplace of westem scholarship”(1962: 17).

1.2 During the Cursades:

The picture painted of Islam following the Crusades entered a new stage of hostility. “The West may not accept the doctrines of Buddhist or Hindu philosophy, but it will always preserve a balanced, reflective, attitude of mind with regard to those systems. As soon, however, as it turns towards Islam the balance is distributed and an emotional bias creeps in” (Asad, 1982; 49). This stage was a combination of military and civil conflict between two civilisations, the Islamic civilization and Christendom. The image of Islam at that time according to Juayt (1 980), was full of myths and suspicions such that Muslims were idolaters and Muhammad was a false prophet and sorcerer.

Colly (1928) described Muslims as a barbarian army descended from Muhammad and having no morals or laws. Southern (1962), refers to the writing of Nicholas of Casa⁴. In 1460 Nicholas wrote one of his most typical productions; the Cribratio Alchoran ⁵In this sieving of the Qur’an, he carried out in detail a systematic literary, historical, and philosophical examination. He dealt with the Qur’an essentially the same way he had portrayed Constantine’s treatment of the Donatists (a North African break-away Christian sect that refused to be subject to state authority – being already subject to the laws of Christianity), but at much greater length. He tried to break it into its various elements and discovered, or thought he had discovered that:

“that there were three strands in the Qur’an. The first, a basic Nestorian Christianity, second anti-Christian sentiments introduced by Jewish advisers of Muhammad and third, corruptions introduced by Jewish correctors after Muhammad’s death” (Southern, 1962; 93).

This is how Nicholas’ contemporaries viewed Islam. An image of fear tinged with spite. Islam, by this time had began to reach Eastern Europe. This negative image was reinforced in a time of war. It provided a logical justification for the conflict for European societies. This effectively concealed and devalued the Islamic civilization and cast Islam in the mould of a legitimate enemy of Church and state. Any questions about the enemy (who he was, what he believed) were dismissed by the propagandists. When one considers the duration of the conflicts (three centuries) you can see how far reaching Western propaganda had to be as to maintain the created image of the enemy in the public consciousness for so long. Riley-Smith described the effects of the Crusades on the western mentality;

“the Crusades dominated the thoughts and the feelings of Western Europeans between 1095 and 1400 so profoundly that there was scarcely a writer on contemporary affairs who did not at some point refer to one of them” (1977: 1 1)

Lamonte (1946) talks about the role of Pope Urban in starting the Crusade by saying:

“Urban’s speech was singularly provocative and persuasive; to the disgrace of Christendom infidel hands were polluting the Holy Sepulchre and the other sacred shrines of Palestine, these places must be restored to Christ; pilgrims to the East had been persecuted, the roads must be opened and kept free to them (a doctrine as appealing to that audience as the freedom of the seas is to us today); the cruel race of the Turks were perpetrating atrocities on the Oriental Christians (atrocities and outrageous incidents have never failed to stir men up to violence). Nor did Urban neglect the gains, temporal as well as spiritual, which accrued to the Crusader; salvation awaited those who gave their lives for the cause, the rich cities of the Promised Land would be the reward of those who lived to conquer them. The Pope did not mention the value to the papacy of a huge army marching under his orders or the effect which it would undoubtedly have on the Emperors to see the Pope so amply armed. He did not mention that the Church had suffered at the hands of the secular powers and that the Crusade would be a useful reminder to the empire that the servant of the servant of God could yet command” (Lamonte, 1946; 161).

Watt (1983: 5) also thinks that the Crusades (as is often the case with wars) brought a demand for fuller knowledge of Islam, its philosophy, its history, its accomplishments and its objectives, by various scholars. Although they had access to the Qur’an and other Muslim books, the image of Islam which they produced for Western Europe was a distorted one. He also believes that the scholars’ feeling of cultural superiority caused them to depict Islam as a religion which was inferior to Christianity. Watt gives us some examples of the points which helped to compose this distorted image of Islam during that time: Islamic doctrine contained many false assertions and deliberate perversions of the truth; Islam was the religion of violence that spread religion by the sword; it was a religion of self-indulgence, especially sexual; and Muhammad was morally weak and the author of a false religion, so he must be a tool or agent of the devil. In other words, “Islam was the enemy of Christianity, and Muhammad an agent of the Devil about whom absurd fables could be told” (Godfrey, 1980; 24).

Asad also describes this period. He says.

“For the first time history, Europe conceived itself as a unity and it was a unity against the World of Islam. Without indulging in undue exaggeration we can say that n)0dern Europe was born out of the spirit of the Crusades. Before that time there had been Anglo-Saxons and Germans, French and Normans, Italians and

Danes; but during the Crusades the new political concept of Christendom, a cause common to a// European nations alike (and by no means identical with the religious concept of Christianity) was created behind the new creation…./t was a tragic development, both from the viewpoint of the Christian Church and from that of Islam. Tragic for the Church, because it lost, after such a startling beginning, its ho/d over the minds of Europe and tragic for Islam, because it had to bear the fire of the Crusades in many forms and disguises, through long centuries afterwards” (Asad, 1982; 53).

At the end of the Crusades the balance of power had changed and the Ottoman Army was on the western coast of Europe. At that time the danger of

Islam was more pressing than ever before. The fear of Islam was noticed by Martin Luther⁶. He wrote a book and named it ‘Confutatio Alchoran ^tSouthern described what Luther wrote •

“He gave powerful expression to one well-established medieval tradition of thought, that of despair about the possibility of any politica/ or inte//ectua/ solution for the problem of Islam. Luther was persuaded that the Muslims could not be converted, they despised the Scriptures, they rejected argument, they clung to the tissue of lies of the Koran”.

Southern adds:

“He (Luther) looked forward to the probability that Christendom would be engulfed in Islam. He wrote to strengthen the faith of those Christians who might find themselves in this condition. The success of Turks and Saracens over many hundreds of years did not show that they enjoyed the favour of God. We must let the Turks and Saracens work their will, as men on whom the wrath of God has come, provided we stay in God’s grace and observe his word and sacraments”. (Southern, 1962: 105)

That was the general image of Islam developed throughout the Crusades and during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; full of myths and spite, motivated by fear, formed in the midst of conflict.

1.3 Orientalism .

The west rediscovered Islam in the nineteen century during the expansion of European influence throughout the world. Western orientalists studied the Muslim world and wrote about its political system, social order, economic importance and its religions. This period none as the Orientalism period. Orientalism as a term, has different meanings. From the position of the Orientalist,the academic definition is “anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient” is an Orientalists, and Orientalism is “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between the Orient and the Occident” (Said , 1978: 3).

For Said the term is not as straight forward as such a definition implies. He thinks it is more historically and materially to place Orienalism in its political and ideological context. He states.

“Taking the eighteenth century as a very roughly defined starting point, Orientalism can be discussed and analysed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it; in short, Orientalism as a western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient” (Said, 1978; 3).

For some Muslim writers’, Orientalism is related to two things: Christianization and Imperialism (Yaken, 1986). Tash (1989: 37) describes Orientalism as a stage that prepared the ground to establish military imperialism over the Muslim world. Zaczouq (1984: 27) explain that the main objective in the birth of Orientalism is to Christianized the Orient by studying its languages and culture .

“Formal Arabic studies in Europe had not only a late but an unfavourab/e start. Throughout the continent and in the British Isles they were conditioned by missionary activity and interests and by World politics. The Europeans as a rule wanted to study Islam either to convert its followers or to further imperialistic interests; Western chauvinism, religious zeal and sheer ignorance played their part. Long persistence of legends about Muhammad….hostile prejudice of Christians towards a rival and aggressive faith, and the unpleasant memories of the Crusades, reinforced by the ever present fears of the growing power of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, militated against an objective or dispassionate – not to say sympathetic – study of Islam” (Hitti, 1946; 9).

If we attempt to locate a time that signalled the start of studies in Orientalism, we find that there is no consensus among those who write about it. But, if we look to the studies themselves, we find that most of the books were written during the last three centuries, when the Muslim world, as a civilization, was going into a decline and European civilization was in renaissance. Orientalism was part of a Christianizing assault upon the Muslim world during the last three centuries. That may be the reason why most Orientalism studies were supported by the Churches and by the governments of the European countries

who were establishing colonies in the Orient (Al Gayhan, 1973). That may also be the reason why Muslim writers link Christianization, Orientalism and Imperialism.

Asad says:

“Orientalists have been guilty of an unscientific partiality in their writings on Islam. In their investigations it almost appears as if Islam could not be treated as a mere object of research, but as an accused standing before his judges… They select the evidence according to the conclusion that they apriori intend to reach…. They cut parts of the evidence of the available witnesses out of the context or interpret their statements in a spirit of unscientific malevolence, without attributing any weight to the presentation of the case by the other party, that is, the Muslims themselves” (Asad, 1982; 50).

The image of Islam developed by Orientalism served the objectives of the Churches and the European colonial governments. Khalidy and Faroukh (1 982: 24) believe that most of the Orientalists tried in their studies to promote Christian objectives. They drew a picture of the Orient in two ways: , on the one hand, the Orient had this false religion, “Islam”, and undeveloped environments, and on the other hand the Orient had advantages for European governments. As Burton (1978: 196) said “Egypt is a treasure to be won, it is the most tempting prize which the East holds out to the ambition of Europe, not excepted, even the Golden Horn”.

To conclude, we can say that the Orientalists studied the Orient historically, politically, geographically and economically from a European mentality and historically disfigured Islam. This occurred at a time when the Muslim world was in the weakest condition it had ever been in. Orientalism legitimated the extension of Europe’s ownership and influence into Muslim lands.

That is why most of the Orientalism became synonymous with European domination of the Orient. That domination over-ruled mere academic investigation into the Orient and turned the findings from those studies to the service of partisan interests. As Said said:

‘Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself viz-aviz the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kind of images, themes, motifs, in his text”. (Said, 1981 :20)

Orientalism provided academic and intellectual credibility to the negative image of Islam handed down from the earlier period.

1.4 The Image of Islam nowadays:

European imperialism in most of the Muslim world,ended with bloody revolution in some countries and peaceful change in others. However, the need for the resources of the Orient in particular the Middle East were still important to the West. The fear of a new intellectual revolution in the Muslim world, that would encourage a movement towards Islam as a fundamental political, social and economic system, also existed. This fear was not simply due to concern that the Muslim countries might cut off the flow of those resources, but also to the future threat of a reunited Muslim world

The structures that the contemporary image of Islam in the West are built on are need and fear. They are the two things that are apparent in the western media coverage of Islam. Today the media, more than any other element plays the key role in the construction of Western perceptions of Islam.

Several studies that have examined the image of the Arabs in the western newspapers or look at the Arab / Israeli conflicts in the Western media. These studies highlight Israeli policies in creating misconceptions of Islam and Arabs to gain the support of Western public opinion for Israel. Mutabakani (1989) and Said (1981) show that some American Foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller and Fibrite, which support Israel, have funded research that misrepresent the image of Islam in the West. Mutabakani (1989) gives examples of two American studies; Islam in Modern History by Smith funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and “The Muslim Brotherhood” by Metchel funded by the Rockefeller, Ford and Fibrite Foundations. These books represent Arabs as ignorance and uncivilised people.

Israel and the CIA according to Mutabakani (1989), funded the conference of “Islam and Politics in the Contemporary World ” which took place in Harvard

University and which took the Iranian revolution as an example of politics in Islam. In a study of propaganda against Islam in Le Monde newspaper and L’Express magazine of France, and the Economist of Britain, Rabia (1970) found different treatment of Israel and the Arabs in these publications. He found that Israel was represented as (western civilization) modern country which many of the values of the west, other Middle East countries were protrayed as full of beliefs and groups that the most backward civilizations .

Salim (1978), found that the wars of 1967 and 1973 played a major role in the creation of the image of Arabs as “cowardly” and Israelis as “intelligent” in the United States. Turkistani (1980) examined the coverage of social change in Saudi Arabia by three American news magazines between 1975-1980 in three news magazines: Times, Newsweek, and US News and World Reports. He found that their reporting was characterized by generalization, by western cultural misconceptions and by sentimental judgement. Most of the themes they focus on were negative: “harsh” Saudi Law (that cuts off the hand of thieves), oil in the hands of a backward people, Saudi women and their rights in their society. Another study by Awadallah (1985) looked at the representation of Arabs in the American press between 1 960-1 982. Awadallah accuses the American press of bias towards Israel. He found that Arabs, during the sixties, were synonymous with terrorism. However, this research also found more understanding of Arabs during the seventies, especially after the Camp David

These are some examples of how the press depicts Arabs in the West. Research indicates there is a misconception in the use of two terms, Islam and Arabs. The press usually uses ‘Arabs’ when they describe Islam and ‘Islam’ when any Arabs carries out some action against the West. This confusion of terms can disorientate their readers by showing Arabs as well as Muslims in the worst light. We will also find it again in television and in movies.

Studies of Arabs and Islam in western movies, such Ghareeb (1979), Shaheen (1979) and Bahjat (1988) conclude that the image of an Arab or a Muslim in western movies is of an overly sexual man, living in the desert with his camel or Rolls Royce, controlling the oil that makes him very rich, but still being uneducated, a coward, and a terrorist. On western television, the picture is almost the same. Shaheen (1 987) examined 1 00 American television programmes and dramas for his study and found again this picture of an Arab

as “uneducated”, a “coward”, a “terrorist”, very “rich” and “overly sexual”. If we take fiction in the West, we also find the same negative stereotyping, as set out above. Terry (1983) found that the image of Arab and Muslim societies in fiction was of a backward, greedy, sexual, evil and non-humanitarian people.

Thus, to conclude, the image of Islam in the West, from the Middle Ages until now, is distinguished by misconception and misunderstanding. It started in the Middle Ages with the Saracens, describing them and their Father Ishmail as wild people who were outside the Covenant. This image was introduced into the Medieval tradition of biblical exegesis and became a common-place of western scholarship.

During the Crusades the image of Islam was full of myths and animosity because of the danger of Islam as a military force that threatened to destroy the western civilization. The development of the feudal system, the modern concept of the nation state and European unity came about initially as a response to the incursion of a more advanced Islamic civilization. This seems to have been lost on western civilization. This ignorance can, to a large extent, be explained by the screen of propaganda erected (in the interests of the ruling ideologies and their representatives) to conceal Islamic society from Western public eyes.

The third development in the image of Islam in the West was Orientalism. These studies promoted a new image of Islam that helped the Church to protect Christianity and to support European colonialist governments. The Orient for them was a treasure which could be won by Europe because it contained backward societies which had a static and non-evolutionary religion named Islam.

In contemporary time, the negative portrayal of Islam has gone further . The need for resources and fear of the new intellectual revolution, led by the Islamic movements or Muslim fundamentalism, gave grounds for concerns that the Muslim world could unite again in one nation which could and threaten the West. These needs and fears motivated the western media to draw the image of Islam, or Arabs, as backward, uneducated, sexually over-active, greedy, terrorists and non-humanitarian people who control the most important resource in the world – oil.

2. Islam as a System of Life

At the beginning of this chapter we mentioned the reason for examining “Islam as a System of Life”. The term religion is not enough to describe Islam; it does not give a full picture of Islam as the term means the belief and the way of worship. In Islam these are only two of the three elements that Islam is built around. These elements are:

Aquedah, or Tawhid, which is the belief in Allah and in his Angels, Books (Qur’an, Bible, Towra), Prophets (Muhammad, Jesus, Moses, Ibraham) and in the hereafter.
Ibadat, which is the way of worship or the primary duties that a Muslim must discharge (if he believes in Tawhid) to be considered a Muslim. These duties are Sala, the daily prayer; Seeyam, fasting for the month of Ramadhan (the ninth month of the lunar year) ;Zaka, poor-due every year and Hajj, the making of a pilgrimage to Mecca once a lifetime
Mua’malat, which is the relationship within the community in the sense of:
1. Islamic social order:
1. Islamic political system.

This part, “Mua’malat”, is the one that distinguishes Islam from other religions. To understand Islamic social order we must focus on the relationships within the Muslim community and how Islam teaches us to develop a moral society.

This moral society that Islam wants, is based on an ideological framework which stresses the equality of mankind whatever their race, colour or language. Islam uses the family as the basic unit of society and provides a detailed structure for relationships within the family. Islam also provides rules for the Muslim community which protect individuals as well as families.

The Islamic political system is the second part of Mua’malat. Teachings identify the shape of the government and the way of selecting the President of State and the law that will be practised in the state, These three elements cannot be found in detail in any other religion as they can in Islam. The Islamic political system is based on four principles. The first is Tawhid which gives all the authority of making any law in the Muslim state to Allah. The second principle is that of prophethood. Since the prophet Muhammad is accepted as the legitimate messenger of Allah who brought Allah’s words to the people, this gives authority to the prophet’s interpretation of the Qur’an. The third principle is consultation. Consultation takes place between the Aalims (or learned men) in any matter that the Qur’an or prophet Muhammad did not mention. It is also an interpretation of the Islamic law. The last principle is Caliph’a or the presidency of the Muslim state. The Caliph’a is not only a politician but has a religious responsibility in his example in fasting and also plays a legal role regarding his knowledge of criminal law.

Our theoretical study of Islam wili answer the question, “What is islam?” It wili also show the fundamental aims that the Islamic movements want to see practised in the Muslim world. What Islam is, from the Muslim point of view, will be discussed. This study will seek to clarify the difference between Islam in theory and Islam in practice. We are going to start with the three elements of Islam, Aquedah, Ibadat and Mua’malat,with the focus on the Islamic political system and Islamic social order.

Islamic Concept of Religion

Every religion nowadays, either derives its name from its founder such as Christianity or Buddhism or by using the community’s or the nation’s name such as the Jews, who took their name from the tribe of Judah. But not so with Islam. Islam is an attributive title. Whosoever or whatsoever possesses this attribute whatever race, community or country, js Muslim.

The Arabic word “Islam” means peaceful submission and a Muslim is one who resigns or submits to the will of Allah. These meanings are a good start to our attempt to clarify the concept of religion in Islam.

In the Qur’an, Allah said “The command is with God” (Qur’an ;40: 12)and and “Is it not his to create and to govern” (Qur’an ; 7. 54). From these two verses we find that Islam asked its followers to submit to the will of their Lord because he is the creator and he is the only one who has the right to govern or make their

laws. This understanding takes us to the first element of the Islamic concept of religion – Tawhid.

2.1. Aquedah or Tawhid:

Tawhid refers to the awareness of Allah and it is the most important element of Islamic belief. It is the basic element that other elements build on.

There is a whole chapter, Surah, in the Qur’an expressing the meaning of Tawhid (Surah number 1 12). which says, “Say, he is Allah, the One. Allah is Eternal and Absolute. None is born of him, nor is he born. And there is none like him”. This Surah implies, for Muslims, that everything on this earth is from the One and the only creator – Allah. He is also the sustainer of the universe and the sole source of its guidance. It also explains that Islam as a religion stands for complete submission and obedience to Allah because legal sovereignty is totally owed to Allah. “The command js with God” (Qur’an 40: 12) and he only has the power of creation, thus he and only he has the right to define the correct roles for those whom he created. “Is it not his to create and to govern” (Qur’an 7: 54) Tawhid means a relationship with the One that excludes a similar relationship with anyone else. By that the Islamic Aquedah or Tawhid defines what is God’s position and it also defines the position of men in the universe. Allah is the creator, the sovereign, and man is his viceregent on the earth. This understanding according to Ahmad (1979) exalts man to the noble and dignified position of being God’s deputy on earth and endows his life with a lofty purpose; to fulfil the Will of God on earth”. “Follow (O men!) the revelation given unto you from your lord and follow not, as friends or protectors, other than him” (Qur’an;7: 13) If a Muslim believes in the Oneness of God, this verse makes it known to him that he must follow the law of Allah and no other laws. This is a very important point in the understanding of the Islamic concept of religion. It simply means that God alone has the jurisdiction to make the law.

This is the key concept of Tawhid, it is not enough to believe that God is One but it leads into the belief of obedience to that God. But what if any Muslim believes in God and does not obey his law?

“But none by thy Lord, they can have no [real] faith until they make thee judge in all disputes between them and find in their souls no resistance against thy decisions, but accept them with the fullest conviction” (Qur’an; 4: 65.) This verse answers that question. The Islamic concept is very clear on this point. Belief in Allah must include obedience in every part of a Muslim’s life.

Some Muslim scholars believe that all the lapses that have occurred in Muslim history, did so because of the mispractising or the misunderstanding of Tawhid. Dr Sjddiqi has said:

“That is why, a student of history who is out to discover the causes of the decline of the Muslims – the causes of their loss of political power, of their economic, backwardness, intellectual stagnation, and social degeneration – will always find this to be a lapse from Tawhid” (Siddiqi, 1981: 17).

This understanding encourages Islamic movements to make Tawhid the essence of Islamic civilization, and to make it the key concept of the Islamic transformation of individuals as well as societies in the Muslim world. This understanding gives Muslims a solid belief in freedom from any bondage to any human. It places them under no obligation to submit to any authority or to be committed to another’s will, whoever that may be. Dr Siddiqi expresses this idea when he states,

“man must be fully conscious of this essential freedom and independence before he can enter into the relationship with Allah required of him by his own nature and consciousness” (Siddiqi, 1981: 18).

In conclusion, Tawhid, in the Islamic conception, is not a knowledge or a doctrine that can be studied, but it is a belief in the Oneness of God, who created the universe, and Oneness of obedience to him, to his law, and to his will. This obedience applies not only to the way of worship but also to the political, economic, social and all other aspects of a Muslim’s life. It is indeed, for Muslims, a basic system that should guide their everyday lives.

The Effects of Tawhid on Muslim Life

After outlining the meaning of Tawhid and its role as a key element in the

Islamic concept of religion, we must now look to how Tawhid influences the life of a Muslim. But before we start to discuss the effects of Tawhid on Muslim life, it is important to remember two things (Cardawi, 1981):

Tawhid is faith in the unity of God, as the Lord of the universe and the only creator of everything. It also includes that he has supreme power over the giving of life and the taking in death, origination and destruction, giving Paradise or Hell, to whom he wants.
Tawhid means full submission, surrender, and obedience in every single matter, in Muslim life to win the blessing of Allah.

The effects of Tawhid on Muslim life are:

Tawhid is the key to heaven. It means for any Muslim that he cannot go to heaven without truly believing in the Oneness of Allah.
Tawhid stresses that the purpose of a Muslim’s life is to obey God. The result of this Obedience will be entry to heaven. Obedience is not only in the form of worship, but in social, political, economic and every other part of his life.

-. Tawhid clarifies for Muslims to whom they belong. It tells Muslims that

“They belong to the creator of the heavens and the earth, the master of the East and the West and the sustainer of the entire universe. After this belief a Muslim does not regard anything in the world as strange to himself. He looks upon everything in the universe as belonging to the same Lord whom he, himself, belongs to” (Maududi, 1989: 74).

This belonging gives him the strength and the ability to stand against any idea or strength to remove him from his belief. It also makes him deny any social or political or economic notions that could take him away from what he has in Islam.

The world, according to Islam, is a place of trial and all people are judged in it according to Cardawi( 1981). They will have to give account of all that they have done herein. Life on the earth, one day, will come to an end, and after that a new world will be resurrected. It will be in this life-after-death that man will be

rewarded or punished for his deeds and misdeeds. Those who live in the present world, in a life of obedience to the Lord, will enjoy eternal bliss in the hereafter and those who disobey his commands, will have to garner the bitter fruits of their disobedience (Ahmad, 1979). This effect could be the interpretation of why some Muslims choose to die in the cause of Allah when they go to war. It is for the transformation from a short earthly life to the real eternal life and, of course, because of the promise that Allah gave to all Muslims that anyone killed in his cause, will achieve Paradise.

Tawhid confirms to Muslims the limits of moderation and decency within the community. Prophet Muhammad said:

“A Muslim who lives in the midst of society and bears with patience the afflictions that come to him, is better than the one who shuns society and cannot bear any wrong done to him.” (Al Byanouni;1991: 164 ).

This makes Muslims believe that Islam stands for the middle path and the goal of producing moral people intent on creating a moral society through a belief in the objective and practice of justice.

Belief in the Oneness of Allah, produces in the Muslim the highest degree of self-respect and self-esteem. This is established when he believes that Allah alone is the possessor of all power, and that none besides him can benefit or harm a person, provide for his need, give and take away life, or wield authority or influence. This conviction makes him indifferent to, and independent and fearless of, all powers other than those of God. This belief makes him interpret the phenomenon of life as a benefit or a burden for him or humanity from the Lord.
Tawhid makes a Muslim believe that he cannot succeed in his life unless he is guided by the doctrine of God. It also creates in him the consciousness that unless he lives rightly and acts justly and worships God faithfully, he cannot succeed in his life.
This belief produces in a Muslim a strong confirmation that he has the support and backing of God when he fulfils any divine commands in political or social life.
There are five articles of faith which make up the bedrock of Tawhid in the Islamic conception. These articles show the common belief within the divine messages of Islam. Belief in them makes anyone a Muslim.

These articles according to Al Othimeen (1984) are:

Belief in one God who has absolutely no association with him in his divinity.
1. Belief in God’s Angels as they are mentioned in the Qur’an or by the Prophet Muhammad.
1. Belief in all God’s books, the Qur’an, the Bible and the Towra, and in the Qur’an as God’s last book.
1. Belief in all God’s prophets mentioned in the Qur’an, or by Prophet Muhammad, and in Prophet Muhammad as God’s last Messenger.
1. Belief in life after death. These factors differentiate Muslims from nonMuslims; not merely others of the Judaic religions but from others who do not worship God. Muslims are the recipients of God’s book, the Qur’an, sent to them by God via His prophets.

In summary, Tawhid is faith in the Unity of God as the Lord of the Universe that has the supreme power of life and death, origination and destruction, though Tawhid for a Muslim is submission, surrender and obedience to Allah’s rules to get the blessing of Allah.

2.2.Ibadat (the way of worship)

When we talk about Tawhid we understand that obedience to Allah’s will is the main part of the belief in Allah’s Oneness. This means that a Muslim’s duty in this life is to obey and to submit to Allah’s will, so he can go to Heaven. This life is a place of trial and man is being judged in it. As a result a Muslim has to work hard in this life and practise Allah’s will in every matter so there will be a reward in the hereafter for his good deeds. But, how can a Muslim know Allah’s will, so he may follow it?

Prophet Muhammad said :

“l left among you, that which if you hold it in your possession practice – you will never be misguided; the book of Allah – the Qur’an – and my traditional teaching”. (Al Byanouni: 1991:135).

So the means of knowing the will of Allah is through the Qur’an and the traditional teaching of prophet Muhammad. It means that a Muslim must look to the orders of Allah and prophet Muhammad as legitimate orders and practise them and, in the meantime he must look to the prohibitions that Allah and prophet Muhammad laid down.

What we have just said may clarify the meahing of Ibadat which Maududi (1 989: 99) defines as “the primary duties which must be observed by each and every person professing to belong to the Muslim community”. The primary duties of Islam are:

Sala (Prayer)
Seeyam (Fasting)
Zaka (Poor-due)
Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca).

These are the four main principles of Ibadat and makes anyone who practises them, and believes in Tawhid, a Muslim. They are not all the principles of Ibadat because the Arabic word Ibadat means ‘submission’. For a Muslim it means that he is the slave or the servant and Allah is the master. Therefore, whatever a Muslim does in obedience to and for the pleasure of Allah, is Ibadat. Thus it is more correct to define Ibadat, as doing anything to satisfy the pleasure of Allah. The Islamic concept of Ibadat is very wide. If a Muslim frees his speech from filth, falsehood, malice and abuse and speaks the truth and does all these only because Allah has so ordained him to do, they constitute Ibadat no matter how secular they may appear. Additionally, if the Muslim obeys the law of Allah to the letter and spirit in commercial and economic affairs and abides by it in dealings with parents, relatives, friends and all those who

come into contact with him, all these activities are Ibadat. Helping the poor and giving food to the hungry to seek the pleasure of Allah, are Ibadat. In short, as Maududi (1989) notes, all activities of the Muslim throughout his entire life are Ibadat if they are in accordance with the law of Allah and if the Muslim’s heart is filled with fear of Allah.

However, there are four main principles of Ibadat. If we examine them we find some of them are to be done daily, some once a year and the last at least once in the lifetime of a Muslim. Let us discuss these in more detail.

Sala (Prayer)

Prayer in the Islamic conception is the most important obligation of Ibadat. Sala for a Muslim is a daily contact with his Lord according to Al Shami (1976). Five times a day he thanks his lord: firstly, when the sun rises to give light to the earth he prays; and in the middle of the day when he feels the heat of the sun and seeks for a shadow to eat he remembers his Lord and prays; when he finishes his work in the afternoon and feels exhausted he prays to his Lord before taking a rest; when the sun sets and darkness comes to cover every place, a Muslim makes his fourth prayer, and before he goes to sleep he makes his final prayer, four Raka’as, thanking his Lord for what he has done this day. The obediences and enfolded quality of human existence in the whole of creation, according to Al Shami (1976) acknowledged in this process of prayer, reveals the fundamental Oneness of God and the relationship of the ordinary Muslim with God in that creation. This is the spiritual content of prayer experienced by all Muslims. Maududi (1989) highlights how the daily prayers strengthen the foundations of a Muslim’s faith, prepare him for the observance of a life of virtue and obedience to Allah and refresh that belief from which springs courage, sincerity, purposefulness, purity of heart, advancement of the soul, and enrichment of morals.

Sala and evety other Ibadat must be done in a certain way to be accepted by Allah. That is what prophet Muhammad taught. Muslims must say their prayers according to the instructions of prophet Muhammad. But these five prayers are not the only prayers . They are “Farthe”, an ordinance, of the minimum duty which must be done a day. A Muslim may pray as much as he chooses.

On Friday there is a Jumah prayer instead of Zuhour prayer. It is done after a speech by the Imam. The Friday Speech gains its name from the day on which it is done. Friday in Arabic means gathering of people. Friday’s Sala is a festival for Muslims to gather and listen to a speech about their aims in this life and about what is waiting for them in the hereafter. The Imams also speak about the Islamic view of politics, of social and economic problems that face their communities or any Muslim country or the Muslim world. This importance of Friday prayer gives the Mosques a role that no other religious church or temple has. It makes them an authority for all their problems whether they are political or social or economic. Every Muslim male must attend this prayer, which indicates the importance of Friday prayer in the formation of the community’s opinion .

Finally, prayer, for any Muslim, is a communication between him and his Lord. It is not a one-way communication but a two-way communication. From the servant seeking the approval, the pleasure and the guidance of the Lord and then from the Lord, the granting of the approval and guidance that a Muslim feels during his prayer. This feeling assures him that his lord accepts his deeds and makes him feel that God loves him. Sala, for Muslims, is a training course taken every day to develop, as Prophet Muhammad said, a perfect Muslim.

Seeyam (Fasting)

In the month of Ramadhan (the ninth month of the lunar year) Muslims fast. They do not eat or drink or have sex from sunrise until sunset or from Fajor prayer until Magrib prayer (Al Bare ; 1987). Such abstinence is a practice of obedience to the will of Allah (Ibn Baz, 1980). Every Ramadhan, Muslims suppress their passions and desires to proclaim the supremacy of Allah’s law upon their appetites for the pleasures of food and the libido (Hanef, 1979).

Fasting is another sign of Muslim unity. As they unite every week for Friday prayer, they also unite every year to fast in the same month. This time of Ramadhan is a combination of Sala and Seeyam, of prayer and fasting. In Seeyam a Muslim feels that he is joining with all Muslims, all over the world, in a spiritual act that increases his sense of community and brotherhood.

Zaka (Poor-due)

Every Muslim whose financial condition is above a certain specified minimum, must pay every year a percentage of his cash balance, gold, silver, merchandise, cattle and other valuables. The Zaka according to the Qur’an must be paid to specific recipients. These recipients are poor, needy, converts, people who are not free but in prison, debtors, wayfarers and travellers who have lost their money and any other means that pleases Allah (Al Salous, 1988).

The idea of Zaka in the Islamic conception neither approves of the hoarding or unlimited accumulation of capital, nor of equalizing everyone financially, because both of them are unjust. It is for the rich to look after their poor brothers and sisters, and to make the Muslim community fully responsible for the livelihood of all its members. In fact Zaka’s fundamental importance according to Maududi (1 989) lies in the fact that it fosters in Muslims the qualities associated with sacrifice and rids them of selfishness and the desire for wealth

Hajj (Pilgrimage to Mecca)

Once in a lifetime a Muslim must make a pilgrimage to Mecca. Mecca for Muslims is the center or the symbol of their unity. They face Ka^raba which is a small house in Mecca built by the prophet Abraham for the worship of Allah. Facing toward this five times a day is one of the symbols of unity among Muslims. The other symbol of unity is Hajj. From all over the world at a specific time each year, Muslims come to Mecca to worship their lord in a particular way; moving from one stage of worship to another together, wearing identical clothes and staying in tents for three nights, (Habohm ; 1 986)

Hajj indeed is the most important of all Ibadat. The other three can be done where people live but, for Hajj, Muslims must travel to Mecca in order to worship their Lord.

In summary, Ibadat is the willing submission to the injunctions of Allah as transmitted to the believers via prophet Muhammad. Any form of obedience to the lord will be categorized as a part of Ibadat and these four principles are the minimum that Muslims must do every day or every year or during their lifetimes.

2.3.Mua’malat (relationship, treatment)

Mua’malat, as part of the Islamic conception of life, has two major elements. The first concerns the Islamic social order and the second, the Islamic political system. In order to discover the internal logic of the various movements within Islam it is necessary to understand the environment within which they flourish; to reveal their hopes and aspirations and to what extent these may conflict with other aspects of society. The discovery of the interconnecting religious and social rules of Islam also reveals the bases for the justification of divergent views – whether that divergence be between different societies or different movements within the same society.

Having clarified the relationship between the Muslim and Allah (in Tawhid and Ibadat) it is necessary to uncover the relationship of the individual in Islam with the community. The Islamic social order deals with relationships within the Muslim community.

Islam tries to build an ideal and moral society that believes in mankind’s equality in rights and duties as well as in rewards and punishment. At the center of Islamic belief is the family. It is the basic unit of the society and that is why Islamic law is full of references to the institution of the family. Islam also protects individuals and families by providing rules on social interaction for the community as a whole

The second element of Mua’amalat is the Islamic political system. There are four principles that together constitute the Islamic political system. The first is Tawhid, and by this principle Muslims believe that only Allah has the right to make the laws for them. Muslims also believe that prophet Muhammad interpreted and practised the law that Allah made. As a result of the latter prophethood became the second principle of the Islamic political system. The third principle is consultation. This principle embodies the method of choosing the Caliph’a and the way of representing the citizens of the state in any type of parliament or Majless. The fourth principle of the Islamic political system is Caliph ^la . In this principle the Islamic focus is on the importance of the position of the Caliph’a from political and religious points of view.

Now, we are going to focus in more detail on the two elements that together build the Islamic conception of Mua’malat.

The Islamic Social Order

Islam as a religion has its own culture and social order. This culture or social order does not belong exclusively to Arabs or Turks despite their leading role in the historical development of the Muslim world. The Islamic social order also is not peculiar to the Orient, it is for anyone who believes in the Oneness of Allah and follows his commands.

“Islam built a perfectly integrated society, first by reforming family life, and then by extending the health within this constitutive unity to the life of the whole society” (Qutop, 1977: 7).

To understand the Islamic social order it is necessary to examine three concepts which together make the ideal society foreseen by Islam. First, we will study the role of the individual, then the institution of the family and finally the community behaviour from the point of view of Islam.

Equality of the individual:

Belief in the equality of status of all human beings is, according to (Audah ; 1982)one of the fundamental principles of the Islamic social order . Muslims believe that Allah created Adam and Eve. They had their sons and daughters and after hundreds and then thousands of years, we come to this life as a generation that belongs to the old father, Adam, and the old mother ,Eve, Faruqi (1980) notes that this historic fact declares that every human being is equal in status to every other human being whatever the race, colour or language.

Affirming the fundamental equality of all people, Islam introduces the condition that if there is any difference between individuals it will only be on the basis of belief. People do not choose their race, colour, mother tongue, cultural order or religion into which they are born. These are predetermined on the basis of parentage. Some of these factors can be altered later in life by choice. Islam does not differentiate (and therefore does not rank in order of race, colour or language) between people on the existential level. It does however make a distinction as regards religion, as this is a matter of choice. Therefore, the difference between people is one of belief. This identification of difference is not only between a Muslim and a non-Muslim but also between individual Muslims. The difference concerning the latter is one between the quality and practice of the belief. On the other hand, Islam guarantees religious freedom. Djermakoye says:

“Religious freedom is one of the most important aspects of Islam…this fact showed forth itself in the most striking manner, when the Muslims entered Jerusalem, and a pact was signed by the Caliph Omer with the Catholic Patriararch of Jerusalem, StSophronius. By this famous agreement, the Caliph granted the Christians security for their lives, their property, their churches and crosses” (1980: 9).

Islam seeks to build a society which stands in contrast to the racial, national and regional societies existing in the world. The basis of co-operative effort among men in such a society, is according to Maududi (1984), a creed and a moral principle There are no high or low people in Muslim society. All of them stand in the same line when they pray, fast at the same time in Ramadhan and wear the same clothes when they go to Hajj. None in the Muslim society will have more or less rights than any other because of his skin or race.

“Physical traits, cultural traditions, dress, food, customs and habits are subordinate or subsidiary to the main doctrinal identity, that God created differences in people in order to facilitate recognition, that the true identity is determined by the manner in which a person or group of any race, colour or physical type approaches the business of living, use his faculties, selects ends and means for worldly endeavours, and soon” (Abedin, 1980: 24).

The moral basis of society is laid down by rules for personal behaviour that come from Allah as detailed in the Qur’an. Muslims are expected to live by these rules. Some of these rules are :

The sexual relationship between a man and a woman in the Muslim society must be bound in a solid relationship through the sacred contract of marriage. Sex before or without marriage is a sin in Islam. “Nor come nigh to adultery: for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road to other evils” (Qur’an ; 17: 32).
Spending money is a right of every one in Muslim society. But how money is spent is subject to the teaching of Allah. “Make not thy hand tied (like a niggard’s) to thy neck, nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach, so that thou become blameworthy and destitute” (Qur’an ; 17: 29).
Muslims should not to be haughty. Islam urges its followers, “Nor walk on the earth with insolence: for thou cants not rend the earth asunder, nor reach the mountains in height” (Qur’an ; 17: 37).
Suspicion is also a sin in Islam if it grows into hatred for neighbours or friends. “O ye who believe, avoid suspicion as much (as possible): for suspicion in some cases is a sin, and spy not on each other, nor speak ill of each other behind their backs”. (Qur’an ; 49: 12).
Hejab or veil is one of the characteristics known to be at the heart of the Muslim moral code. Muslim women are told by Allah to cast their outer garments over their person when they go out of the house (Maududi, 1976). The reason for Hejab is to avoid molestation that can happen to women when they are overdressed. “Prophet tell thy wives and daughters and the believing women they should cast their outer garments over their persons (when abroad) that is most convenient, that they should be known (as such) and not molested”. (Qur’an ; 33: 59).

These are some examples of the Islamic conception of a moral society that believes in the equality of all its members and has a code of personal behaviour for everyone in the society. This moral society combines the belief and its practice in daily life.

The Islamic Family :

The family in Islam is seen as the basic unit of society according to (Hamid ; 1989). “O mankind, be mindful of your duty to your Lord who created you from a single soul and from it created its mate and from the two, created many men and women” (Qur’an ; 4: 1). Islam lays stress on family in playing a major role in society. Sait describes the family in Islam by saying:

ⁿThe family is the nucleus of the social structure of Islam. It is the cornerstone of the social edifice erected by Islam. It is the last

line of defence against exotic influences and undermining forces which are working to destroy the Islamic way of life. No wonder Islam pays extraordinary attention to this institution” (Sait;1980: 110).

Hamid (1989: 70) distinguishes Islamic societies from liberal societies, on the basis that in the latter individuals are regarded as the basic unit of the society. The idea that the individual is considered free to live his or her own life. On the other hand, there are other social experiments where individuals count for little and the need of the community or state takes precedence. This means that the children become a social industry, But in Islam, the need to preserve the family as the basic unit of society, results in Islamic law safeguarding the institution of the family. That may be the reason why adultery and fornication are strictly prohibited and punished severely. Maududi (1989) believes that, according to Islam, the correct form of relationship between man and woman is marriage; that is the one in which full social responsibilities are undertaken by them and which results in the emergence of a family. Free sex is not condoned by Islam as an ordinary transgression. Rather it strikes the roots of human society. Hence, Islam holds every form of extra-marital sex relationship as a sin that is punishable under the criminal law .

On the other hand, Islam instructs Muslims to behave faithfully to their wives, husbands, children and parents (Qutop, 1978).

“The Lord hath decreed that ye worship none but him, and that ye be kind to parents, whether one or both of them attain o/d age in thy life, say not to them a word of contempt, nor repel them, but address them in terms of honour, and lower to them the wing of

humility, and say: my Lord, bestow on them thy mercy even as they cherished me in childhood” (Qur’an ; 17: 23).

In the meantime Islam asks parents to cherish their children and educate them. Islam also asks the poor who, during the time of prophet Muhammad, killed their children, fearing that they may be unable to feed them, not to do so because Allah shall provide sustenance for them. “Kill not your children for fear of want: we shall provide sustenance for them as well as for you” (Qur’an ; 17: 31).

The relationship between a man and his wife in the Qur’an is described as a love and mercy relationship (Qutop, 1978): “And among his sign in this, that he created for you mates from among yourselves, that ye may dwell in tranquillity with them and he has put love and mercy between your (hearts)” (Qur’an ; 30: 21).

In summary, we find that in terms of the individual behaviour of a Muslim there should be no sex before marriage and a balance in spending money. Humility is one of the aims and everyone must avoid suspicion and not spy on his brothers or sisters. The Hejab, or veil, worn by Muslim women is a sign of a Muslim woman. The family’s behaviour is one that is full of love and mercy that will not allow parents to kill their children for fear of want. Respect for parents is also indicative of the Muslim way of family life.

Islamic Community Behaviour:

As a result of what Islam expects, of the individual and the family, we find a community that is conceived differently from other communities (Audah, 1982). Islam outlines a way of life based on Tawhid and good deeds:

“Faith is not merely a proclamation of belief in the reality of God and the truth of His messenger Muhammad (Peace be on Him), but also the putting of our beliefs into practice by fulfilling our obligation both to God and to man. Clearly one’s obligation to his Creator and Sustainer ought to take precedence over all other obligations” (Islamic Correspondence Course, 1974: 3).

To ensure that these obligations on the individual and family are obeyed, Islam lays down punishments.

We mentioned before that no sex before marriage is allowed but what if it happened? The Qur’an answers: “The woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication, flog each of them with a hundred stripes, let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by God, if you believe in God and the last day, and let a party of believers witness their punishment” (Qur’an ; 24:2). This verse shows us the punishment for adultery but it also stresses that a party of Muslims must witness the punishment. The Islamic punishment law in all its elements asks judges to ensure the punishment is in public. Its philosophy in making it public is to set an example to the evil-minded to prevent them from doing it again.
In another verse, the Qur’an ta!ks about men or women who bear false witness against chaste women (without supporting witnesses) in order that those women should be punished. “And those who launch a charge against chaste women, and produce not four witnesses (to support their allegation) flog them with eighty stripes and reject their evidence ever after” (Qur’an ; 24: 4).
Hejab is for Muslim females and for males to avoid looking at women. Islam asked Muslim males to lower their gaze and guard their modesty. By that, each one, male or female, has to avoid attracting attention that may lead to relationships that Islam asks his followers not to enter into. “Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty: that will make for greater purity for them” (Qur’an ; 24: 30).
In economics, Islam does not accept capitalism because it has divided societies into two groups: a minority, who are very rich, and a majority who live poorly: “So that this wealth should not become confined only to the rich amongst you” (Qur’an ; 59: 7). Islam also does not accept the idea that everyone must have as much money as each other (Shafi, 1975). That is why the Zaka is a duty of every Muslim who reaches that limit of income beyond which payment is due. Islam also asks and strongly encourages people to give charity to the poor and the needy.

On the other hand, Islam forbids usury and describes it as an evil act. Muslims are asked to be patient if a debtor is in difficulty (Cadiri, 1986). “Those who devour will not stand except as standing on whom the evil one by his touch has driven him to madness. That is because they say trade is like usury, but God hath permitted trade and forbidden usury” (Qur’an ; 2: 275) and in another verse (2: 279) Aliah said ‘If a debtor is in difficulty grant him time until it is easy for him to repay”. This verse may clarify the mercy that Islam tries to build in when dealing with money. But when it comes to the community structure, as in crime or adultery, Islam punishes law breaking very sternly. For example, when it comes to crime Islam deals with criminals harshly, so as to deter people from doing it again. It is also to discourage (by making a public example of criminals) other from falling into the same errors of behaviour.

The equality of justice is one of the basic foundation of Islamic law. This equality makes the Islamic law totally different from any other law. For example, if a man kills a man, according to the Islamic law he must be killed and not take a life sentence in prison as many laws judge. Also, if a person gouges out a person’s eye, his punishment could go to the same level of retaliation by gouging his eye because of the need for equality of justice. “We ordain therein for them: life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth and wound equal for equal. But if one remits the retaliation by way of charity it is an act of atonement for himself” (Qur’an ; 5: 257).
Thieving is one of the things that Islam deals with very harshly. According to Islam, the thief who steals anything from a fortified place must have his hand cut off (Cadiri, 1986). “As to thieves, male or female, cut off his or her hands, a punishment by way of example, for God for their crime” (Qurⁱan ; 5: 90).
When two people or groups quarrel, Islam asks other Muslims to take their responsibility and make peace between them. It is the duty of a Muslim to make peace between a man and his wife, one friend and another, and any person or persons and another or other parties. As a result, the Muslim community should act more collectively than any other community. “If two parties among the believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them, but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies, then make peace between them with justice” (Qur’an ; 49: 9).

In summary, Islamic social order believes in equality of rights as well as punishment. The idea of equality in Islamic law makes the punishment fit the crime. In the meantime, Islam asks its followers to avoid punishment by making peace between any groups or individuals. Islam also avoids theft by asking its followers to pay Zaka and to give charity.

In the social structure of the Muslim community, Islam uses the family as the first basis of the society. That is why the Islamic law (Shari ^ta) is full of chapters that discuss the family’s structure and how it is built. As a result, divorce is the final step after all other attempts have been made to save a marriage. At this point, the law also states who should take care of the children.

This brief description of the Islamic social order may clarify why some writers, such as Maududi (1 989), like to describe the Muslim society as an ideal society that can be built any time anywhere. Elements of this social order, such as Hejab, or not drinking alcohol, or separation between males and females, make Muslims who live in a non-Muslim country appear as a society within a society.

The Islamic Political System

The political system of Islam is based on four principles. These four principles are:

Tawhid (the Oneness of Allah)

Tawhid as we noted earlier, is not only a theoretical belief in Allah, but the belief in the Oneness of Allah. This means that it is he and only he, who has the right to make laws for those whom he created. It is important to clarify that Tawhid is the first pillar of the Islamic political system. Every aspect of the political system in the Islamic state must be authorised by Allah, (Islahi, 1983). As Nadwi says:

“The role of the prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, and the message which he communicated to mankind was revolutionary; it brought about a radical transformation in society. Man was freed from slavery to innumerable nameless and arbitrary forces into the Service of One God” (Nadwi, 1983; 93).

In other words no one has the right to make laws or to refuse to practise Allah’s laws Practising Shari’a in the Muslim state is the first aim of the government in that state. This verse helps to clarify this : “(They are) those who if we establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong. With God rests the end (and decision) of all affairs” (Qur’an ; 22: 41). Those who obtain the power to rule the Islamic state must, first of all, establish prayers as a symbol of every individual kind of worship, collect and give charity as a symbol of building a fair society, and enjoin the rights and forbid wrongs as a symbol of justice.

It is difficult for a non-Muslim to understand the political system in the Islamic state (one that practises Islam) without understanding Tawhid. Tawhid explains to Muslims that the objective of their creation is to worship Allah in every single matter of their life. That is why many writers, like Maududi (1984) and Mortimer (1982), call Islam a state religion. For Islam, from the beginning, God gave his lawful project to Muslims to be their statute in their state.

In conclusion, if the government of a Muslim state chooses another political system other than the Islamic political system to rule its Muslim citizens, this government, from Tawhid’s point of view, will be considered a non-Islamic government even though its members are Muslims. Some Muslim governments that practise parts of the Islamic law and ignore other parts are also considered to be not fully Islamic governments.

“The unity of God altogether negates the concept of the legal and political sovereignty of human beings, individually or collectively. God alone is the sovereign and his commandments are the law of Islam ” (Maududi ; 1984: 37).

Prophethood (Risala)

When prophet Muhammad left Mecca and went to Medina his first aim was to establish an Islamic state in Medina . This small state, within ten years, before prophet Muhammad died, had spread from Yemen, in the south, to the north of Saudi Arabia and from the Red Sea, in the west, to the Persian Gulf in the east. This historic fact tells us two things: firstly, the belief and the state were inseparable and complimentary. Secondly, the combination of the belief and the state gave Islam, in the form of the state and the religion, the ability to spread within ten years to this large size. Most of this land joined the Islamic state when its people became Muslims.

Prophethood for Muslims is the interpretation and exemplification of the Qur’an. The Prophets’ life deeds, speeches. and his approval of any system or custom. must be taken as equal to Qur’an. Because prophet Muhammad has, “In accordance with the intention of the Divine Book, set up for us a model of the system of life in Islam by practically implementing the law and providing necessary details where required” (Maududi 1984: 37).

Understanding the prophet Muhammad’s life in Medina, the way he governed his state and how he made conventions with the Jews in Medina are the main

source of the development of the Islamic political system. In the main there is no difference between commandments of the Qur’an and the authoritative interpretation of the Qur’an by prophet Muhammad. The two elements according to Islamic terminology are called Shari ^ta (Maududi 1984)

Consultation (Shor ^la)

The third principle of the Islamic political system is Shor’a. Allah said “Who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation” (Qur’an ; 42: 38). This verse describes the Muslim community as “a consulting community”. Consultation in Islam, is not democracy. The difference comes in the making or establishing of the laws. In the democratic system members of the parliament have the authority to make or change any law. In the Islamic political system consultation refers to any matter that the Qur’an or prophet Muhammad did not mention or for an interpretation of the law from the Qur’an or to the tradition of prophet Muhammad. But for other laws, mentioned in the Qur’an or by prophet Muhammad, there is no authority to change or to stop practising them. Authority to change the law is the main difference between the democratic system and the Islamic (political) system. For Muslims, the authority to make as well as change the law is for Allah alone.

In another verse, Allah orders his prophet to consult his companions “and consult them in affairs (of moment)” (Qur’an 3: 159). The order thus given to prophet Muhammad enables any Islamic government to make any type of consultation. Consultation is one of the citizens’ rights that must exist in the Islamic state.

There is however no special form that the Islamic government must take to represent its citizens in the parliament or Majless. Citizens could choose the type of parliament they want and how many members will be in the parliament. The citizens also have the right to list the qualifications expected from the members of the parliament. The main qualification is that a member must, according to prophet Muhammad, practise the basic teaches of Islam in his daily life.

Consultation is also a symbol of unity within the Muslim society (Al Nafisi, 1982). It is also focuses on the way of choosing the Caliph’a, the head of the state, and what qualification he must have.

Caliph’a (the president of the Islamic state)

This fourth principle in the Islamic political system is the symbol of the Islamic government. The Caliph’a is not only the leader of the country, but also has some religious responsibility according to Liberation Party (1980). For example, Muslims use the Hijr ^li calendar, which started from the year that prophet Muhammad moved from Mecca to Medina. This calendar uses Lunar months, which means months that have no fixed number of days. In order to know on which day Ramadhan will begin, Muslims have to be able to see the Moon. They also have to see it again to know the exact time of Hajj. The Caliph’a is the one who approves the signs and by his address Muslims start fasting.

jn criminal cases when a judge pronounced the death sentence or decided on the cutting off of a thief’s hand, approval had to be obtained from the Caliph’a.

The Caliph’a’s power came from his religious position more than his political position. Muslims describe the Caliph’a as a person who exercises the delegated power from Allah.

The Qur’an and prophet Muhammad have given no certain way for Muslims to choose their Caliph’a. After the death of prophet Muhammad there were four Caliph’as that prophet Muhammad described before his death as the guidance Caliph’as. As he said, “follow my doctrine – Sunnati – and the doctrine of the guidance Caliph’as who come after me” (Al Byanouni; 1991 : 32). These four Caliph’as were chosen by the Majless or a kind of parliament at that time. Election or any other means may also be used for choosing the Caliph’a, if Muslims approve it.

Whichever way Muslims choose to select their Caliph’a, he must have the highest qualification in the interpretation of the Qur’an and knowledge of the Islamic law. This comes through studying prophet Muhammad’s life and commands. This qualification together with other attributes such as trustworthiness, pride and justice, means the Caliph’a requires a combination of political and religious attributes

Mua ^lmalat, in summary, delineates the form of relationships among the Muslim community, in what we have named the Islamic social order. This system attempts to build a moral and ideal society starting from the idea of the equality of people. This idea disassociates Islam from nationality, race, language or colour. The only difference that Islam accepts between one person and another is between belief in Islam or disbelief. Islam requires its followers to adhere to moral codes, such as that a relationship between a man and a woman must only be through marriage. He also asks them to be humble and not to be suspicious of each other and for Muslim women to wear the Hejab and for men to lower their gaze.

The Islamic social order focuses on the institution of the family, important for its position as the basic unit of Muslim society. That is the reason why Islamic law preserves the institution of the family and makes adultery and fornication strictly prohibited.

The Islamic social order makes demands of the Muslim community. The aim of these rules is to protect individuals as well as families. The criminal law in Islam may look harsh to non-Muslims but for Muslims it is a fair law, because of its equality in punishment.

The other part of Mua’malat is the Islamic political system. This political system is based on four principles that distinguish it from other political systems. Tawhid is the key concept in the Islamic political system. Tawhid is a belief in the Oneness of Allah and that it is only He who has the right to make laws for those he has created.

To promote understanding of the laws of Allah, prophet Muhammad explained and followed them during his leadership of the first Islamic state. As a result, prophethood is the second principle of the Islamic political system.

The third principle that we have to understand in the Islamic political system is consultation. The difference between consultation and democracy is Tawhid. In a democracy people make the law and in consultation they discuss the law but do not make it. Rejecting any law from the body of Islamic law is rejecting Tawhid. Consultation in the Islamic political system focuses on the way of choosing the Caliph ^la and the way of representing the citizens of the state in a parliament (or Majless). Because Islam does not impose a particular type of

consultation, Muslims have the right to choose any kind of parliament or Majless that they want.

Last, but not the least principle in the Islamic political system, is the Caliph’a. His importance comes from his political and religious position. Religious and political responsibility means the person who will be a Caliph’a must have a high qualification in the interpretation of Islamic law.

For Muslims, therefor Islam teaches a way of life. It is based on a spiritual pact between the servant and the Lord. This is Ibadat; a two way communication. The servant asks for guidance and the Lord gives the blessing. This is what Muslims describe as their relationship with Allah. Prayer, fasting, Zaka and Hajj are all aspects of the communication between Muslims and their Lord.

Mua’malat, or relationships, among the Muslim community, in accordance with Tawhid, is part of the Islamic way of life. For that Islam has its own social order. The objective of this social order is to develop a moral society. To achieve this the Islamic social order started from the ideological concept of the equality of mankind. In this respect, the Islamic social order focuses on individuals and their rights and duties. This emphasis on the value of the individual leads to a focus on families as the basic unit of the society. As a further extension of this belief, individuals and families are protected by providing just laws and economic order to the Muslim community.

The social order needs a political system that defends it and keeps it in practice. This provided, in Islam, by the four principles.of the second aspect of Mu’amalat’s.

3 Islam in Practice

In previous section, we discussed the theory of Islam and belief of the

Oneness of Allah and how this belief developed a way of worship authorised by Allah. Then we examined the social order and the political system that Islam believes its followers should build.

In this section we want to diScuss the practice of Islam during its lifetime, from its start to the present day. To do this, I will divide the history of Islam into four sections:

The Islamic state under the presidency of prophet Muhammad and the four guidance Caliphs (622-661). The importance of studying the practice of Islam during this time is simply because it is the time when Islam was understood and practised perfectly. This period serves as the model for the contemporary Islamic state.
The Isiamic state during the Omaya and the Abasey Caliphat (661-1258). During this time one of the four principles of the Islamic political system was not practised. That element is consultation (Shor^la). The Caliphat became a monarchy system rather than a consultation system.
The Islamic state during the Ottoman Caliphat (1258-1924.) At this time the Caliphat was controlled by the Turks. They were very powerful at the beginning of their Caliphat – then the Ottoman Caliphat became weak until the beginning of this century when it collapsed. The importance of studying the Ottoman Caliphat is to understand how the Caliphat as a political and religious position ended.
The practise of Islam since the end of the Ottoman Caliphat (from 1924). As we said before, the Omaya, the Abasey and the Ottoman Caliphats froze one of the four principles of the Islamic political systems, consultation. Another principle(the position of Caliphat as a political and religious leader) disappeared when the Ottoman Caliphat was ended. The position of the Caliphat as a government that gathered all Muslims under one nation and one leader was also disappeared. During the same time the principle of

prophethood also disappeared in many Muslim countries as these countries replaced Islamic law with French or British or other European laws.

Throughout these periods we have seen a gradual evasion of the basic values of and beliefs of Islam. In particular the process of secularism has undermined the Islamic faith. But tracing these developments we can better understand the aims and claims of the contemporary Islamic movements.

3.1 The Islamic state during the presidency of prophet Muhammad and during the four guidance Cilaph’s (622-632).

During this time Islam was practised in its rnost ideal form. The prophet was there practising what he was preaching as the president of the first Islamic state in Medina. Then came the first elected Caliph’a, Abu Bakr, who was succeeded by Omar. When Omar was killed, Muslims elected Ottoman and when he was killed, they elected Ali. During the presidency of prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliph’as the basic foundations of Islamic political system and the Islamic social order were laid down.

During this time most Muslims converted to Islam, turning away from their previous religions. For most of them, Islam was a challenge. It was not only a change of belief but it was also for them a change of life. Al Ahsan (1988: 9) mentions that Arabs before Islam gave all their loyalty to their tribes. The tribe for them was everything. Islam brought a radical change in Arab society . The formation of the new Ummah (nation) drastically changed the nature of the individual’s commitment to the tribe, which no longer claimed his supreme loyalty. The tribe no longer served as an independent political unit with exclusive sovereignty in society.

This change could not have happened if Muslims at that time had not understood Islam clearly. They understood that Tawhid means the Oneness of Allah; the Oneness of worshipping him and the Oneness of loyalty to him, not to the tribe or to anybody else. This led some tribes to persecute and kill some of the early Muslims, such as Yasser and Soumayah. The tribes, including prophet Muhammad’s tribe, forced their followers to migrate from their homeland. Those early Muslims, including the prophet, migrated to Medina where the tribes of Alouse and AIKhazraj accepted Islam and promised to defend prophet Muhammad and his companions.

When prophet Muhamnnad arrived in Medina he became the president of the first Muslim state. The practise of Islam during his presidency was developmental. That means, according to Al Byanouni (1 991), that he spent ten years in Mecca building the meaning of Tawhid amongst his followers . He started to shape a tribal society into a Muslim society by joining all the tribes and individuals who accepted Islam into one nation called the nation of Islam. As a result Arabian society was divided into two groups, Muslim and Kaffirs (non-Muslims). The Muslim society started to have its own identity. In social terms, prophet Muhammad started a fair and equal society. There were a lot of inhumane practices in Arabian society at that time, such as adultery, people killing their children because of poverty, discrimination between slaves and masters, unlimited wives for men, killing daughters because fathers wanted sons. The new society abolished such practices Islamic law developed day by day. Not all forbidden deeds were prohibited when the prophet arrived in Medina (such as drinking alcohol or men having more than four wives). The ways of worship were also developed in Medina. During the ten years that prophet Muhammad was in Mecca he spent concentrating on the meaning of Tawhid. The number of prayers, fasting, Zaka and Hajj were all established in Medina at that time.

Prophet Muhammad was confronted with considerable political conflict and in-fight in between the Arabian tribes. The invasion of one tribe by another for their camels or sheep was common. This situation led the new nation develop its own political laws. Political definitions were also developed such as enemies, alliance and Mua’hedeen (those who made an agreement with the State of Medina not to fight against it). The Islamic state built its own army from different tribes. It was not simply another army in Arabia, but an ideological army that went to war not for food or for camels but to defend the new state from its enemies and to break those forces who stood against the new religion. The army was also ideological from the point of the promise that each soldier had from prophet Muhammad. This promise was that any Muslim soldier who was killed in war between Muslims and non-Muslims would go to heaven and the non-Muslim soldiers killed would go to hell. The promise made the Muslim soldiers go to war with an intrepid feeling and made them fight bravely.

The Muslim army of the first Islamic state had another characteristic that other armies did not have, that was consultation. Although the prophet was the

leader of the army in all the wars that he fought, he used to consult his companions before each and then, according to Haroun (1976), he explained the plan to all the soldiers and asked them for advice. This consultation during wars was extended to his followers in Medina after peace was established.

Prophet Muhammad, built Muslim society from three levels. The first was the equality of all people by joining all tribes into one nation and by making masters pray shoulder to shoulder with slaves. The second was making the family the basic unit of the society. He encouraged all young men to marry when they could support themselves. He also encouraged strongly the united family; that can be seen clearly in his Syra’a (autobiography) when he solved family problems or when he refused to allow some of his companions to join him in some war when their parents were in need of their help. He also asked the spouses to reject divorce as a solution to family problems. The third level was that of Islamic criminal laws to protect individuals and families.

Prophet Muhammad also put together the basic elements of the Islamic political system. In Mecca he spent ten years teaching his followers the meaning of Tawhid and practised all the orders of Allah in his social as well as his political life thereby setting the model of what a Muslim should be. Although he was a prophet, he consulated others and would not make a decision without doing so. One important aspect of consultation lay in his refusal to appoint the next president of the state to follow him. He left it to his people to choose who they wanted.

After the death of prophet Muhammad his companions gathered to elect the Caliph’a, the successor of prophet Muhammad. Omar (one of the famous companions) nominated Abu Bakr, who was the first Muslim man to believe in the prophet and the one who never left his side in peace or war. The companions accepted the nomination and elected Abu Bakr to be the first Caliph ^la of the Islamic state.

Abu Bakr governed the Islamic state for two years then he died. During those two years new land was added to the state after the Roman defeat in Jordan, but Abu Bakr’s presidency was famous in the Islamic history for the wars of Redd^la (apostasy). It happened when some tribes refused to pay Zaka (poordue) after prophet Muhammad’s death. Abu Bakr clarified to them that rejecting any part of Islam is rejecting Islam as a whole and by doing that they have no belief in Tawhid led to them being considered as apostasies or Murtadeen. When they again refused he went to war with them and won these wars.

Before Abu Bakr died on 22 August 634, “he consulted Abdulrahman Ibn Awoff, Ottoman, Osaid Ibn Houdier and other companions and nominated Omar to be the next Caliph’a” (Al Najar , 1979: 1 10). They all agreed to choose Omar and elect him to be the second Caliph ^la.

During the presidency of Omar (634-644) the state expanded to include Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan. However the most important thing in the ten years of Omar’s presidency was the development of the political structure of the Islamic state. Omar became famous as the interpreter of Islamic political theory. He forbade anyone to write about the Islamic political system without taking examples from what he did. He established Dywanes or ministers that took care of the army, poor-due, child benefit and public treasury. He also made the rules about choosing the Amires or the governors of cities. Omar was the founder of the child benefit law which made the state give to every child a certain amount of money for his food. He also established an annual conference for all the Amires (governors) to review what they had been doing during their governance. To make sure that their governing was just, Omar chose the time of Hajj every year for the conference in Mecca where there were citizens from every part of the state if he needed to make sure of any information about the governors.

Omar also made Medina the capital of the Caliphat, as well as the center of information by establishing AlBarid (Post Offices) that gave him the ability to send or receive a letter from Damascus within three days. He was also the first Caliph’a who drew up a budget for the state.

On 4 November 644, Omar was killed by a magus man called Fairouze while he was leading the prayers in the prophet’s Mosque, (Al Nadawi : 1989). According to AINajar (1979) the reason Fairouze killed Omar was that a Christian Persian slave he was offended because his country had become part of the Islamic state.

Omar nominated six names that they may choose one of them as his successor and the companions elected Ottoman to be the third Caliph’a, (Al Nafisi , 1982). During Ottoman’s Caliphat (644-656) the Qur’an was collected

and written in one text then it was copied into six copies and distributed through out the state. Syra ^la (the autobiography of prophet Muhammad) was also written for the first time during Ottoman’s presidency. Arminia, Kukase and the North of Syria became a part of the Islamic state during his time. In May 656 Ottoman was killed by a rioting crowd who were organized by Abdullah Ibn Saba ^la who used to be a Jew and was embittered that Muslims destroyed the Jewish tribes in Medina and Khibar during the wars between the Jews and prophet Muhammad. This riotous crowd became known in Islamic history as Al Saba’iaih.

After the killing of Ottoman the companions elected Ali with the nomination of Al Zoubair (Al Nafisi, 1982). Group of the companions lead by Mua ^lwaih accused Ali of defending the killers of Ottoman. Ali tried, during his time (656661), to reunite the state but he was killed by the same group responsible for Ottoman’s death.

in summary, Islam during the time of prophet Muhammad and the four Caliph’as was at its highest level of development in its political system. Consultation was the only way of choosing the Caliph’a and Islam was understood and practised in every aspect of the Muslims life. The most important thing about this period is that it specified the signposts of the Islamic political system. Knowing Tawhid and practising it and following what the Qur’an and prophet Muhammad said were the clear features of that time.

In social life they practised the Islamic social order after practising the tribal social order for hundreds of years. It was the first time that Arabs knew the meaning of equality. They also practised for the first time some community rules such as the women’s rights, neighbours rights and individuals rights. All these signposts made this period of time the model for Islam.

3.2 The Islamic state during the Omaya and the Abasey Caliphat

(661-1258)

When Caliph ^la Ali was killed Mua’wiah established himself as the Caliph ^la. This was the first deviation in practice from the Islamic political system. Mua’wiah had not been elected; one of the four principles of the Islamic political system, consultation, was broken. The second deviation in the Islamic state occured when Mua^lwiah appointed his son to be the next Caliph’a. By doing

this, Mua’wiah started the hereditary monarchy system. The position of Caliph’a was left open to the son or the brother of the present Caliph’a. This deviation is still practised in the Islamic state. Appointing the son or the brother as a heir to the position of Caliph’a removed the need for any kind of qualification for the next Caliph’a. It was enough for him to be the son or the brother of the present Caliph’a. As a result the fourth principle of the Islamic political system, Caliph ^la, lost some of its religious meaning. Some of the Caliph’as were not very religious.

One of the major deviations that also happened during the Omaya and the Abasey Caliphat was changing the name of the Islamic state to the name of the family that ruled the state. Again this deviation has continued until today. It gives the royal family authority over the public treasury, which has allowed some unprincipled Caliph ^las to give their relatives and friends funds from the public treasury.

All these deviations happened during Omaya ^ls and Abasey’s Caliphat where Islam spread into Africa, Asia, and Europe and became the most powerful state of its time (Al Byanouni, 1991). It is an irony that at the height of the Muslim world’s influence the teachings of Islam were undermined. During the Omaya and the Abasey Caliphats Muslim civilisation illuminated the whole world. Baghdad and Cordova, the two great cities of Islam, were centos of civilization.

The Omaya Caliphat saw advances in poetry and in writing the grammar of the Arabic language. The speeches of prophet Muhammad and his biography were also written down. The Abasey’s Cilaphat continued the Islamic civilization by discovering Algebra and added the Zero to mathematical science. Muslim scientists also contributed a lot to astronomy, geography, physics, chemistry, medicine, economy, social and other sciences.

The important addendum that the Muslim scholars added during the Abasey’s Caliphat was the four Islamic law schools. These schools explained the Islamic law in detail. The books of the founders of these schools became the interpreters of the Islamic law in all its aspects.

One of the reasons Islamic civilization had a wide distribution of knowledge in every science was the Caliph’as themselves. They used to give rewards for scientists and writers to encourage them to write or discover new things. One of the famous rewards in the Islamic history was that of Caliph’a Almansour who gave the same amount as the weight of a book in gold. It is not surprising that Encyclopaedias were very famous during Abasey’s time.

In summary, Islam as a system of life lost one of its principles, consultation, when Muaⁱwiah introduced hereditary monarchy. This system affected the fourth principle of the Islamic political system, Caliph’a, when each Caliph’a appointed his son or brother to be the next Caliph’a with or without any qualification. Some of the Caliph ^las deviations included taking money from the public treasury for their personal use and others were in famous for their religious weakness. There deuatous occured when Islam was practised throughout Africa, Asia and Europe. Islamic civilization was in its golden period. Islamic law was written and the speeches of prophet Muhammad were collected. The Arabic language grammar was also written and Arabic became spoken from China to Andalusia in Spain.

3.3 The Islamic State during the Ottoman Caliphat (1258-1924)

When the Abasey’s Caliphat ended the Ottoman Turkish tribes took over the Caliphat. The Turks were very powerful militarily and went from victory to victory. During their time Islam spread further into Europe and they became a threat to western Europe when they surrounded Vienna (see Al Byanouni ; 1991). Although there were many political and military challenges during this time the Ottoman Caliphat throughout this period defined the Islamic state.

The Ottoman Caliphat, used the monarchical political system to rule the Islamic state. Every deviation that had developed during the time of the Omayas and the Abaseys, under the Ottoman become more pronounced . For example, there were Caliph’as who killed their brothers in order to appoint a son as the next Caliph’a. Because of this monarchical system some families declared independence from the Caliphat and established a new state (as did the Abaseys in Andalusia). Some of them stayed (for tens or hundreds of years) independent from Istanbul, the Capital of the Ottoman Caliphat. Thus the ottoman Caliphat saw the fragmentation of the Muslim world.

The second major deviation, was the freezing of the Islamic Fiquh or Islamic jurisprudence. Qutop (1983: 106) says “the most famous characteristics of Islam is its jurisprudence movable. It is an effective institution that exists in every aspect of a Muslim’s life whether it is politics, social, thought or economic”. He also said “Fiquh is the expression of the community’s development from the point of view of Islamic thought”. Freezing Fiquh meant that there was no continuation of research in the Islamic law. Religious scholars during Omaya ^ls and the Abaseyⁱs Caliphats had four major Fiquh schools. The founders of these schools and their students explained and prescribed the Islamic law and because of the new developments in every aspect of human life, Fiquh must also have the ability to indicate the origin of the present situation or problems by looking for its origin in the Qur’an and from what prophet Muhammad said. That may clarify the major problem regarding Islamic law and its suspension during the Ottoman Caliphat. Ijtehad or looking at developments in human life from a Fiquh point of view was stopped which made the Islamic law something holy but without understanding. This was one of the major elements, that destroyed the Islamic civilization.

As a result of what happened to Fiquh, the Islamic social order became a custom more than a religion. Hijab and separation between males and females became a custom of the Arabs or the Turks rather than an order from Allah. The Qur’an also became a holy book that must be in every house for its blessing but not for practice.

The decline of Islam further accelerated in the last two centuries when Europe expanded its influence to the Orient. It took her, Europe, a whole century to occupy the Muslim world.

Europe adopted a new approach that separated Islam as a belief from the daily life of Muslims (Audah, 1982). Qutop notes that

” Muslim societies were ready for this change. There were some thoughts that were never heard before among the Muslim society, such as that there was no relationship between Islam and the social order or economy. Some also think that there is no relevance between Islam and the community’s customs such as the clothes that women wear and some also think that there is no relationship between art, or communication and Islam. In summary there is no relationship between Islam and life” (Qutop, 1985; 110).

Through the educational order that Europe brought to the Muslim world during the last century of the Ottoman Caliphat, we see the building a new class in the Muslim countries, the “educated class”. Maududi described them as “these westernized Muslims, whose lack of Islamic spirit you are lamenting, are the worst products of western colonialism in Muslim countries” (Jameelah, 1982; 5). This educated class who studied in the colonial schools where Europeans set the curriculum, became the leaders of their communities. The idea of separation between Islam (as a belief) and everyday life was established in all the generations that came after them, especially those who studied in universities or taught in them.

The role of Islam in everday life was also been effected by the introduction of the Western legal system. When Napoleon, with his army, occupied Egypt he created Egyptian law based on French law. This was the first time for Muslims practised another law other than Shari ^la.

Secularism became acceptable more and more in politics, economics, education and social life. The Islamic idea of Ibadat as a way of communication between a Muslim and his lord became a tradition more than an integrat part of life. Mosques became a place for older people and Hajj was only for those soon to die, so they could seek forgiveness. Zaka was paid by few.

In the latter years of the Ottoman Caliphat, nationalism became a danger that occurred for the first time in the Islamic history (Yaken; 1986). Arabs led by Shariff Hussain wanted an Arabic state and Turks led Ataturk and the Young Turkey movement wanted a Turkish state which led to further fragmentation of the Muslim world.

In summary, the Ottoman Caliphat spreaded Islam but it failed to presided the fragmentation of its Muslim world . Deviations from the core teachings (the law) started when Arabic was ignored as the common language of the state during the previous Caliphat. This move from Arabic as the language of the laws weakened the studies of Islamic law and the continuation of development of new students in the Islamic law schools.

Another problem was the introduction of hereditary monarches. The monarchical system segregated the capital from the rest of the state and left those parts to be governed by their leaders independently of state control. Some of those leaders adhered to the Islamic law but others, such as Muhammad Ali Ba^lsh⁷deviated on many counts from that law (Amen ; 1981).

The Islamic Caliphat (as a political system) was ended on 3rd of March 1924 by Ataturk, the first president of the Republic of Turkey. That was the first time in the Islamic history that Muslims were without a Caliph’a; a leader whose authority was legitimated by Islamic law and part of whose function was to interpret that law. As a result there was no focal point for the Islamic order and its power began to diminish.

3.4 The practice of Islam since the end of the Ottoman Caliphat

Historically we find that the four principles of the Islamic political system have been suspended one after the other. The first was consultation which ceased when the Omayas came into power. Then parts of the message (or Resala) of the prophet (such as the law) were also abandoned at the end of the Ottoman Caliphat when some Muslim states practised French or British law instead of the Islamic law. Also secularism in education developed; generations grew up in a social system that believed in separation between Islam as a belief and their daily life. Another principle from the Islamic political system was also lost when Ataturk ended the position of Caliph’a in 1924.

It was not only the suspending of consultation, Caliphat, and a part of Ibadat. It was also a distortion of Tawhid. Its meaning was diluted into a theoretical belief in the Oneness of Allah more than a practical meaning of obedience to the command of Allah.

That was a conclusion to the effectiveness of the practice of the Islamic political system and the Jslamic social order which had survived until the end of the Ottoman Caliphat. It was also a starting point for the new order of the Islamic world.

As we said before, the Caliphat as a system ended when most of the Muslim world came under the European colonialism. Then, year by year, most of the Muslim world became liberated. Some parts of its Muslim world became new nations and had their own governments, but under the British or the French mandate. But, instead of becoming reunited in one state, as it was during the Omaya, the Abasey and the Ottoman Caliphat, the Muslim world fragmented into more than fifty countries. Some of these countries have less than 100,000 citizens. “Muslims according to the Qur’an are an Ummah, they are brothers and cannot as such be proper Muslims if they live separately” (Idris, 1983; 16).

It was not only a matter of a division of the land but also a division of ideas. Some of the Muslim countries chose the communist way of ruling their states. Others chose democratic or socialist or monarchical systems of ruling. Islamic law was not in practice in most parts of the Muslim world. Most adopted French, or British, or other European laws in their countries. Not one of these new countries adhered to the Islamic political system which is a part of the Islamic law or Shari ^la. Thus it was not only a political or a social change that happened. Actually, it was a revolution in the realm of ideas that changed the fundamental beliefs of Islam in the Muslim’s minds. It was the first time that Muslims had taken another law or political or social system other than that pertaining to Islam. It was a defeat for Tawhid inside Muslim souls. The loss of the effect of Tawhid in the Muslim life and the limitation of understanding of the meaning of Ibadat, in a society that no longer practised the Islamic social order and political system, made Islam less relevant to everyday life in the Muslim world. Add to this the voices that have been heard in some Muslim countries during the thirties, forties and fifties. Qutop (1983: 117) describes these voices as an echo of the European philosophers and thinkers such as Freud, Darwin, Marx, Durkheim and others. Egyptian writers as Taha Hussain, Abdul Razeeq, and Amin, tried to transfer the western philosophies and thoughts to the Muslim world (Yaken, 1986). Such thoughts and philosophies gained support within the educated class at that time and become influential in the development of the post colonial Muslim world.

In short, Islam became a spiritual religion that maintains and practises only a part of Ibadat (without any real understanding of its purpose in, or implications for, Muslim life) and which no longer has a political or social order.

With this decimation of the body of Islam, does that mean that Islam was lifeless?

During the end of the Ottoman Caliphat and during this century, there were still some voices to be heard in the Muslim world asking Muslims to reunite and to retake Islam as their system of life. Abdul Wahab in Arabia, Sanusea in Libya, and Mahdie in Sudan, are examples of Muslim scholars who tried to return Muslims to their own identity during the eighteenth century. Later, during this century, Ben Badiess in Algeria, Al Bana in Egypt, Maududi in India, Nursi in Turkey, and Muhammad Nasser in Indonesia also did the same.

All of them built movements to spread their thoughts. These were known as the Islamic movements. Their ideas focus on three main principles. Tawhid, the Islamic political system and the Islamic social order. Their ideas and practices are the bases of the Islamic resurgence in the Muslim world nowadays. Their books were translated into more than thirty languages by one organization alone (World Organizations of Muslim Students in Kuwait). Their objectives were the same as those of the present Islamic movements which are to make Islam the system of life for every individual Muslim and to return to practises of the Islamic political system as it was during the period of prophet Muhammad and the four guidance Caliph’as. The birth of these movements indicated that there have always been two voices to be heard in the Muslim world during the last two centuries. One which believed in Europe and its civilization and the other which believed in Islam and its civilization. Often it seems the former drowned out the latter.

To summarize, we can say that Islam as a system of life became misunderstood by individual Muslims over the centuries. The meaning of Tawhid or Ibadat or Mua’malat moved far from that recommended by the prophet. This situation developed in an atmosphere of acceptance of the transference of western civilization and philosophies to the Muslim world. Under the influence of colonial governments the Muslim world divided into more than fifty countries led by different political systems, none of them Islamic. These changes did not only westernize the way of life or the clothes that Muslims wore. It was actually a fundamental change in ideas among the educated classes who studied in Europe or in the colonial schools and then after the liberation of their countries achieved positions whereby they shape the development of their societies through a secular revolution.

Although all this happened, some voices tried to encourage Muslims to return to their roots. These voices can be called the Islamic movement or Muslim fundamentalism.

Conclusion

Islam as a system of life had its ideal time during the presidency of prophet Muhammad and his four guiding Caliph’as of the Islamic state. Then the Islamic political system lost one of its principles: consultation. It was the beginning of hereditary monarchy, practised during the Omaya’s, the Abasey’s and the Ottoman’s Caliphats. But islam still retained its meaning and structure during the Omaya’s and the Abasey’s Caliphats, and had its golden age during that time.

The Ottoman Caliphat began with a powerful military presence, but it did not continue to develop the Islamic civilization. That was the start of the deviations that beset Islamic civilization in all its aspects. Islam, day by day, became something holy but not understandable (something divorced from practical human life) because there was no continuance of the schools of Islamic law or Islamic thought. Then Europe became the first civilization. With its influence and later its colonialism, Europe became the example for a new Islamic civilization in the minds of those who studied in Europe or studied in European schools in the Muslim world This educated class became the real leaders of the Muslim world when they gained positions that allowed them to transfer their ideas through universities or education ministries.

As the old European colonies slowly gained independence the new Muslim governments chose their own (often different) political systems. None of them were Islamic. That, along with the other aspects mentioned above, was the reason why some voices could be heard talking about a return of Islam. These voices may be called, as they called themselves, the Islamic movement.

4. The Distribution of Muslims in the World

On 3rd March 1924 the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the Caliphat. It meant the end of the United Islamic State after 1342 years. Muslims had sometimes divided during those 1 342 years into two or even three states but they had always reunited again. However, even divided they retained the position of Caliph’a. Every state named itself a Caliphat State (for example of Bany Omay’a, or the Caliphat State of Bany Al Abass) and every president of these states named himself as Caliph’a.

After 1924 when the Caliphat was abolished, Muslims found themselves in a state of confusion because of the following reasons:

this was the first time in the Islamic history that a Muslim government or a parliament abolished the position of Caliph’a;
most of the Muslim land was under European colonialism – that situation weakened the ability of Muslims to reorganize and reunite themselves to rebuild the Caliphat State;
although there were some independent Muslim countries at that time they were not strong enough to become a new Caliphat State or to reunite Muslims all over the world under their leadership;
the scholars (Ulama) were the only people who called for conferences to rebuild the Caliphat State, but they had no official power in their countries. In the meantime,those who were in power prefered not to take the risk of opposing the imperialist countries to rebuild the Caliphat State.

These reasons made the rebuilding of the Caliphat State only a wish in the hearts of Muslims. In reality, most Muslim lands were colonised and Muslims who lived in them were encouraged to try their best to liberate their land and become, after its independence, a new country. Some of these independent countries were created out of tribal affinities as were the United Arab Emirates. Others obtained their independence by alternative means.

There were other African, Asian and European non-Muslim countries which were also colonised by the West, and which had a Muslim minority. When these countries obtained their independence Muslims who lived in these countries lived as a minority.

In this part of the study, we will focus on the number of Muslims in the world and how they are distributed into majorities that live in Muslim countries and minorities that live in non-Muslim countries.

The importance of this section is to show the extent of the Muslim world. That is because in the section on the Western misconception of Islam we said that

the western media play a role in showing western people how dangerous Islam will be if Muslims reunite again in one country.

Another importance of showing the growth of the Muslim world is that the rising Islamic movements spread all over the Muslim world and they have common political objectives, one of which is reuniting the Muslim world.

To accomplish this part of the study some difficulty was experienced in finding the correct percentage of Muslim residents in some countries because:

the statistics obtained from some countries were found to be incorrect because they included non-Muslims, who are working in those countries on a temporary basis, together with the native population who are Muslims (as in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates);
in some countries there are no exact numbers of Muslims because the governments in those countries do not wish to provide correct numbers for political reasons;
in some of the western countries the estimated numbers of Muslims has not changed for ten years or more, as in the United States;
there are big discrepancies too between numbers obtained from different sources giving estimates of Muslims in some countries.

A determined attempt was made to provide correct figures by giving total population numbers from United Nations sources and the highest estimate of Muslim percentage. The highest estimate of the Muslim percentage is given because it was found that there is a big difference between the Muslim sources and the European sources when they talk about the number or the percentage of Muslims. In the meantime, other estimates are provided at the end of this section, even though there is a sizeable difference in those estimates.

Table (1)

Muslims living in Muslim Countries

(Where majority of population are Muslims)

AFRICA

Country Population Muslim% Year

1986

1987

1985

4. Comoros	484, 000
DjiboutiEgypt	483,000
7. Ethiopia	46, 184,000
The GambiaGuinea	698,817
10. Guinea-Bissau	943,000

Ivory Coast
Libya

MaliMauritania	7,620,225
15. Mayotte	67,167

Morocco
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal

Sierra LeoneSomalia	3,517,530
23. Former	100,000

Spanish Sahara

Sudan 20,564,364
Tanzania
Togo
Tunisia
Upper Volta

ASIA

Afghanistan
Azerbaidzhan
Bahrain 421 ,040
Bangladesh
Brunei Darussalam 226,300
Daghestan
Indonesia
Iran 49,857,384
Iraq

99.5%	1986
100%	1987
94%	1987
65%	1987 1983
95%	1987
70%	1989 1984
100%	1984 1987
100%	1986
98%	1985

controlled by France

99%	1986
50%	1986
95%	1981
65%	1986
95%	1984 1985
100%	1986
100%	1979
79%	1983
97%	1986 1982
99%	1986
64%	1979
99%	1986
90%	1986
100%	1988
95%	1987
76%	1986 1986
94%	1987
98%	1986
95%	1986

Jordan94% 1987

1 1 . Kafkas75% 1979

KansuMaj.M 1 986 controlled by China
KashmirMaj. M 1 979

14 Kazakhistan50% 1986

Kirghiz1 986
Kuwait1 986
Lebanon57% 1 986
LiaoningMaj.M 1986
Malaysia57% 1986

20. Maldives	1 89,000	100%	1 986
21 . Oman		100%	1 985
22. Pakistan	99, 163,000	97%	1986
23. Qatar	369,079		1986

Saudi Arabia100% 1 986
Syria 2,000 90% 1 986

26. Tadzhikistan	4,643,000	85%	1 986
27. Turkmenistan	3,271 ,ooo	66%	1 986

East Turkmen1 979
Turkey99% 1 985

30. United Arab Emirates

1,622,464

100%

1 985

31 . Uzebekistan88% 1 986

YemenICO% 1 986
Yunnan1 986

EUROPE

controlled by China

Albania79% 1 987
Bashkir60% 1 986
Caucasus69.8% 1 979
Chuvash 1 986
CrimeaMaj.M 1 979
Jourduf55% 1 979

7.	Mari	729,000	79%	1 986
8.	Ornbrge			1 979
9.	Tatar	3,531 ,ooo	65%	1 986

10. Udmurt 59% 1 986

In this Table it was realised that geography and history were playing a role in causing these countries to have a Muslim majority in their populations and the following countries to have a minority groups of Muslims.8

Table (2)

Muslims who live in Countries where they are in a minority group

Country Population Muslim% Year

AFRICA

Angola
Benin

3, Botswana

Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cape Verde
Central African

Republic

Congo
Gabon
Ghana

1 1. Guyana

Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malagasy
Malawi
Mauritius
Namibia
Rwand

21 . Sao Tom and

Principe

Seychelles
South Africa
Swaziland
Uganda
Zaire
Zanbia
Zimbabwe

ASIA

1. Antigua and

Barbuda 2. Bhutan

Burma
Cambodia
China
India
Israel
Japan
North Korea

8,981 ,ooo

1, 169,000

5,001 ,ooo

334,000

790,000

21, 163,000

7,278,925

1 , 184,000

108,000 65,244

676,089

6,242,000

76,296

39,411 ,OOO

4,406,500

25%	1986
45%	1987
2%	1987
43%	1987
25%	1987 1989
30%	1986
2.8%	1985
45%	1985 1987
10%	1985
35%	1986 1985
33%	1986
7%	1985
25%	1984
30%	1986 1986 1986
5%	1983 1985
0.23%	1985
1.5%	1987
0.06%	1986 1980 1986
15%	1983
22%	1987 1986
3%	1986
10%	1986
5%	1986
8%	1986
15%	1988

1987

There are 1,712,000 Muslims in Israel

0.02% 1987

0.004% 1986

10. South Korea	41	0.03%	1 986
1 1 . Laos	3,584,803	1.1%	1 985

Mongolia2.2% 1 987
Nepal3.03% 1 987
Papua New1 987

Guinea

1 5. Philippines22% 1 986

16. Singapore16.9% 1 986

17. Solomon Island	285,796		1 986
18. Shrilanka	1 6,361 ,ooo		1 987
19. Taiwan	19,672,612	0.25%	1 987

Thailand25% 1 987
Vietnam0.1 1% 1 987

NORTH AMERICA
1. The Bahamas 240,000		1 987
2. Canada 25,625, IOO	1.66%	1987
3. Cuba	0.05 /	1 987
4. Haiti 5, 707,000	0.024%	1 987

Jamaica

1987

Mexico0.01 /1 987
United States0.9% 1987

of America 8. U.S.A. External Territories:
– American Samoa 36,000		1 986
– Guam 129,546		1 986
– Marshall Island 35,000		1 986
– The Federated 85,200 State of Micronesia		1 987
– Northern Mariana 1 9,635 Island		1985
_ palau 1 4,000		1 987
– Puerto Rico		1 985
– US Virgin Island 1 10,800 SOUTH AMERICA		1 985
1 . Argentina 31	1.12%	1987
2. Barbados 253,881	0.29%	1 987
3. Belize 1 75,600		1 987
4. Bolivia 6,740,417	0.1 0/	1987
5. Brazil 141	0.16%	1987
6. Chile 1 2, 748,498	0.05%	1988

Colombia0.026% 1 985
Costa Rica0.09% 1987
Dominican0.02% 1 986

Republic

1 0. Ecuador0.05% 1 988

1 1 . El Salvador0.02% 1987

12. Equatorial Guinea 300,000	0.1 %	1983
13. Guatemala	0.22%	1987

1 4. Honduras 4,051 ,400 0.020/0 1 987

1 5. Nicaragua0.020/0 1 985

Panama0.050/0 1 987

18. peru 20,207, 1 00	0.002%	1 986
19. Suriname 393,748	23%	1 985
20. Trinidad & Tobago I , 199,200	6.6%	1 986
21 Uruguay		1 985
22. Venezuela 1 8,272, 1 57 AUSTRALASIA	0.260/0	1 987
1 . Australia 1 6,531 ,900		1 988
2. Fiji 71 5,375	80/0	1 986
3. Kiribati 63,883		1 985
4. Nauru		1983
New Zealand New Zealand’s Associate Territories	0.060/0	1 987
– Cook Island 17,1 85		1 986
– Niue 2,531		1 986
– Tokelau I ,690		1 986
7. Tonga 94,535		1 986
8. Tuvalu 8,229		1 985
9. Vanuatu 1 40, 154		1 986
10. Western Samoa 58,940 EUROPE		1 986
1 Andorra 46,976		1 986

Paraguay0.030/0 1 986
Austria

1 987

Belgium2.5% 1 987

5. Cyprus 680,400	19%	1 987
6. Czechoslovakia 15,588, 1 70	6.980/0	1 988
Denmark 5, 1 29,1 54Danish External Territories	0.350/0	1 988
– The Faeroe Islands 47,969		1 987
– Greenland 54,524		1 987
9. Dominica 81 ,200		1 988
IO. Finland 4, 938,602	0.030/0	1 987
– Finnish External 23,745 Territory (TheAland Island)		1 987
1 1. France 12. French Overseas Possessions: A – Overseas Departments	46%	1 987
French Guiana 90,240		1 988
– Guadeloupe 336,538		1 987
– Martinique 335, 1 30		1 988
– L Reunion 571 ,600	2.3%	1 988

Bulgaria16% 1 987

B – French Overseas

Collectivites Terriotriales.

Pierre and 6,041 Miquelon C – Overseas Terriotirales		1 982
– French 188,814 Polynesi		1988
– French Southern 210 and Antarctic Territories		1 985
– New Caledonia 154,000		1986
– Wallis & Futuna 1 2,408 Island		1 985
13. East Germany 1 6,641 ,298	0.08%	1 987

– St

14. West Germany2.75% 1 987 15.

16. Grenada	98,000		1 987
17. Hungary		0.03%	1 988
18. Iceland	247,357	0.21%	1 987

1.5% 1 987

Ireland

0.01% 1 988

21. Liechtenstein 27,399		1 986
22. Luxembourg 369,500	0.27%	1 986
23. Malta 343,334	0.02%	1 986
24. Monaco 27,063		1 982
Netherlands 1 4,661 ,293Netherlands Dependencies	2.1%	1 987
Aruba 67,000		1 983
– The Netherlands 171 1620		1 981
27. Norway 4.174,005	0.14%	1 987
28. Poland 37,571 ,800	0.007%	1 986
Portugal Poäugal Overseas Territory:	0.15%	1 986
– Macau 298,200		1 986
31. Romania	0.22%	1 986
32. St Christopher 461,000 (St Kitts) & Nevi		1 983
33. Saint Lucia 139,500		1 986
34. Saint Vincent and 1 1 , 41 9 The Grenadines		1 986
35. San Marino 22,638		1 987

Italy0.35% 1 987

Spain0.04% 1 986

38. Switzerland	6,523,413	0.84%	1987
39. United Kingdom of Great Britain &		2.8%	1 986

Northern Ireland 40. United Kingdom Crown Dependencies:
The Isle of Man 64,282The Channel	1986
Islands Jersey 80,21 2	1986
Guernsey 55,482	1 986

Sweden0.26%1 987

Conclusion

Islam has been misunderstood in the West From the Middle Ages until now. The church during the Middle Ages, the Crusades and the Orientalists were the responsible for the misconception and misunderstanding of Islam in the West. But Media played a major role in the misconception of Islam in the contemporary days. The western media concerns the West that the Muslim world is developing new enemy to the west; the Muslim Fundamentalism” or the Islamic movements. The media fear the west not only from the fundamentalists movements, but also from Islam as a religion that produced backward, terrorists and uneducated people who control the world-oil.

In our study we found that Islam for Muslims is a system of life. The Muslim scholars explained Islam through those elements; Tawhid, Ibadat and Mua’malat. Each element concentrated on specific relationship. Tawhid, is the belief in Allah and in every thing comes from him. Ibadat is the primary duties that every Muslim must do. While Mua^lmalat is the relationship within the Muslim community in social and political terms.

Islam as a system of life had its ideal time during the time of prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliph’as. During the Omaya’s, the Abasey’s and Ottoman’s Caliphats, the Caliphats system become a monarchy. In the end of the Ottoman Caliphats, other elements of the Islamic political system were also not been in practice in some part of the Caliphat as the change of European laws instead of Shari’ah in Egypt. In 1924 the Caliphat system was demolished and the Muslim world divided into tens of countries and each country chosen political and ideological system and practice it, but none is Islamic.

I Bede: He was one of the famous biblical masters of the early Middle Ages and he commanded the whole Biblical scholarship during his time and what he wrote was the foundation of this part of learning For more details see Southern (1977).

Saracens: The sons of Ishmail whose father is prophet Ibraham and his mother is Hagar.
Hagar: Wife of prophet Ibraham.
Nicholas of Casa: He was born in 1 401 ; created a Cardinal by NicholasV in 1448. He went through chasteness experience in the Council of Basel and he was one of

the chief negotiators with Hussites and the Greeks. He wrote Cribrotio Alchoran in 1460. He died 1464. For more details see Southern (1977).

5AIchoran or Koran is the Qur’an the Holy book of Muslims.

6Martin Luther: He translated the Qur’an into German languages as Confutatio Alchoran and it was the most anti-Islamic works that been done during the thirteenth century. For more details see Southern (1977).

⁷who was one of the figures who transferred secularism to Egypt and then to other Muslim countries.

8For more details see, Ghallab, Salih and Shakir (1 979), Al Matri (1 984), Shaqliyah (1986) and Shakir (1985).

CHAPTER TWO

THE MEDIA AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The chapter starts with a definition of what constitutes a social and political movement. Then it examines the literature on the role of communication in the growth of social and political movements. This is followed by a discussion of the development of the mass media in the Muslim World with a section on the traditional channels of communication and small media in the Muslim world. The chapter then concludes with a section on the media systems in the countries of this study, Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey. Important factors concerning the media in these countries will be outlined including the ownership of radio and television, the circulation of the leading newspapers, magazines and periodicals as well as the number of films produced and imported from other countries.

Thus this chapter will provide a review of the literature on the role of the mass and traditional media in the rise of political and social movements and an outline of the key factors relating to the process of communication in the Muslim world. This will help in the discussion of our findings about the role of the media in the rise of the Islamic movements presented in Chapter Six.

2.1- Political and Social movements:

Before we discuss the relationship between communication and social and political movements in the next section, it is important to identify what we mean by a political or social movement and how Islamic movements are located in this discussion.

According to Burgess a social movement is “a joint organization endeavor of a considerable group of persons in some way to change or alter the course of events by their joint activities.” (1971; 5) Such a movement lays stress on collective activity to improve the society according to their beliefs and understanding of events. Inglehart (1990) tries to explain the collective sense of activity that leads people to act in these movements. He believes that their actions are a product of four main factors. And as Inglehart put it “when people act in these movements, it reflects an interaction between (1) objective problems; (2) organizational networks; (3) relevant motivating values, and (4) certain essential skills. The absence of any one of these factors can inhibit the movement from emerging” (Inglehart, 1990: 43).

THE MEDIA AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Introduction

The role of communication in the rise of social and political movements in the West has been discussed widely in the literature (see, for example, Halloran, (1982), and Lazarsfeld and Merton, (1974). However there little knowledge and understanding of the role of communication in the rise of the Islamic movements in the Muslim World

At the end of the last chapter we identified the distribution of Muslims throughout the world, in different nations where in some places they are the majority while in others they are the minority. However wherever they are, there has been a clear trend in the last decade in the growth of support for what in the West are described as “fundamentalist” Islamic movements; in other words we have witnessed the revival of Muslims commitment to Islam throughout the world.

In order to examine the role and place of communication in this revival it is important to discuss the relationship between communication and the rise of social and political movements. This chapter examines the literature in this area, in particular the theories that have been advanced to explain the role of communication in the development of political and social movements. Much of this literature is based on the western political experience. As a result it concentrates on modern means of mass communication. However in relation to developments in the Muslim world the mass media as channels of communication have faced considerable problems of credibility in the last few decades. Official channels have denied access to political discourse and debate even in Muslim countries with an ostensibly democratic political system such as Turkey. As a result there has been a growth in other means of communication such as traditional channels, such as the Friday speech at the local Mosque or the meeting of community elders, and small media such as audio and video cassettes. Hence the greater importance attached to these channels in Muslim societies. In this chapter we will examine traditional mechanisms of communication and small media as well as modern mass communication channels in the development of political and social movements in order to assess how each has played a role on the rise of Islamic movements in Muslim countries.

The first one is how the movement defines the nature of the problem that it is addressing and the nature of the solutions it is offering. Clarity and clearly definition of the problems confronted and the solution recommended in important in cementing people together for collective action.

The second factor is the organizational network. Such movements to operate collectively need many people to participate in their activities. Thus it is important to organize and inform people and explain to every member or activist in the movement his role , position, and responsibility. Effective collective action requires a sound and solid organizational base.

The third factor is, relevant motivating values. The alteration and the improvement of the society by the social movement is based on a clear set of shared values and beliefs which motivate people to act. The fourth factor is, the creation of essential skills that the social movement will use to improve the society and to solve the society’s problems.

It can be argued according to Inglehart’s criterion that Islamic movements are also social movements. The Islamic movements as any social movements work to alter and to improve their societies. They perceive problems in their societies that require solution according to Islam. These problems are seen in religious terms; in the deviation from the true teachings of the prophet Muhammad and the Qur’an. The solutions, however, embrace social and political aspects. In particular the movements struggle against the ‘secular trends’ in Muslim societies. It is here that the true problem lies. The movements are also organizational networks with clear structures and hierarchies which mobilize their members by sending and receiving messages to organize their activities to achieve their objectives.

Social movements solve the problems according to their values, and the Islamic movements draw their beliefs and values from the Qur’an. Their slogan is “Qur’an is our constitution” which means that the Qur’an provides the values which serve as the foundation of the solution they proffer to the problems and ills of society. And was said in chapter one the Qur’an, the book of Islam, consider Islam as a system of life and thus the political and social values of the Islamic movements are totally taken from Islamic teachings and provide an all embracing solution to the problems in Muslim society.

Islamic movements thus fulfill the basic characteristics of social movements in the west. However there are some differences. The first relates to the legal status of these movements. In the west most social movements have some legal status. They are allowed to organize and operate freely within the social and political system. While there are some legal limits placed on their activities – for example, many non government political bodies are denied access to advertising space on British television to show their message – they are entitled to participate in the daily life of the nation. But in the case of the Islamic movements in Muslim countries their legal status is not granted. Some are legal sanctioned to practice their beliefs and promote their objectives while others have to work undercover due to their illegal status. The latter use different skills in order to pursue their struggle to improve their societies. Some use political parties as front organization in order to promote their political objectives. Other try to infiltrate or participate in other non governmental bodies or professional organizations with the idea of changing the society from the top level downwards, concentrating on harnessing the influence of opinion formers in society. While others involve themselves in working at the grass roots in the education system, spreading their values among the younger generation. As a final resort some movements have resorted to the use of direct force to fight the political regime of their countries that blocks every peaceful way to political and social change. However despite the differences in legal status all the Islamic movements operate as social movements in their involvement in non political aspect of daily life.

The Islamic movement are different from the social movements in western society in the basis of their values. While social movements in the west are linked to specific issues or events or are based on particular communities, it is important to emphasis that the Islamic movements are based on a religious creed, that is, Islamic doctrine and teachings. Such a religious basis provides the Islamic movements, in contrast with those social movements in the west, with a continuity and certainty in terms of their objectives and practice.

2.2- Mass Media and the Communication Process:

Media in our life

The mass media today has become a part of daily life. We wake up in the morning looking for the morning news. We stop before going to work to buy a

newspaper or switch on the radio to listen to some programmes and we repeat these things again in the afternoon or in the evening. The advanced development of modern communication media with their new information technology (satellite and cable technology) has led to predictions that the mass media will completely reshape day-to-day life in the near future (Glover, 1984).

The mass media play a pervasive role in individuals’ lives and it also plays a role in reshaping societies. The media can introduce new cultural values and offer new models for identification. They also focus attention, widen horizons, show other ways of living and of doing things, redefine problems, question traditions and conventions, suggest new answers, confer status on people and ideas,and indicate approval and disapproval with regard to behavior and attitudes (Halloran, 1982).

Cherry believes that:

“Communications have enabled the social unit to grow from the village to the town, to the modern City-State, until today we see organized systems of mutual dependence grown to cover whole hemispheres” (1 957: 4).

This global role of the media has caused Real (1989) to describe their existence in every aspect of our daily lives – they bring us the news, scare us, relax us, and at times inspire us and according to Real we cannot live without and sometimes fear we cannot live with. But whether we agree with the view of all embracing nature of the mass media we have to agree that they play an important role in the development of individuals and societies. They might present a “warped reflection of the societies of which they form a part, whether in the Third World or the industrialized world” (Gaillard, 1980: 6) but without doubt they play an important, if debatable, part in the formation of modern societies.

Over the years there has been much debate about the role of communication and the mass media in the social, economic and political life of modern societies. Before examining this discussion with reference to social and political movements it is important to define clearly what we mean by “communication” and “media”.

What is Communication?

According to MacBride (1988: 47) “the spectrum of communication in contemporary society almost defies description because of its immense variety and range of its components”. For most observers communication involves, as Williams summarizes, the process of “passing of ideas, information and attitudes from person to person” as well as from “place to place” (1966; 17). But as Williams and others have noted communication is not simply a matter of exchange. It is, as Barnlund states, is not a reaction to something, nor an interaction with something, but a transaction in which man invents and attributes meanings to realize his purposes” (1970: 87). Communication then involves a transaction not only of ideas, information and attitudes but also symbols and signs and its meaning is a process of interaction between the sender and the receiver. Man invents and attributes meaning and Peterson, Jensen and Rivers point out that he:

“is the one creature that reacts not only to his real physical environment but also to a symbolic environment of how own making” (1965: 15).

Communication according to Wright is “the process of transmitting meaning between individuals” (1974: 241). Nimmo explains the meaning of transaction more when he says:

“communication is the process of social transaction people use to construct meanings that constitute their images of the world (on which they act) and to exchange those images via symbols” (Nimmo, 1978: 5).

But what is the purpose or objectives of such transactions? When one or more human beings communicate with each other or with a database there must be some purpose to their communication.

Lasswell (1948) and Schramm (1973) have identified three primary communication goals. These goals are surveillance, transmission and coordination. They identified surveillance as the use of communication to understand and share information about the environment. Transmission is the transmission of culture and knowledge from generation to generation and from

place to place and co-ordination is the use of communication to manage society.

Middleton (1985) uses ‘inform’ instead of ‘surveillance’ because of its common usage, and ‘educate’ instead of ‘transmission ^lfor the same reason. But what Lasswell and Schramm identified as ‘co-ordination’, Middleton divides into two parts ‘persuasion’ and ‘co-ordination’. He defines persuasion as the use of communication to bring about desired change in people, groups and institutions and co-ordination as the use of communication resources to organize, stimulate or control the performance of individuals, groups or organizations.

Kincaid (1979) and Middleton (1985) add another communication goal: ‘dialogue’. Kincaid defines dialogue as the process through which interactive communication leads towards mutual understanding between the participants in a communication act. Wright (1959) highlights the importance of ‘entertainment’ as another goal of communication. For Middleton (1985) ‘entertainment’ is incorporated in all of the other five communication goals.

McQuail (1987) describes the mobilizing function of communication. He notes that communication plays a vital role in bringing people together: mobilizing them around a set of values or beliefs. This is crucial role that communication plats in all societies, developed and developing.

Thus in the process of communication we can identify the purpose of the transaction in a number of ways: sharing information, transmitting knowledge, attaining change, organizing people, providing entertainment or relaxation, and finally mobilizing people to act according to a communality of values.

Having defined communication as a process of transaction between sender and receiver directed at a number of goals it is now important to discuss the channels through which the transactions can take place. This involves the media.

Which Channels, What Media?

To send our messages to any person or database there must be channels for the messages to go through. These channels and forms have been changed through the ages. In early history people used doves, horses, drums and fires to transfer their messages. During the last two centuries technological change has made the transference of the messages wider and more sophisticated. Today we live in the era of instantaneous mass communication; McLuhan’s “global village” is with us.

Mass communications is the ability to send messages from point to a large number of people who receive them at the same time. For Wright “mass communication may be characterized as public, rapid and transient” (1974: 243). Wright means that the messages reach audiences within a short time for some types of mass communication, such as newspapers and magazines, but for other types the messages reach their audiences at the time of transmission, such as radio and television.

Peterson, Jensen and Rivers (1965) have described mass communication channels as one-way, attracting large audiences and where the process of communication is conducted by a social institution responsive to the environment in which it operates. They argue that in the process of mass communication the audience has little capacity to feedback its views and reactions to the senders.

It is possible to identify two kinds of mass communication channels. First there are the mass media or big media such as television, radio, press, films and magazines. But secondly there are alternative or small media such as books, journals, posters, leaflets, slides, poetry, cassettes, videotapes, pamphlets and underground pamphlets. It is possible to distinguish between the two for a number of reasons. Mass or big media are technologically more complex, more open to government or external control, more costly to operate and better able to reach a large audience. For Schramm the mass media are “complex, expensive media like television, sound films and computer assisted instruction”(1977: 15). Small or alternative media are usually seen as less influential than big or mass media and hence have been less worthy of academic research. However increasingly such media are seen as being effective in promoting dissenting political ideas in developed and developing societies. Small media are seen as being responsible for advances in farming, health and family welfare (MacBride, 1988; 51). The main feature of such media is their adaptability and flexibility in relation to their audience. According to Schramm and Lerner (1978; 343) they are most receptive to two way communication. They are also better able to be used to avoid government censorship and regulation. They are also cheaper and thus more available to groups with limited resources.

However mass communication channels are not the only communication channels. While attention has been focussed on the advent of new media technology in the late 20th century, there has also been a development of interpersonal communication channels:

Interpersonal communication “consists of the word-of-mouth exchanges between two or more persons” (Nimmo, 1978: 147). According to Ostlund (1973) interpersonal channels play a significant role in transmitting political information, although probably not a dominant one. That is because as Nimmo (1978) found in his research news about political events reaches a large portion of citizens through a two-step flow of information; citizens hear about the event by talking with others who learned of it through radio, television or newspapers.

The interpersonal communication channels may be divided into two groups. First, communication channels “most typically used to facilitate two-way communication between two points in the system” (Middleton, 1985: 25). These channels include letters, facsimile, telephones, computers, telegrams and telex. Then, Secondly, there are more traditional channels which “take place directly between and among individuals” (Middleton, 1985: 25) or as Goldhaber says ‘I two or more people directly communicating face-to-face” (1986: 313). These channels include Mosques and temples, conferences, public meetings, demonstrations and theater.

2.3. Communication and social and political movements:

In the rise of the social movements, the media has a major part to play in the creation of the movements’ values and leadership. The role of the media in this respect can make the social movements well known nationally and world wide or cause them to remain just local social movements that have no objectives and no influence further than the locations where they were established.

Because the Islamic movement can be categorized as a social and political movement (drawing its values from Islam) it wants to change the political and social system that is practised in the Muslim world to an Islamic political system and the Islamic social order.

To spread values or to change conventions or norms in a society, a social movement has to be in touch with people, policy-makers and those who oppose the changes or values. This communication with these groups can be achieved in many ways, such as meetings, letters, rallying, or demonstrations. But all these type of actions need a lot of physical and economic effort and investment and those who witness these activities are those who receive the letters or go to the meetings, rallies and demonstrations.

If the social movement that stages the rally arranges to cover it in the local newspaper, the local television and the local radio, almost everyone in the locality will come to hear about the rally and the values that the social movement stands for or the problems it wants to see addressed.

Let us go further in looking at this hypothetical rally. If it happens in Britain and is covered by the Times, the Guardian, BBC Radio, BBC TV and ITV we will find that the voice of the social movement, that conducted the rally, has been heard all over the nation and the reaction of citizens will be seen in different parts of Britain. In the meantime the movement itself will become well-known nationwide.

Lastly, let us go further still to see the effect of the rally of this social movement which has been shown on television in most of the countries of the world and reported in broadcasts, newspapers and magazines, again all over the world. That means that hundreds of millions of people in the world will know about the rally and will agree or disagree with it. The second important thing is that the movement itself will become known world-wide.

By this we can see that as much as the social movement manages to distribute its messages through the media, so there will be people listening and affected, positively or negatively, by those messages. On this basis also, the policy makers will bear in mind the strength of this movement before making any decision against the values of this movement because politics as Lasswell (1958) said is who gets what, when and how. Conversely, policy makers will

benefit from the support of this social movement if the policy they want to introduce or maintain is in the interest of this movement.

However social movements do not necessarily gain access to media channels on their own terms. Gitlin (1981) describes the compromises and accommodations that the American student’s movements in the 1960s had to make to gain access to the American mass media, particularly network news. He outlines how they had to respond and adjust to the image constructed of the movement by the media. By setting down or dictating the “frame” within which the movement had to operate the mass media played an important part in shaping the development of the movement, including its internal structure, the nature of its leadership, the type of political activity it undertook and the kind of goals it promoted. The American students’ movement had to reach the public through a news frame set down by the US media and this had major implications for what the movement said and how it represented itself.

Goldenberg shows the problems and difficulties faced by “resource poor” groups in gaining coverage from the mass media. He notes how those groups without money, status, officiality and knowledge find it difficult to initiate and regularize contact with the media (1 976, 145). Jackson (1971) writes about the determinants of failure of a social movement. He outlines the conditions that appear to be a prerequisite for success.

The first condition is communication. There must be effective communication linking like-minded people over an extended area into one group whose images and actions can be effectively co-ordinated. Mass communication alone is probably insufficient without a network of communication specifically linking those interested in the matter, permitting leaders to emerge and draw up plans, and keeping the leaders and followers in touch through trusted spokesmen.

The second is there must emerge leadership which will be followed by individuals from a variety of local areas and which is able to operate primarily on a community-wide basis rather than a local one.

The third is an ideology and a programme, suitable for rallying the bulk of the followers must be developed and widely disseminated through the communication channels already indicated.

The fourth condition is the public image of a movement must be that of sustained and growing strength, promising tangible accomplishments in the near future as sufficient reward for the disruption of ordinary routines involved in supporting a protest movement.

For any social movement to be successful in achieving political change, it must also understand the opinion process. Nimmo (1978) suggests three stages to the opinion process:

Personal construction (which) is the stage in which individuals take things into account, interpret them, and construct private, subjective meanings of political objects.
Social construction (which) is the stage of public expression of private opinion. That public expression takes three forms, group opinion when the private opinion has been discussed within social groups. Secondly, popular opinion when persons express views through the relative privacy of the voting booth, letters to congressmen, etc. Thirdly, the mass opinion which is the generally diffuse views frequently symbolized as a culture or public opinion.
Political construction when linking all the group opinions, popular opinions and mass opinions to the activities of public officials, sharing the responsibility for initiating formulating, adopting, applying, interpreting and evaluating policies.

In the second stage, social construction, the social movement needs the media in order to create the mass opinion. It also needs the media in the political construction phase to play the role of sharing responsibility with the government in converting mass opinion into the practice on reality’s stage. Gitlin points out that social and political movements need the media for many things:

” They want to recruit supporters and sympathizers. They want to challenge the authority of the dominant institutions. They want to attract, or at least neutralise, third forces. They may want to place issues on local or national political agendas. They may want to redress specific grievances. ” (1980: 242)

Gitlin underlines how it is not possible for those with dissenting political objectives to avoid or ignore dealing with the media at some point. The reasons for using the media highlighted by Gitlin apply to social and political movements in developing and Muslim countries. However the issue of addressing the media is much more problematic. The media in many developing nations, and in most Muslin countries, is state controlled and what is said or written is heavily circumscribed. In fact the mass media is often mobilized against oppositional or dissenting voices. Hence the political structures and culture are a vital aspect of any discussion of social and pblitical movements and communication in Muslim nations and it is to these questions we now turn.

2.4 Media Structures in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and

Turkey

In the Muslim World and the Third World countries in general, the mass media is heavily regulated by the state. Most of the mass media channels, such as television and radio stations, are owned by the government and as a result the mass media’s role concentrates on propagandizing for the regime and promoting governments policies. Other big media such as newspapers, magazines and films, are owned and produced by private investors. However they have to operate under strict censorship laws. The governments of these countries created the censorships laws to regulate private ownership. Often there is little need for such censorship as the private owners are either members of the government or the ruling elite.

For our purposes it is important to provide an outline of the media structures that exist in the five countries of our study, Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey. The importance of this analysis is to identify the media environment in these five countries that shape the use of communication by the Islamic movements. It will also assist in the discussion of the role of the media in the rise of the Islamic movements, as set out in Chapter Six, by revealing the ownership of the media in these countries and the extent of their freedom. For example, Kuwait as a state, not only owns the television and radio station but also censors independent newspapers and magazines (Al-Ibrahim, 1988). The Ministry of Information is responsible for directing “media policy, as well as culture, ideology and the arts”. This ensures the strengthening of “citizenship and promotes the national feeling according to the basic religious values, customs and traditions of Kuwait society” (Kuwait Al Youm, 1979: 3). But as Frantz Fanon said “A community will evolve only when people control their own communications” (quoted in Kellner, 1985; 79).

It is important here also to be aware of the percentages of television and radio receivers in the five countries. These percentages will give an indication of how many people in these countries have radio and television. Also by identifying numbers of newspapers and magazines in circulation in the countries under discussion, we may be able to gain insights concerning media freedom.

On the other hand circulation numbers of newspapers and magazines may show the effectiveness of poverty on illiteracy in these five countries.

Lastly, the numbers of films produced in those countries, compared with the number of films imported into those countries, may show us how much the film industry works in those countries to defend culture and national identity from outside influences.

We will study first the structures involved in the provision of radio programmes in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey. Then we will address the same issue with regard to television and cinema in the five countries.

2.4.1 Radio in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey

The ownership of broadcasting stations in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Pakistan is in the hands of the government. Turkey is the only country of our study that has a public ownership of this service.

The ownership of broadcasting in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Pakistan has given the Ministry of Information in those countries control over the design and production of all programmes and messages that the government wants broadcast through a monopoly of broadcasting stations in the country. It means that citizens in these countries only listen to one voice from the national broadcasting station, the voice of the government. That also means that the broadcast programmes belong to the Ministry of Information, as part of the government.

Turkey, ownership is not governmental but public. This public ownership allows broadcasting to have some freedom from government . It also allows the opposition parties to address their political programmes during election campaigns according to the Directorate General of Press and Information Ministry (1982). In the other countries, the ruling party or family alone has the right to present their political programmes.

Radio Broadcasting Programmes

The total annual broadcasting hours per year in 1987 were for Afghanistan 32620, Kuwait 21640, Pakistan 116098,and Turkey 211 15. If we look to the types of programmes, bearing in mind that these are developing countries, our attention is likely to be drawn initially to the low level of educational programmes. We find that the only country (from 1987 figures) rating higher than Pakistan’s 9.3 percent of the total broadcasting hours per year, for educational programmes, was Turkey with 13.2 percent of the total broadcasting hours, while Afghanistan had only 3.3 percent of the total broadcasting hours and Kuwait had no educational programmes at all.

Information and news programme broadcasts are much needed in developing countries to open a communication channel between the government that is trying to develop the country and the public in order to generate public reaction towards the government’s development plans. Afghanistan had the highest rating of informative programmes with 13.4 percent of the total broadcasting hours, white Pakistan had the lowest rating with 4.0 percent of the total broadcasting hours.

Rural development programmes broadcast in developing countries are strongly needed; firstly because of the developmental factor. The stage which some of these countries are at means that a large number of rural areas have no electricity (such as in Pakistan and Egypt) which in turn means they are unlikely to be able to watch television. Second, is the economical factor. Farmers, and Bedouins of the desert, have very low incomes which does not allow them to buy televisions even if they have electricity in their villages. But they can afford to buy radio because of its lower price and its use of batteries which allows them to be taken into the fields or deserts with no need for electricity.

Programmes for rural development in Turkey stood at 8.4 percent of the total broadcasting hours, the same as Pakistan, while there were only 1.7 percent of the total broadcasting hours in Afghanistan and nothing in Kuwait.

In 1987, religious programmes in Afghanistan were only broadcast for 0.6 percent of the total broadcasting hours, the same as in Turkey, because of the communist regime and anti-Islamic ideology in Afghanistan and the secularism in Turkey, while in Pakistan (during the Ziaul Haq government and its Islamization programmes of the State) there were 13.7 percent of the total broadcasting hours . In Kuwait, as a conservative Muslim society, there were 1 1.9 percent of the total broadcasting hours.

Entertainment has the highest number of broadcasting hours in all the countries of our study. In Pakistan, in 1987, it was 70.9 percent of the total broadcasting hours, Turkey 70.6 and Kuwait 70.3 percent of the total broadcasting hours. The only difference was in Afghanistan which broadcast only 17.1 percent of the total broadcasting hours (see UNESCO, 1990).

Radio Broadcasting Number of Receivers and Receivers per 1000 inhabitants

The number of receivers of radio broadcasting has been growing in Egypt since 1980 when it was 6 million; about 14.5% of the total population in the same year. The number more than doubled in the seven years to 1987 to 15,500,000, about 31% of the total population in the same year.

In Afghanistan there were 1,200,000 receivers in 1980, about 7.5% of the total population. The number had only risen to 1,550,000 in 1980, about 10.2% of the total population in the same year.

The number of receivers in Kuwait was 105,000 in 1970, about 14.1% of the total population in the same year. The number increased almost 6 times in ten years to become 600,000 (in 1987), about 32.7% of the total population. Although the number increased almost 6 times, the percentage was only increased 2.5 times because of the growth in the number of laborers in Kuwait during the last 2 decades which changed the population number.

Pakistan number of receivers in 1975 was 4 million, about 5.4% of the total population. By 1987 it had more than doubled to become 9,500,000 receivers, about 8.6% of the total population.

The number of receivers in Turkey was 5 million in 1980 which grew until 1987 to 8,400,000, about 16% of the total population (see UNESCO, 1990).

2.3.2. Television in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey

Television stations in Egypt, Afghanistan and Pakistan are government owned, but they are publicly owned in Turkey. Kuwait had a private television station between 1957-1961 before its independence in 1961. Two Behbehani brothers established the black and white private television station in Sharaikh in Kuwait in 1957, according to Al Bannay (1988). “On 15 November 1961, five months after independence, the Kuwaiti government bought the private station and became government owners” (Ministry of Information, 1981; 538).

The station was working through the Ministry of Guidance and Information (later Ministry of Information) by Emiri Decree No. 2 on 17 January 1962 according to Kuwait Al Youm (1962).

Television Broadcasting Programmes

The total annual broadcasting hours in 1987 were in Afghanistan 15035, Kuwait 5935, Pakistan 16841 ,and Turkey 5840. Information programmes occupy 3.5 of the total broadcasting hours in Afghanistan. This low level of information includes the news programmes broadcast while the country has been at war. This may show us the policy the communist regime has used to limit the citizens’ knowledge of the victories of the Mujahadeen and the role of the Soviet Army in influencing the regime.

In Kuwait there were 11.9 percent of the total broadcasting hours of information programmes in 1985, while in 1987 in Turkey it was 21.3 percent of the total broadcasting hours and 24.9 of the total broadcasting hours in Pakistan (the highest rating).

In Afghanistan, where one might assume people have the need for educational programmes because of the high rate of illiteracy, we find it was only 1.2 percent of the total broadcasting hours. But when we look to Turkey, we find the public television broadcast 16.5 percent of the total broadcasting hours of educational programmes.

Religious programmes have their highest rating in Kuwait (in 1985) with 9.5 percent of the total broadcasting hours and in Pakistan (in 1987) with 7.7 percent of the total broadcasting hours. The differences are Turkey, where there were only 1.2 percent of the total broadcasting hours(because of secularism) and only 0.1 percent of the total broadcasting hours in Afghanistan, because of the communist regime.

Entertainment programmes have the highest rating number of hours in Pakistan, Turkey and Kuwait. It goes from 43.4 percent of the total broadcasting hours in Pakistan (in 1987) to 47.3 percent in Turkey to 49 percent of the total broadcasting hours in Kuwait(in 1985) , while in Afghanistan it was at the lowest level of 1.2 percent of the total broadcasting hours because of the war (see UNESCO, 1990).

Television Broadcasting Number of Receivers and Receivers per 1000 Inhabitants

The difference between the rich and poor countries is evident particularly in the contrast between the number of television and radio receivers in the countries being considered here.

The number of television receivers in Egypt have grown very fast during the last two decades. It was 500,000 in 1970 then it went to 1,400,000 in 1980 to become 4,150,000 in 1987, about 8.3% of the total population in the same year.

In Afghanistan the number of television receivers also doubled. It was 45,000 in 1980 and in 1987 it went to 120,000, about 0.7% of the total population.

Kuwait as a wealthy country, has the highest rate of television receivers. It had 480,000 receivers in 1987, about 26.1% of the total population in the same year.

Pakistan number almost doubled from 1980 to 1987. It was about 900,000 in 1980 and became in 1987, about 1.4% of the total population in the same year.

In Turkey the number of receivers has increased more than 3 times from 1980 until 1987. It was 3,500,000 in 1980, increasing to 9 million receivers in 1987, about 17.2% of the total population.

When we compare the number of radio receivers with that of television receivers, we find that in 1987 Egypt had 30% of the total population with direct access to radio receivers and only 8% of the total population with the same access to television receivers. However, in Kuwait, in the same year, television receivers were available directly to 26% of the total population, only 6% less than the total number of radio receivers. In Pakistan, in that year, only 1.4% of the total population had television receivers. It is a fact that televisions are very expensive in some of those countries but it is also a fact that hundreds of villages have no electricity and that contributes to this difference between the percentage of radio receivers and television receivers in Egypt, Afghanistan and Pakistan (see UNESCO, 1990).

2.3.3 Newspaper and Periodicals in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey

The number of newspapers goes up and down in these countries. In some the difference is minimal, whereas in others, like Turkey, it is marked. It alters in Turkey from 437 daily newspapers in 1970 to 11 15 daily newspapers in just over 9 years because of the political freedom in the 1970s. A big change occur when the number went down again to only 34 daily newspapers in 1986. This change came about with the political change that happened in 1980 when the military took over the government and suspended all parties and political newspapers. ‘I A new press law promulgated in November 1982 which gave public prosecutors the right to confiscate any publication prior to sale, permitted the government to ban foreign publication deemed to be dangerous to the Unity of the County and made journalists and publishers liable for the issuance of subversive material” (Banks, 1990; 657).

In 1986, Pakistan had 1 1 1 daily newspapers in different languages, slightly less in number than in 1979 but with increased circulation. Using technology by

printing the newspaper in different cities in the same day helped in this increase as Okley (1992) notice. In Egypt and Afghanistan, the number of daily newspapers has gone down since 1970, but in Egypt this drop in variety has been accompanied by an increase in circulation according to the most recent figures (although these also show a slight drop against 1979). The estimated circulation per 1,000 inhabitants shows us that only 5% of the total population in 1986 were accounted for in sales of newspapers in Egypt and 0.7% in Afghanistan in 1970 (no figure available for 1986). In Kuwait, 2.7% of the population in the same year could be classed as purchasers of newspapers. Only 1.3% in Pakistan in 1979. These percentages give us an idea about how much daily newspapers might be expected to affect the public while they reach no more than 5% of the population (see UNESCO, 1990).

The number of non-daily newspapers in Egypt was 29 newspapers in 1985, while it was 519 newspapers in Turkey. The estimated circulation of these nondaily newspapers in Egypt was only 5.5% of the total population of Egypt.

Numbers of other periodicals were 277 in Egypt in 1985 and 73 in Kuwait in 1986 and 2670 periodicals in Turkey in 1986 (see UNESCO, 1990).

The big difference between the number of daily newspapers, non-daily newspapers and other periodicals in Turkey and the other countries that we are studying, shows the difference between cultural information provided to the public in Turkey and the other countries. This difference makes public opinion in Turkey more of a reality than it is in the other countries because it is built on information that comes from this large number of newspapers and periodicals which are usually specialized in politics, economics, education, industry, linguistic, religious and art topics. Harley (1977) believes that a fully informed public is the only reliable base for ensuring that a government of any country is responsive to the public will.

2.3.4. Cinema in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey

Films, as other types of mediums, play a role in the transference of knowledge and culture from generation to generation and also from place to place. Films also play a major role in creating images in e generation’s minds. For example, the image of the powerful white man has been created by tens of films such as Rambo and James Bond. Also, the image of the army that cannot be stopped (the USSR Army) has also been created by many films and in the Arab world, where “The lion of the desert” was a very successful film in creating the image of the anti-colonialism movement.

On the other hand, the political regime plays a major role in allowing the Eastern or Western films to be shown in a country. For example, 84.8% of the total number of films imported into Afghanistan in 1985 came from the Soviet Union. In Egypt, 75.4% of the total number of films imported in 1983 came from the United States (see UNESCO, 1990).

When we look to the feature length films that are produced in Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey, we find the number of films produced in Egypt slightly more than doubled between 1970 and 1975. It was 47 films in 1970 to become 90 films in 1975.

The number of films produced in Pakistan and Turkey had decreased since 1970; it was 141 films in 1970 in Pakistan, 120 films in 1975 and 57 films in 1987. In Turkey there were 160 films produced in 1975 which reduced to 74 films in 1980 and increased to 96 films in 1987 (see UNESCO, 1990).

Conclusion

This chapter discussed communication and social movements. It provided a definition of a social movement and located the Islamic movements in Muslim countries within this definition. It discussed the process of communication, identifying different kinds of communication and the different goals of the communication process. A distinction was made between mass and interpersonal communication as well as between “big media” as opposed to “small or alternative media” was noted.

We also discussed the relationship between social movements and the media. Drawing on work done in the west we noted the importance of the media to the development of social or political movements but also the many problems that such movements have in interacting with the media.

In the last section of the chapter we looked at media structures in the five countries of our study. We found that Turkey was the only country that has public ownership of television and radio stations, while in the other four countries the state directly owned television and radio stations. We also found that the numbers of newspapers and magazines went up and down with the political changes in Afghanistan and Turkey while in Egypt and Kuwait the censorship of media as a whole and newspapers and magazines in particular, play a role in rise or fall of their numbers. We also found that the film industry in these countries were permeated with the large numbers of imported films. The kind of imported films were determined by the ideology of the regime. Thus in Afghanistan the highest percentage of imported films came from the Soviet Union, while in Egypt, the large percentage of the imported films came from the United States.

In the next chapter, Chapter Three, we are going to study the broader socioeconomic context of Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey to find out the factors that determine the ways in which the Islamic movement work.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL ΙΝ EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, κυν,ΙΑιτ,

PAKISTAN ΑΝΟ TiJRKEY

POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, KUWAIT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

Introduction

In chapter one we discussed Islam in theory and the development of the practise of Islam since 1924 when the Muslim world began to fragment into more than 60 independent countries it today. From our study of this events since 1924 it is clear that the true beliefs of Islam have,as one leader of an Islamic movement has stated,been diluted and undermined by the development of socialist, secular, communist and monarchical political systems in the Muslim world (Kassem,1 991 ). The degree of commitment to Islam varies with the different kinds of political organization of the state in Muslim countries.

In this chapter we are going to examine the political background to the countries that we have selected for this study.Such a background will assist us to explain the position of the Islamic movements in these countries as well as proved us with knowledge about the context in which these movements have to operate. This is essential if we are to discuss the role of communication and the media in the growth of these movements.

As mentioned previously the countries selected -Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Pakistan and Turkey-represent the different kinds of political systems that constitute the contemporary Muslim world and under which the Islamic movements have to operate. Egypt is at the heart of the Arab world. Following the Nasserist revolution it established itself as a socialist-secular state with a number of political parties represented in the political process. Committed to the cause of Arab nationalism it became a leader of the Arab world. Today with its adherence to a liberal economy it is representative of the trend to socialistsecular political systems in the Muslim world. In one form or another such system can be found in Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, and Iraq.

Afghanistan is found on the far eastern periphery of the Muslim world. An isolated country with limited European colonial involvement in its development it became the focal point of East-West competition in the Muslim world following the Soviet invasion in 1 979. Until its recent liberation the country had a communist political system,with one party rule and close ties with the Soviet Union. In such as situation the cause of Islam was at war with the state.

Afghanistan is representative of the struggle that many in the Muslim world have had to go through to defend their faith. Similar situation have been found in Somalia and South Yemen.

Kuwait as a monarchial system is an example of Muslim countries ruled by Royal families, including the wealthy states in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia, Qutar, Bahrain,Oman and United Arab Emirates.

Pakistan is a democratic’ system modelled on Western system. Although the country has been subjected to military intervention, including two periods of military ruled under Generals Zia ul Haq and Ayub Khan, it has had a considerable degree of Western – in this case British -involvement in its development. In political terms Pakistan is similar to Malaysia and Bangladesh.

Finally there is Turkey. In contrast to other Muslim countries Turkey accepted the Western modelled completely on disintegration of the Ottoman Cilaph’at. Under Kemal Ataturk Turkey opted for a secular state, openly removing the state’s ties with Islam. This distinguishes Turkey from other Muslim countries and for one writer its the struggle to restore Islam is most keenly felt in the Muslim world (see Vatikiotis,1 987).

This chapter will then examine the political and socioeconomic background to the struggle for Islam in these countries.

The Political Structure in Egypt

The official name of Egypt is the Arab Republic of Egypt. Its capital is Cairo and the universally spoken language is Arabic. Islam is the state’s religion and Muslims comprise 94% of the population; the remainder are Coptic Christian.

Post war development:

After establishing a protectorate in 1914, Britain granted formal independence in 1922 to Egypt after the bloody revolution of 1919. Egypt, before that, was a province of the Ottoman Caliphat that had been occupied by Britain. Although Britain granted independence to King Fu’ad’s government in 1922, it continued to exercise a gradually dwindling control over the country until 1 956 with the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone.

Discontent with British involvement in Egyptian politics developed during the 1940’s, under the Kingship of King Farouk, the successor of King Fu’ad:

“Egypt was reflected in the rapid appearance of new social and political groups which, despite their different leaderships, shared a belief in violence – the use of force for the attainment of po/itica/ ends. By 1945 some of these groups accepted the use of violence for the resolution of social and political conflict” (Vatikiotis 1969: 315).

These social and political groups included Young Egypt, which was established in 1933 and which preached Egyptian nationalism with religious fanaticism and a xenophobic platform. The second group was the Green Shirts who were established in 1 922 and called for a resurrection of a glorious Egyptian past, and demanded an equally glorious Imperial Egyptian future. The third group was the Muslim Brotherhood which was founded by Hassan Al Bana in 1928 and who called for Islam as a system of life instead of the secular political and social Egyptian system that most of the Egyptian politicians adhered to.

According to one writer:

“By 1952, Egypt was in urgent need of reform. Among the features that caused most resentment among the majority of the population were:

Corruption in po/itica/ life.
Deterioration in the country’s economy.
Class distinction coupled with an elite educational system” (Hassan, 1978: 9).

King Farouk’s rule (1 936-1952) rule was abruptly ended by a military coup with the help of the Islamic movement “Muslim Brotherhood” in July 1952 (see Mardini , 1985 ). Officers who made the coup met towards the end of 1949 and organized themselves as the constituent committee of “the Free Officers Movement”. They were led by Major General Najib but the acting leader was

Colonel Nasser who agreed with the Muslim Brotherhood to practise Islam in

Egypt after the coup (Al Yaseen, 1 990). General Najib secured King Farouk’s abdication on 1 8th July 1 953 and made Egypt a republic under his presidency in June 1953 (Banks, 1990). “The Executive Committee of the Free Officers was expanded and became the Council of the Revolution. This was the new government of Egypt” (Sadat 1957: 1 31).

McDermott (1988) explains that Nasser, as an acting leader behind the scene came under pressure from three main political powers, the Wafd party, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Communists who sought to share power with the Free Officers. The Wafd party was tainted by corruption and scandal and Nasser was suspicious of the partVs political ambitions.(see Tigner, 1982). The Muslim Brotherhood attempted to make Nasser keep his promise to practise Islam and resist the increasing secularization of society. While the Communists were also looking for a share in power, Nasser suspicious of all parties played them off against each other until 1953.

In January 1 953, the government dissolved all political parties and movements and confiscated their funds (Abo-El-Nasr, 1 989). Then Colonel Nasser, who had largely guided these events, replaced General Najib, the first President who “became popular and in Nasser’s eyes, had developed with his easygoing style a dangerously close walk-about contact with the public” (McDermott 1988: 1 9). Nasser became the Prime Minister and Head of the Revolution Command Council on 24th February 1954 while Najib remained President of the Republic. Nasser militarized the government and stopped any political activity by the political parties including Muslim Brotherhood Movement. On 26th October 1 954 while Nasser was addressing a rally in Alexandria, to celebrate the signing of the Evacuation Agreement with Britain, a man tried to assassinate him. Nasser blamed the Muslim Brotherhood. He accused them of plotting to overthrow the regime while they blamed him for fabricating this action and using it against them (Al Houdibi, 1991). Police and security personnel arrested thousands of the Muslim Brotherhood activists and leaders and as one writer notes: “Six members of the Muslim Brotherhood were executed.” (Vatikiotis 1969: 386). Nasser consolidated his power on 14th November 1954 when the Revolution Command Council dismissed Najib from office and placed him under house arrest.

The institution of military rule under Nasser’s presidency signalled the commencement of an internal social and economic revolution. Egypt became a socialist country and an Arab nationalist country. This claim to socialism enabled the government to nationals the Suez Canal Company and all industrial and commercial companies. Nationalization was followed by the Suez War in October and November of 1956, when Israeli, British and French forces invaded Egyptian territory. These forces were subsequently forced to withdraw under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union. Egypt as a nationalist country, joined with Syria to form the United Arab Republic (UAR) under Nasser’s presidency on 1st February 1958. Syria however, reasserted its independence in September 1961. “The break up of the IJAR in 1961 may have represented the final failure of genuine political commitment – as opposed to propaganda campaigns – to the ideal of Arab Unity” (Cleveland, 1986; 9). The name, United Arab Republic, was used as the name of Egypt until 1971 , when it adopted the new name, Arab Republic of Egypt.

In reaction to western influence in Egypt since the last century, Nassar turned toward the USSR .ln 1 955 Egypt accepted Soviet military assistance. When Egypt incurred heavy losses in the six day Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, Egypt’s military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union increased. One of the results of this war was the subsequent overhaul of the state machinery and a far-reaching reconstruction of the Arab Socialist Union, which was the nation’s only authorized political party. Other political parties reacted strongly against the dominance of the Arab Socialist Union.

“Egyptian conservatives, whether aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wafd party, or some other group, despise Nasser. They believe that he and the other officers who helped him seize power in 1952, understood nothing of economics” (Sadowski, 1 991 : 52).

During Nassar’s presidency, all the opposition leaders were jailed. This included those of the largest Islamic movement in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, who had helped the “Free Officers” during the coup of 1952 by supplying 10,000 armed men to secure Cairo. Many of this movement’s leaders were killed or jailed.lt was not until 1971 that they were freed by Nassar’s successor, Anwar Sadat.

In September 28th 1970, Nasser died and Sadat came to power. During his presidency, Sadat was responsible for widescale political change in Egypt. Firstly, he succeeded in removing all political figures who were pro-Soviet

including Ali Sabri, the Egyptian Prime Minister. They were accused of plotting his overthrow. In 1 972 Sadat finally severed Egypt’s ties with the USSR with the expulsion of some 1 7,000 Soviet personnel from the country. Secondly, Sadat accepted United States’ support in effecting a return of Egyptian territory (held by Israel through the success of the 18 days war of October 1973 against Israel) through the Camp David agreement of 4th September 1975. This agreement guarantied territory lost in 1 967 to be returned to Egypt, as well as major economic and military support from the United States. The Camp David agreement was also responsible for the establishment of a relationship between Egypt and Israel which had not existed before. It made Egypt unique in the Arab world. Thirdly, Sadat reduced the role of the Arab Socialist Union (Ibrahim, 1988). In 1977, a law was promulgated that permitted the formation of additional parties under carefully circumscribed circumstances.

Sadat finally approved the peace treaty with Israel on 15th March 1979 and it was ratified by the People’s Assembly. A referendum held nine days later reported 99.95 percent of those casting ballots voiced approval. Sadat then dissolved the Assembly and called for a two-stage legislative election on 7th and 14th June 1977. Sadat’s National Democratic Party (NDP) won the limited multi-party election which was the first such election since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1953. This limited multi-party election “stipulated that no party would be allowed to function unless it had 20 members of parliament” (McDermott 1988: 1 10).

During Sadat’s presidency however, Egypt suffered continued domestic unrest. This threat arose from the government policy towards the Islamic movements and other political parties for more political liberalization.

Most of the Islamic movements’ leaders and other political leaders were jailed (although each time they were jailed their popularity become greater). These arrests occurred,

“under a code of ethics (law of shame) approved by the National Assembly on April 29 1980, which included the offences of inciting opposition to the state’s economic, political and social system and the dissemination of “false” or “extremist” statements deemed to have endangered national unity or social peace. Penalties imposed were imprisonment, fines, house arrest, suspension from politica/ activity, dismissal from employment in the service of the state and restrictions on overseas travel” (Day, 1988: 154).

The political unrest culminated on 6th October 1981 when Sadat was assassinated by a group of militants affiliated with the Islamic Organization “Al Jihad”, one of the Islamic movements in Egypt.

Mubarak, who was the vice president during Sadat’s presidency, became the president. He “has emerged as a synthesizer of Nasser and Sadat policies (Cantori 1987: 312). His party (NDP) retained overwhelming control of the Assembly after the 1984 election. The new Wafd party co-operating with the Muslim Brotherhood secured 58 seats. The government’s policy towards the opposition still causes unrest. Opposition leaders were again arrested under the law of shame and Islamic movement leaders were accused of campaigning for the institution of full “Shari ^la” or the Islamic law.

At the beginning of 1 987 “the opposition parties were angry about the electoral law requiring a party to win 8 percent of the total vote before being entitled to a seat in parliament” (McDermott 1988: 1 1 8). Anticipating a resurgence of the opposition and facing court challenges to the legality of the Assembly, Mubarak confounded his critics by mounting a referendum in February 1987 on the question of legislative dissolution. McDermott (1988) believes that because one of parliament’s functions is to endorse the appointment of a president, and as Mubarak’s term was due to end in October 1987, he could not run the risk of being endorsed by an unconstitutional body. The law preserving the 8 percent rule but permitting independents to stand was passed in December. That was why Mubarak held the referendum to dissolve parliament for the April elections. The subsequent election of April 1987 reconfirmed the NDP’s control with 346 seats. The Alliance of Socialist Labour and Liberal Socialist parties with the Muslim Brotherhood obtained 60 seats, the New Wafd party, 35 seats, and there were 7 independent seats. Mubarak thus received a public endorsement for a second term. The state of emergency law continued for an additional three years until 1989, after their introduction in 1981 with the assassination of Sadat. Article 148 of the emergency Jaw states:

“The President of the Republic shall proclaim a state of emergency in the manner prescribed by the law. Such proclamation must be submitted to the People’s Assembly within the subsequent fifteen days in order that the Assembly may take a decision thereon.

In case the People’s Assembly is dissolved, the matter shall be submitted to the new Assembly at its first meeting.

In al/ cases, the proclamation of the state of emergency shall be for a limited period, which may not be extended unless by approval of the Assembly” (Ministry of Information, 1984; 15).

Constitution:

The Egyptian Permanent Constitution was issued in 1 971 and amended in the referendum of May 1980 (Abo-El-Nasr, 1989). It defines in its first article that:

“The Arab Republic of Egypt is a democratic, socialist State based on the alliance of the working forces of the people. The Egyptian people are part of the Arab nation and work for the realization of its comprehensive unity” (Ministry of Information, 1984; 4).

It was clear then the Article that Egypt is in constitutional terms a democratic country. In reality the Egyptian government has refused to allow some of the political and religious movements to establish political parties or set up political organizations. Reasons for this refusal (as happened to the Muslim Brotherhood when they applied four times following the re-introduction of the multi-party political system Law)have never been given.

Under the 1971 constitution, executive power is vested in the president who is nominated by the People’s Assembly and elected for a six year term by popular referendum. The president may appoint vice- presidents in addition to government ministers and may rule by decree when granted emergency powers by the 458 Member Assembly. This latter functions primarily as a policy approving, rather than a policy initiating, body, although the constitution says in Article 86 that:

“The People’s Assembly sha// exercise the legislative power and approve the genera/ policy of the state, the genera/ plan of economic and social development and the genera/ budget of the state. It sha// exercise control over the work of the executive authority in the manner prescribed by the Constitution” (Ministry of Information, 1984; 6).

The Islamic movements have gained from the government’s abuse of the constitution by not only calling for their legality,but also for the change of the constitution to be fully Islamic. They introduced a slogan that gain them strong publicity among the Muslim citizens “Qur’an is our constitution”.

Political parties:

The Assembly consists of several political parties. The most important is the National Democratic Party (NDP). This party was founded by Sadat in 1978 as the principal government party (Sadat, 1978). The NDP was established by Sadat to control the new political order he was setting up after changing Nasser’s socialist ideas and rernoving Nasser loyalists from key political power.

He dissolved the Arab Socialist Union and established the National Democratic Party to allow freer rein to market forces and more expression for varied political groups. It is worth noting that 306 of 308 Arab Socialist Union members in the People’s Assembly joined the new party which proceeded to win a majority of the Assembly seats (Aly, 1988).

In the May 1984 election under Mubarak the party retained 390 of the 448 elective seats of the Assembly. The NDP also retained control of the Assembly in 1987, winning 346 elective seats, however, the election was tainted by opposition claims of voting irregularities. One of the major NDP policies is the”commitment to the principles of democratic socialism” (Day 1988: 1 55). However the party’s secular policies in politics and education are at the center of the party’s principles. In one of his speeches in 1980 Sadat explain his seculars policy when he said “there is no religion in politics, and no politics in religion”.

Oppositions parties:

Arranged against the NDP are several opposition parties ¹:. The oldest is the Wafd party.

-New Wafd party: The Wafd was originally organized as a delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 where it attempted to gain Egypt’s independence from British control. The party was involved in the Egyptian politics from that time until 1952 when it was dissolved by the revolutionary regime (Day and Degenhardt, 1 984). The party’s principles are more secular. The NWP was re-established in February 1978. The party’s leader, Serageddin, with the new generation of Wafd leaders, instigated demonstrations in several cities until November 1981. Later, in alliance with the 0. Muslim Brotherhood, the party won 15 percent of the votes in the 1984 election (Abo-El-Nasr, 1989). However, the party lost seats in the election of 1987 (23 less than in 1984) due to a split with the Muslim Brotherhood and a coalition with the Socialist Labour Party and the Liberal. Socialist Party (Banks, 1990).

-The Liberal Socialist Party (ISP): The party which was created from the right wing components of the Arab Socialist Union in 1976, formed the right wing parliamentary opposition to the government during Sadat’s presidency, dwindling to only 3 seats in 1987 as a member of the SLP-led coalition.

-The Socialist Labour Party (SLP): The party was founded in 1978 with its origins in the Misr El Fat’a (the Young Egypt) which was a socialist party founded in 1930 (Hill, 1984). In the June 1979 election the SLP became the main opposition of the NDP (Cantori, 1987). However the party failed to obtain the required 8 percent of the votes to secure a direct Assembly representation in May 1984, although 4 of its members were appointed by President Mubarak. In 1987 the party joined the coalition with the LSP and the Muslim Brotherhood which netted 60 seats.

The National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP): This is a left wing party dominated by social democratic and Marxist intellectuals. The party was created from the left wing component of the Arab Socialist Union. The NPUP formed the left wing parliamentary opposition to Sadat’s regime. In the June 1979 Assembly election the party contested on a platform that opposed the Egyptian Israeli peace treaty and failed to retain its two parliamentary seats.

Although the party leadership charged the government with fraud and harassment in 1979 and 1984, Mubarak included an NPUP member among the presidential nominations to get their support. In the Assembly election of 1987 the NPUP got less than 2% of the votes (Banks, 1990).

The Political Structure of Afghanistan

The official name of Afghanistan is the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Its capital is Kabul and which is dominated by the Pushtuns who are divided into two major sub-tribes: the Durranis and the Ghilzais. They make up 20 % of the population. The other major ethnic group is the Tajiks who comprise 30% of the population.

The official language is Pushtu and the second major language is Dari. However, there are more than 18 languages spoken in Afghanistan. While 18% of Afghanis are Shi’a, 80% are Sunnies and the remaining 2% are Hindus, Sikhs and Parsis.

Post war development:

Afghanistan was a monarchy until 1973. The monarchy was compatible with the tribal system and supported by Ulama. However, change began to take place in the 1920s.

In January 191 9, King Habibullah was assassinated, by a group of Mujahdeen’s supporters, (Abdul Baki, 1992). His loyalty to the British and his failure during the First World War to regain large tracts of Afghan land in India from the British in return for his loyalty alienated the king from many of his own people.

His son Amanullah became the new King of Afghanistan. He “developed friendship with the newly established Soviet government in Moscow..and to regain the territory lost to the British, in May 1 91 9 Amanullah attacked India expecting support from a planned uprising in the Northwest Frontier Province which however failed to materialize” (Klass; 1990: 41 1). In less than a month 35,000 British troops went to war with 50,000 Mujahdeen. The war ended with a peace treaty on 8th August 1919. (Sen Gupta, 1986)

Amanullah went for a seven month trip to India, Turkey, Egypt, France, the Soviet Union, Britain and Italy. On his return he tried, according to Klass (1 990), to emulate Kamal Ataturk’s transformation of Turkey by trying to westernize Afghanistan. Abdul Baki (1992) Amanullah called for the following changes:

For women not to wear the hijab (scarf); For provincial leaders and members of Parliament to wear western formal dress; For citizens to use the western way of salutation. For the activities of the Ulama to be restricted. (Abdul Baki, 1992);

In a Parliamentary hearing of 28th September 1928, he suggested prohibiting a man to marry more than one wife, changing the weekend from Friday to Thursday and limiting the age of marriage

In response, Fazul Mujadidi, one of the famous Afghan I-llama, with other Ulama issued a declaration that Amanullah had became a Kafer (not-Muslim) because of his rejection of Islamic law and traditions. This declaration was signed by four hundred Ulama and according to Schofield (1987) this forced the King to back-down and eventually to leave Afghanistan. The first attempt to secularise or westernize the country fell in the face of the Ulama’s influence.

Amanullah was succeeded by Habibullah Kalakani on 19th January 1929. Habibullah recognized the Ulama’s influence in Afghanistan and how it had •led to the fall of Amanullah. Habiballah called himself the “servant of prophet Muhammad’s religion” and be announced jihad not only against the British but also against the Soviet Union to liberate the Islamic republics in Southern Russia. This announcement encouraged the Ulama to support him (Abdul Baki, 1992). He stayed only for ten months when he was overthrown by General

Nadir (Schofield; 1 987) who had fought in the third Afghan war against the British. Klass (1 990) notes that in reaction to the westernization of Amanullah, many of Nadir’s edicts were designed to prevent the move to a more secular, western society, and an anti-modern mood set in.

Nadir was assassinated in 1933. He was succeeded by his 19 year old son Zahir Shah.Zahir Shah’s uncle, Hashim, served as the prime minister and the King’s advisor. During Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) the influence of the Ulama by gradually remove. Zahir Shah’s policy was to send them out of Kabul and other major cities to far-away villages. He also sent more students to France and Germany to train. These students returned to teach in Kabul University and in the modern schools which were set up to replace religious schools. A shortage of trained teachers in the country resulted in a large number of German and French teachers coming to work in Afghanistan (Gregorian;1969). According to Anwar (1988) these German and French teachers, were important in helping to disseminate western ideas through out the Afghan education system. The result of the spread of western ideas among the students was the establishment of the Movement of Enlightened Youth (ME Y) in 1947 by Abdul Rauf Benawa. It was, according to Anwar (1988), a loose kind of political movement and its manifesto (published in 1947) was actually the flowering of the tender plant sown by those Amanullah twenty years earlier. The movement called for the freeing of Pushtunistan which was under British occupation.

The Movement of Enlightened Youth received support from the press which was relatively free at this time. Publications such as Angar, Nadai Khala, Oulas and Watan newspapers, favoured the movement. In 1951, however, the prime minister “ordered a ban on the publication of all these papers. The editors were put in prison or exiled” (Jaekel; 1978: 105). Their criticism of the misuse of power by the Royal Family had brought them into direct conflict with the government. Eventually the government moved against the Movement of the Enlightened Youth which was crushed in 1953.

In the same year Daoud the cousin of Zahir Shah and his sister’s husband became the prime minister. During this time, Daoud took the opportunity to raise the Pushtunistan question after Pakistan became independent.

One of the leading supporters of Pushtunistan independence was the publisher of the journal Angar, Faiz (who was from Kandahar in Pushtunistan) and his friend, Noor Taraki, who used to work at the Bakhtar News Agency as an assistant director. Taraki became the leader at the Afghan Communist Party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965. Another MEY figure was Babrak Karmal, who was a student of Kabul University and became Deputy Secretary General of the PDPA in 1965.

Daoud brought Afghanistan and Pakistan to war when he raised the Pushtunistan question again in 1961 . Daoud resigned in 1964 and the King appointed Dr Muhammad Yussof as prime minister. Yussof was the first prime

minister who was not from the Royal Family. He was educated in Germany and was pro-democracy (Klass;1990) a new constitution was adopted in 1964 which in many respects similar to the American constitution. The Ulama fomented an uprising against the new constitution. The influence of Ulama had already been reduced through Zahir Shah’s efforts and the uprising failed. Many were jailed, and some exiled from Kabul.

The first nationwide parliaméntary election under the new constitution were held in September 1965. The PDPA got four seats Yussof resigned and Maiwandwal, the former Afghan Ambassador to the United States, became the new prime minister.

The failure of the Llama revolt led to a reorganization of the Islamic forces in Afghanistan. In 1968 the first Islamic organization was founded under the name of the Muslim Youth Movement (MY M). The founders of this movement had studied in Egypt and Pakistan and were influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Islamic organization in Pakistan. Gulam Nyazi, Rubani and Muhammad Nyazi were some of the movement’s founders. They were teachers at Kabul University while Hekmatyar, a student, became the leader of the youth movement. By 1 971 the movement formed 60 percent of the Students’ Union. They became a political force, challenging the communists to gain the hearts and minds of the youth, as well as the government. The government obstructed the growth of the movement by forbidding them to publish any newspaper or magazine and by using intensive propaganda against them.

However, ‘normal political activity’ came to an abrupt halt when Daoud, the former prime minister, launched a coup, while the King was on vacation in Europe, on 17th July 1973. He was the Defence Minister at that time. He drew support from a large number of young reform-orientated army officers who had had military training in the Soviet Union but were nationalists in their political leanings (Sen Gupta, 1 985: 15). Daoud abolished the monarchy and made Afghanistan a republic,and appointed himself president. He brought to the cabinet some Parchami communists.

During his presidency Daoud launched an attack on the Muslim Youth Movement.lts leaders were jailed and some of them were killed. The MY M was divided into two groups; the first led by Hekmatyar and the second by Rabany.

The first decided to fight Daoud and declared jihad against him. The second group called for talks with the government on the subject of changing its behavior towards Islam and the Islamic movement. Talks failed and the government become increasingly repressor the Islamic movements.

Under Daoud the communists increased their influence in government. Recognizing the growth of PDPA influence Daoud began to remove some of them. The result was the communist coup of 1978. Dupree (1989) described the way that Daoud governed his country as that of an old tribal leader who appointed friends, sons of friends, sycophants and even distant members of the deposed Royal Family. The army became increasingly restless with Daoud style of government.

Before the coup of 1978 there was a difference between the two communist factions, Khalq and Parcham. It happened, as Anwer (1 988) suggested, when Daoud threw out all the officers who played a role in bringing him to power. This was a major set back to the Parcham group because these men were Parchamists. Meanwhile, the Khalq group used the disaffection, created by Daoud’s action, to get more support in the army. This situation made the Khalq group stronger and more powerful than the Parcham group.

The Soviet Embassy in Kabul, according to Klass (1990), worked to heal the rift between Parcham and Khalq and it succeeded in bringing them together at the end of 1 977. Then the coup was planned in detail, and scheduled for August 1 978 (Kabul Times; 1 980). However on 1 7th April 1978, Khyber, the editor of the Parcham newspaper, and the ideological pundit of the Parcham group, was murdered by two men ². The murder of Khyber brought forward the date of the coup, according to Anwar (1 988) fearing Daoud’s plan to arrest all the communist leaders. On 27th April 1978, the PDPA carried out the coup. On 1st May 1978 the Revolutionary Council chose Taraki as the Chairman of the Council and Prime Minister, Karmal as Vice Chairman of the Council and Deputy Prime Minister and Amin as the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. After three months the two factions fell out. Parcham follower were accused of defending Daoud. The Khalq leadership under Taraki and his chief deputy, Amin, quickly turn against Parcham’s leaders” (Edwards; 1987: 2) and on 24th June, Taraki sent the Parcham leadership into exile.

Following the coup, the Mujahideen leaded by Hekmatyar conducted a massive fight against the communist government. The division between Khalq and Parcham helped them to take most of the country. Another element which helped was the factions of the MY M, led by Rabany and Hekmatyar joined together to wage the war against the government. The third important element was the inability of communist ideology to make in roads into Afghan society.

The Mujahideen went from victory to victory and in the war government forces killed more and more of the civilians particularly in the rural areas which led to hundreds of thousands of Afghanis leaving homeland to take refuge in Pakistan and Iran (Zad; 1 991). The government called in the Soviet Army after Taraki and Brezhnev signed a Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation on 5th December 1978, which opened the way for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan a year later (Klass; 1990). In September 1 979, Taraki met Karmal in Moscow and, according to Klass (1 990), drew up a plan to eliminate Amin. On 14th September Amin escaped from a trap set with the aid of the Soviet Ambassador. As a result Amin seized power, assassinating Taraki and becoming the new President, as well as Foreign Minister and Minister of Defence.

To reverse the set back the Soviet Union encourage Parchami exiles to met in

Eastern Europe and organize themselves for a return to power. In December Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan and on 27th December they seized Kabul. Amin, together with his family, was killed. On the same night, Karma! was established as the new president. He proclaimed the change of government in a speech broadcast from Tashkent in Turkistan. Four days later he came to Kabul. On 21 st April 1 980 the Revolutionary Council established the Democratic.Republic of Afghanistan:

However, the war continued between the Soviet Army its allies the Afghan Army, and the Mujahideen. The war lasted for almost ten years with more than

1.5 million deaths and more than 5 million refugees in Pakistan and Iran (Klass;

1 990)

The final stage of the war began on 15th May 1 988, the Geneva Agreement was signed between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union on one side and Pakistan and the United States on the other side. It included the withdrawal of half of the Sovit troops by 15th August 1988 and the rest within 9 months.

Although the Soviet troops were pulled out of Afghanistan the Soviet Union still helped president Najib’s government to survive. The Mujahideen continued the fight to practise Islam on their land through the temporary Afghan government they created in exile in Pakistan.

In April 1992 the Communist regime in Afghanistan finally collapsed and the the Mujahideen marched into Kabul (International Issues, 1992).

Constitution:

According to the constitution of 1980 which shaped afghan politics between 1 980-1992, the Revolutionary Council was the highest organ of state power. The council met every year in February and August and between these two meetings the Presidium deals with everything. The members of the Central Committee of the Party with the Revolutionary Council elected the Polithuro and the Presidium. The Revolutionary Council and the Presidium were presided over by the President with one or more deputies and a secretary, all of whom were elected by the Council from among its members. The President in Afghanistan was also the commander of the army.

The Council of Ministers is the supreme executive organ of state power with the constitutional responsibility for implementing governmental policy. The council is composed of the Prime Minister, two Deputy Prime Ministers and the heads of the various governrnent Ministries which are responsible for implementing the policy directives the of the Revolutionary Council. The Council of Ministers is charged with establishing budgetary expenditures, submitting legislative proposals, and organizing the execution of development programmes through the ministries under its control.

“It is also the Ministers’ Council responsibility to handle state security and for providing guidance in defence matters although in both areas, authority has been relinquished to the Soviet command which dictates basic policy with respect to military and security matters” (Edwards 1987 : 2).

Mujahideen gain from the centralization of decisions in the hands of the Revolutionary Council by showing the Afghan citizens the dictatorship face of the communist. On the other hand they show to the Afghanis the Mujahideen’s

democratic policies through their elected Shu’ra members in their contemporary government.

Political Parties:

The only legal party (at the time of writing the thesis) is the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) ³. It emerged in 1 965 as a constitutional experimentation inaugurated by King Zaher Shah. The party in its early years did not become known until he published his newspaper and made his organizational nucleus under the leadership of Taraki.

After two years of the party’s establishment divisions occured over the question of how could the party develop a popular base of support?

The first group were led by Taraki and the Khalq (Masses) faction advocated group who refused to co-operate with other new political parties. The second group were led by Karmal and the Parcham (Banner) faction who advocated a coalition approach that included working within the parliamentary framework. The two groups decided to split when Daoud (the former prime minister) in 1973 staged his successful coup and promised them a socialist reform and an open political system. Parcham backed the new government and consequently was damaged when the regime turned increasingly repressive and autocratic. In the meantime, Khalq stayed outside the governing coalition and pursued a programme of covert organization which focused particularly on the military officer corps and civil service.

The two factions were reunited in 1977 then they made the successful coup in April 1978. Relationship between the two factions was one of distrust.

Taraki was killed in the first year of the coup then Amin also was killed after a few months. Then Karmal became in power after the coup of 1980. With this coup the party and the government have become one, following the Soviet pattern. In the same year he invited the Soviet military to help his regime after the opposition was very effective.

On November 20th 1986, Karmal was removed from power and became a political refuge in the Soviet Union, after a visit to the Soviet Union for what were described as medical reasons. When Karmal stepped down as the

general secretary of the party in favour of the former head of the state intelligence service (Khad) Najib who became the new President of the Central Committee.

In December 1986 the party’s central committee endorsed Najib’s plan for “National reconciliation”. This plan was based on calling for a cease-fire, political liberalization and the formation of a coalition government, but Mujahideen and the tribes refused the plan and continued to fight until the communist regime stepped down.

On April 15th 1988, the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States, concluded a series of agreements providing for a Soviet troop withdrawal to be completed within one year. In the same month there was an election in the new national assembly then Sharq was appointed to be the first chairman of the council of ministers who was not from the party. But Najib dropped all the non PDPA members from the council of ministers in February 1989 after the Soviet troop withdrawal on February 1 5th of the same year. The Mujahideen’s vowed to continue their resistance until an Islamic regime was installed in Kabul.

Oppositions parties:

The seven Mujahideen parties who founded the Afghan temporary government in Pakistan with the other anti-communist parties ⁴can be described as the opposition parties in Afghanistan. The parties listed below are those which founded the temporary government in Pakistan and played part in new Afghan government following the thrown of the communist.

1 . The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar): The party was a part of the MY M which divided into two factions after the coup of 1973. One was the Islamic Party led by Hekmatyar and the other was led by Rabany and called the Islamic Society. The party is a Sunni creed.

The Islamic Society: It was a part of MY M and after the division with Hekmatyar, Rabany called his faction the Islamic Society. The party is also a Sunni creed (Khalil; 1991 ).
The Islamic Party (Khalise): This party was a part of the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and became an independent party after the failure of talks to unite the Islamic Party with the Islamic Society. Most of the party’s leaders are Ulama and judges. The party is a Sunni creed (Khalise; 1991).
The Islamic Unification: The leader of the party, Sayyaf was the head of the Islamic Unification when the Islamic Society united with the Islamic Party in 1982. After the failure of this unification, Khalise and Sayyaf established their own parties. It also is a Sunni creed (Anwar; 1988).
The Islamic Coup Movement: This movement is called by some writers, such as Klass (1990) and Anwar (1988) as a moderate movement, while the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic Party (Khalise), the Islamic Society and the Islamic Unification, are classified as a fundamentalist movement. The Islamic Coup Movement called for the return of King Zahir Shah and was openly supported by the Saudi Government and the United States. The party is a Sunni creed.
The Afghan National Liberation Front: The party was established in 1983. The party is has amongst its routs secular and nationalist elements but the party’s objectives are Islamic. Its founder was Mujadedi, a scholar in Shari’a, and his family were famous as a Sufi family. It is a Sunni party and according to Klass (1990) and Anwar (1 988), it is a moderate party because of the same reasons that made the Islamic Coup Movement moderate.
The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan: This party was also established in

1983. Its founder was Gailani who was the hereditary spiritual leader of the Qadirya Sufi doctrine. Gallani transformed his spiritual followers into troops. Klass (1990) described the Gailani family as a wealthy and influential family in Kabul before the coup of 1 973 when they were close to Zahir Shah. It is a Sunni creed and also a moderate party.

Political Structure Kuwait

The official name of Kuwait is Dawlat Al Kuwait or the State of Kuwait. Its capital is Kuwait, the only big city in a country of small settlements. The language of the country is Arabic. As a wealthy country Kuwait had introduced many benefits to its citizens (Al- Ali; 1989). However as a small nation Kuwait needs thousands of workers to help the country in its economic development. Those workers constitute almost 60% of its population (Crystal; 1987).

Kuwait first emerged as a semi-autonomous political unit in the early eighteenth century when it was settled by Bani Utuba (branch of the Arabian Anazah confederation). The religion of the country is Islam with 100% Muslims 90% Sunni and 10% Shi’a.

Post War development:

Kuwait has a Sheikhship system (Kingship system) according to the Constitution Article 4 which said “Kuwait is a Sheikhship heir system in the Sons of Mubarak Al Sabah” (Kuwait Constitution; 1991 : 6). In the meantime Article Six of Kuwait constitution said:

The system of the Government in Kuwait shall be democratic, under which sovereignty resides in the people, the source of al/ powers. Sovereignty shall be exercised in the manner specified in this Constitution

The ruling family is known as Al Sabah family. The origins of Al Sabah family, as a rulers of Kuwait dates, from 1756 when the leading families of Kuwait at that time, according to Crystal (1987), appointed a Sabah Sheikh to represent them jn dealings with the Ottoman Caliphat. In 1899 Sheikh Mubarak (founder of the current ruling line) negotiated a treaty with Britain which secured Kuwait’s independence from the Ottoman Caliphat in exchange for British control over its foreign relations (Ralph, 1976). He declare

“The said Sheikh Mubarak-bin-Sheikh Subah of his own free wi// and desire does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait, or at any other place within limits his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty’s Government for these purposes. This engagement also to extend to any portion of the territory of the said Sheikh Mubarak, which may now be in the possession of the subjects of any other Government” (quoted in Lauterpacht; 1991 : 10).

The association with Britain which continued until independence in 1962, consolidated Al Sabah family’s control over domestic politics (Ismael;1 982).

In accordance with the 1962 constitution, Kuwait’s chief executive, the Emir, is chosen from male descendants of Sheikh Mubarak. Since 19 15, Kuwait’s emirs have been chosen from Al Salim and Al Jabir branches of Al Sabah family. The actual selection is made privately by senior family members. The emir has very broad powers but governs within the informal constraints set by family consensus. In the family disagreements are managed and family control assured by the direct recruitment of family members into the highest and most sensitive administrative posts.

On 29th August 1976 the government of Sheikh Jabir Al Sabah resigned in the wake of criticisms of ministers by members of the National Assembly. The Assembly was made up mostly, socialists, nationalists and representatives of Islamic Movements. The Islamic Movement’s members in the National

Assembly also called for the change of Article Two of the constitution asking for Islam to be the religion of the state and Shari’a the only source of legislation (Al Khatrash; 1992). Sheikh Sabah, who was the emir at that time, responded the same day by dissolving the Assembly, suspending a constitutional provision that would have required a new election within two months and instituting severe limitations on freedom of the press which the Kuwait Constitution upheld in Article 37: “Freedom of the press, printing and publishing shall be guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and manner specified by law”. On September 6th a new government was formed by Sheikh Saad and Sheikh Jabir became the emir in 1977 has remain in power until today.

suspension the National Assembly was left on February 23rd 1981 when a new National Assembly was constituted. This Assembly has fifty seats (Europa Publications Limited; 1991). “The majority of seats are filled, as in previous elections by conservative government loyalists and members of traditionally allied families” (Crystal; 1987: 657).Sheikh Sa’d, the prime minister, was re-appointed in March 1985 after a ballot. However relations between the government and the assembly were still acrimonious and in July 1986 the Assembly was dissolved again. This happened after a series of confrontations between elected and ex-official government members over fiscal and internal security issues. In early 1989 a group of ex-parliamentarians, led by former speaker Saadoun launched a petition drive to revive the 1962 constitution and restore the National Assembly (Banks; 1 990). The government’s response was a new form of participation centered on a National Council of 50 elected and 25 appointed members to serve as a surrogate for the former National Assembly for the ensuing four years. But the opposition, from the Islamic Movement and the Nationalists, called instead for revival of the earlier parliament.

On 2nd August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait laying claim to disputed land and accusing Kuwait of stealing its Oil and destroying the Iraqi economy by flooding the Oil market with Kuwaiti Oil during the Iraq-Iran War. The Royal Family escaped to Saudi Arabia and Iraq formed a local Kuwait government for less than a month. The United Nations issued some resolutions calling for Iraq withdrawal and when Iraq refused to withdraw the war to liberate Kuwait started on 15th January 1 991.

After the liberation the Royal Family returned to govern Kuwait promising more democracy. In 1 992 elections of the National Assembly will be held and all the opposition parties agreed to work through the National Assembly when the government assured them that it will stick with the 1962 Constitution. The government also promised to change Article 2 in the Constitution to make Shari’a the only source of legislation (Al Khatrash; 1992).

Constitution:

The constitution promulgated in 1962 vests executive power in an Emir (Day and Degenhardts; 1 984), selected from Al Mubarak line of Al Sabah family, whose dynasty dates from 1756 (Ministry of Guidance and Information; 1964).

The Emir rules through an appointed prime minister and council of ministers. The constitution calls for legislative authority to be shared by the emir and the National Assembly which is subject to dissolution by decree.

The Islamic movements in Kuwait supported the return of Al Sabah family to rule Kuwait after its liberation.

Political Parties:

Legal political parties as such are not permitted in Kuwait. There is no legal opposition. There are however four main political groups:

The tribal and merchant families whose input according to Crystal (1 987), into the decision making process has declined because they have been mollified economically by the business opportunities associated with increased oil revenues and politically they have been partially co-opted into the state through the Assembly and ministerial posts.
The Shi’a: In Kuwait Shi’a are 10 percent of the total population and they are Persian in origin. Their influence was seen during the Iranian Revolution and during the Iraq and Iran War.
The Islamic Movement: There are two main groups of the Islamic Movement; the first one is the Muslim Brotherhood who works under the name of a social organization, the Organization of Social Improvement and after the liberation of Kuwait, they established apolitical movement to present their political viewpoints, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (Al Khatrash;1992).The second group is the Salaffies who follow the doctrine of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1791). They work under the name of the Organization of lhya Al Torath (Al Oune; 1992).
Nationalist and Socialist: Although they were two groups they worked together under the name of the Democratic Alliance in the National Assembly of 1985 (Banks; 1990).

The Political Structure of Pakistan

The official name of Pakistan is the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and its capital is Islamabad. The national language of the country is Urdu but there are other spoken languages. The dominant language is Punjabi which is spoken by 65% of the population. Sindhi is spoken by 1 1%, then 15% speak Pushtu and 1 0% speak Urdu. Pakistan constituent political units are the North-West Frontier, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan provinces.

Islam is the state religion and Muslims are 97 % while the remainder are Hindu, Qudiani, Siekh, Christians or Buddhist.

Post war development:

Pakistan obtained its independence on August 14th 1947 from Britain. It was a part of the British Raj. When Pakistan was liberated it was divided into two parts, Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The national territory was confined to West Pakistan with defacto independence of East Pakistan on December 16th, 1971 . The idea of a separate Muslim state was endorsed in 1940 by All India Muslim League (AIML) Which was founded in 1906 as a separate political party (Maddison;1 971). It was the main first potential rival to the Indian National Congress, a primarily Hindu body. The AIML was known as the voice of the Muslim population in India at that time. In the early 1930’s a statement by Viceroy Lord Irwin announcing Britain’s willingness to concede a greater degree of independence to Indians.

“stimulated the League’s temporary presiding officers, Muhammad Iqbal, to formally proclaim a separate Pakistani

National conscience and the necessity for eventual separate Muslim Statehood. Iqbal saw this goa/ as the final destiny of the Muslims at least of the Northwest of India” (Phillips; 1982: 2).

Maududi, the founder of the Islamic Organization, through his journal Turjoman Al Qur’an promoted Iqbal’s idea and established a center in East Punjab with Iqbal to study this possibility. In 1940 the AIML led by Jinnah formulated the Lahore Resolution which called for the establishment of a Muslim State in the Northwestern and Northeastern zones of India because of the Muslim’s population majority at these zones. Phillips (1982) described how

the Lahore Resolution led to the establishment of two Pakistan States, Eastern Pakistan (Bangladesh) and Western Pakistan. After the League success in the 1946-1947 election, Britain accepted partition and Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act, which incorporated the principle of a separate Pakistan.

Jinnah, the head of All India Muslim League and independent Pakistan’s first governor general died in 1948. He was succeeded by Prime Minister Liaquat. In 1950 “the Basic Principles Committee” proposed a bicameral legislature. This was to have a “House of Units” with equal representation of all provinces and a “House of the People” with equal powers, but with representation by popular election (Phillips; 1982). Liaquat was assassinated in 1951 which was a serious blow for the country because of its new independence. Liaquat assassination was succeeded a period of complete instability. In 1954 governor general of East Pakistan, Muhammad declared a state of emergency. The installation of President Mirza in August 1955 and the belated adoption of a constitution in February 1956 contributed little to political stability. In October 1958, Mirza abrogated the constitution, declared martial law, dismissed the national and provincial governments and dissolved all political parties. Pakistan’s failed to establish a stable democratic political system between 1 947 and 1958 because

“the basic organic law under which Pakistan was governed was the 1935 India Act, as amended by Pakistan in 1947. There were several features of the 1935 Act (as amended) and the political situation as it emerged in Pakistan that seriously complicated the task of formulating a democratic constitution and establishing a government based on this organic law” (Rose; 1989: 1 1 1).

Because Jinnah made himself the Governor-General with the broad powers in his hand then Liaquat ruled the same way. After Liaquat’s assassination, the Muslim League established a democratic constitutional system but the constitution did not, according to Rose (1989), create an effective leadership. This ineffectively made the change of the constitution in 1 956 to give the president the emergency powers that include the power to suspend the Constitution. This new article gave Mirza the ability to declare a state of emergency in 1958 and to suspend the constitution.

Ayub Khan took over the presidency from Mirza on October 27th 1958 and was confirmed in office by a national referendum in February 1960. He was the first president who ruled Pakistan with a martial law (between 1958 and 1962). In June 1962 a constitutional government under a presidential system based on indirect election was established. Ayub Khan was designated president for a five year term in January 1965. But Ayub Khan’s government put Pakistan under considerable pressure trying to achieve economic progress. These prussures plunged the nation into renewed crisis in the winter of 19681969(Rose; 1989). Ayub Khan resigned in March 1969 and Yahya Khan, the army commander in chief, became the president and put the country for the second time under martial law. During his presidency the war with India broke out in November 1971 and the Bengali guerrilla with the Indian military forces occupied East Pakistan and 90,000 Pakistani troops surrendered. All that made Yahya Khan step down as a president and he was replaced by Ali Bhutto who was “the son of a powerful Sindhi family and had been a rising star in Ayab government from 1 958 to 1 966” (Richter; 1987: 841). He was also the founder of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1967 that took office in January 1972.

In July 1972 Bhutto agreed with the Indian prime minister to exchange all occupied areas along the Western border except Kashmir where a new line of control was drawn. Then on July 10th 1973 the National Assembly granted Bhutto the authority to recognize Bangladesh and on August 14th a new constitution was adopted. The 1973 Constitutional System

“was democratic in theory and format but no less authoritarian than the Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan governments in practice. Indeed, Bhutto was far more ski/fu/ than either of his military predecessors in exploiting the various emergency clauses in the constitution to his own advantage” (Rose; 1989: 1 21 ).

Chaudhry became the president of the country and Bhutto designated prime minister (Burki; 1988). In the 1977 election the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Bhutto, won the election but nine opposition parties, who included The Islamic Organization, Pakistan Muslim League, Pakistan Democratic Party, Tehriki-lstiqal Party, the Organization of Pakistan’s Ulama, the Organization of Islam’s Ulama, the National Democratic Party, the Muslim Conference and the Khaksar Party, formed Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) and denounced the return as fraudulent and initiated a series of strikes and demonstrations that led

to outbreaks of violence throughout the country. Rose (1 989) believed that except for the period between 1 951-1958 Pakistani Prime Ministers, such as Liaquat and Ali Bhutto, ruled as the Governor-General in the Colonial tradition.

Sayeed (1980) compares Bhutto with Ayub in their dictatorships and deriving their power and authority from a well-established institution like the army in the case of Ayub or from a political movement in the case of Bhutto. Many of the Islamic Organization’s leaders and members have spent, according to Richter (1987), long periods in jail; Bhutto saw the movement as a conspiratorial group. He also tried to kill one of the opposition leaders in 1977 according to Al Muntada (1988). As a result of growing domestic disorder and faced with impending civil war, the army took power on July 5th led by General Ziaul-Haq. The new government arrested many of the leading politicians including Ali Bhutto and imposed the third martial law for the time in Pakistan’s history.

Ziaul-Haq declared in 1 979 that a non-partisan election to local government would be held in November. However he promulgated a complex party registration procedure with which the revived PPP refused to comply, and the election of October 16th were postponed. After four years of a martial law Ziaul Huq promised an election that would be held by March 1985. This announcement helped to undercut the movement for the restoration of democracy that was led by PPP. Ziaul-Haq also promised an Islamization of the country’s systems and in late 1984 he announced a December 19th referendum on his Islamization programme which he interpreted as a mandate for him to remain president until 1989.

In February 1985 the scheduled parliamentary election on a non-party basis, produced a large turnout of 52% of the electorate. Ziaul-Haq interpreted this as a personal victory. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) Pir Mardan group,and and the Islamic Organization were the two major parties that gained at these elections (Richter, 1987). As a result, Ziaul Haq dissolved the cabinet and designated Junejo of the PML as the country’s first prime minister in eight years. In the absence of legal parties the Assembly divided into two groups. Official Parliamentary Group (OPG) who supported the government and the Independent Parliamentary Group (JPG) who formed the opposition and who were dominated by the The Islamic Organization). The Islamic Organization, adopted as its primary goal the lifting of martial law and the curbing of presidential power. The increasing fragility of the opposition alliance was demonstrated at technically party-less local elections in November 1987.

In May 1988 Ziaul Huq abruptly dismissed Junejo ^ts government because of alleged corruption and dissolved the National Assembly, as well as the local governments assemblies. On July 20th he announced that free, fair and independent election to the national and provincial assemblies would be held on November 1 6th and 19th respectively, but on August 17th Ziaul Huq was killed by a bomb in a military aeroplane, with thirty five of his Army generals (Al Hamidi,1 988).

The senate chairman Ishaq Khan was sworn in as acting president and announced the formulation of a caretaker Emergency National Council to rule the country until November’s election. In the election the PPP achieved second place in three of the four provincial elections with a plurality at the National Assembly. Ishaq Khan appointed Benazir Bhutto as a prime minister on December 1st and was himself elected to a five year term as president on December 12th.

In 1989 relations between Ishaq Khan and Benazir became increasingly strained that a non-confidence vote on November 1st was held and the government narrowly survived and then in 1990 Ishaq Khan dismissed the government accusing them of corruption. After the dismissal of Benazir’s government the election was held again in the same year and Nawaz Sharif became the Prime Minister representing the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA) with the alliance of the Islamic Organization other small parties.

Constitution:

Pakistan is a democratic multi-parties system. Between 1947 and 1973 Pakistan adopted three permanent and four interim constitutions. Then in 1973 a presidential system was introduced by Ayub Khan and then replaced by a parliamentary form of government. In 1977 a martial law started and in 1981 an interim constitution promulgated which increased the power of the president. The restored Federal Assembly remained bicameral but largely advisory senate and a popularly elected National Assembly.

The Islamic movements gain from the democratic multi-parties system in Pakistan by forming their own parties to Islamized the economic and education systems.

Political Parties:

The Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA): The party was formed in August 1988 by PML’s Fida Group, led by Fida Khan after its break with the Junejo group. On October 15th the two factions reunited to form an electoral coalition of the groups listed below, plus a number of smaller formations that are Azad groups and Jihad party.

The party with the lead of Nawaz Sharif and the alliance of the Islamic Organization and other political parties succeeded in the election of 1990 and came to power with Nawaz Sharif as the prime minister.

The Islamic Organization: The Islamic Organization was organized in India in 1 941 and advocates the establishment of an Islamic State in Pakistan. Many of the party’s leaders and activists have spent long periods in jail particularly under Ali Bhutto’s regime, who saw the Islamic Organization as a conspiratorial group. The party contested the 1977 election as part of the PNA. In 1979 the party was one of three major parties which registered with the election commission by September 30th as required under an amended political parties act announced a month earlier. After Ziaul-Huq postponed the election and banned party political activity, the party pressed for early elections and the end of the martial law while continuing to give broad support to the regime’s Islamization programme (Al Hamidi; 1988).

Members of the party ran as individuals in the 1985 election. In the mean time the Islamic Organization led the ‘PG and the anti-martial law forces and despite its unregistered status, functioned as the largest legislative opposition party. In 1990 the party joined the collection of parties led by Nuwaz Sharif.

Oppositions parties:

The major political parties ⁵are

Pakistan Muslim League (PML)

The party has gone through numerous transformations since it was founded in 1962 as a successor to the All India Muslim League. Following a factional split in the party each faction would claim the party name in an attempt to capitalize upon the reputation of the party which brought the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). At the time of 1977 election there were three major PML. One under the leadership of Mardan Shah of Pageira, another led by Malik Qasimard, the third led by Abdul Qayyum Khan. The first one was the largest and was an active component of the PNA, the nine part coalition that battled Bhutto’s PPP in the 1977 election.

During Ziaul Huq presidency the PML (Pagara) supported the military government and it was along with the Islamic Assembly who allowed their members to contest the 1985 election. When Junijo established an official parliamentary group (OPG) in the National Assembly and after passage of the political parties act Junijo proceeded to transform the OPG into a revived PML. Nearly two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly attended the inaugural session of the revived party, many of whom had not been associated with the earlier Pagara League. The PML split again in 1988 but reunited under the IDA banner prior to the November balloting at which both Janeijo and Pagara failed to secure re-election (Day and Degenhardt; 1984).

Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)

The party was founded in 1 967 by Ali Bhutto and Rahim, a former high ranking civil servant and intellectual who formulated the party’s original programme(Richter; 1 987).The PPP got 155 of 200 seats in the 1977 election when Bhutto was Pakistan’s prime minister. Bhutto was executed in April 1979 and because the party structure was organised around the family, his widow and daughter became the leaders of the party. Both Nusrat (his widow) and Benazir (his daughter) were under house arrest for several years after Bhutto’s execution. They then went to exile in London. In July 1985 Benazir returned to Pakistan because of the wake of charges against her. After successfully fighting these charges she took over the running of the PPP. Benazir appeared to retreat from the populist policies of her father and adopted a strategy of providing candidacies to former Ziaul-Huq supporters during the 1 988 electoral campaign. The PPP won 92 of 205 contested seats at the National Assembly

balloting in November 1988. With the support of independent candidates and the smaller parties, Benazir became prime minister on December 1st 1988.

3 Pakistan People’s Alliance (PPA)

The party was formed in October 1988 by two parties the Solidarity Movement and the Assembly of Pakistani Clergy. The new formation was agreed, after a projected alliance with the Junejo group had collapsed, but not to contest seats for which the• IDA would present candidates. The Solidarity Movement (SM) is a democratic Islamic group that was a founder member of the PNA. It withdrew in November 1977. In September 1986 most of the party’s leaders withdrew in opposition to Benazir domination of the alliance after it was a leading component of the Movement for The Restoration of Democracy (MRD) (Richter; 1987). Asghar Khan resigned from the party’s presidency in December

1988 following the poor showing at the November election. The JUP or the Assembly of Pakistani Clergy was founded in 1968. It was a popular Islamic group that withdrew from the PNA in July 1978. The party joined the MRD in 1981 . Noorani, the party’s leader, failed to secure an Assembly slot in 1988.

The Political Structure in Turkey

The official name of Turkey is the Republic of Turkey. Its capital is Ankara and the spoken language is Turkish with Arabic spoken in the South and Kurdish in the East and part of the South. Muslims comprise 98% and the remainder are Christian and Jews. There are two main ethnic groups – Turks 85% and Kurds 12% and the remainder are Arabs.

Post war development:

Kemal Ataturk was the founder of the modern Turkey. Turkey, used to be the Ottoman Caliphat founded as we noted in the thirteenth century. Turkish history did not,as one writer notes,

“began as abruptly as many Turks or Turkish school text books would suggest with the declaration of the Republic in October 1923.the attention paid to Ataturk’s role in the formation of the Republic often seems to suggest a complete break with the past

and to deny the existence of any influence of the past on the present’ (Pickering, 1 989; 18).

Ataturk did not only abolish the Ottoman Caliphat but he also tried to separate the “Turks from the various social, cultural, economic and psychological constraints of the Ottoman Islamic system and world view” (Okyar, 1984). To do this Ataturk established a program of action based on the following strands:Republicanism, Nationalism, Popularism, Statism, Reformism and Recularism (Dumont; 1984).

In one of his speeches in 1925, Ataturk said

“Religion is a matter of conscience. Everybody is free to obey the dictates of their own conscience. We respect religion, we are not against thought and reflection. We only try not to mix religious affairs with state and other affairs” (Mills Egitim Genelik Ve Spor Bakanlighi (2), 1987).

It is clear from this statement that Islam in Turkey had to be as Christianity is in Europe, no involvement for Islam in the state’s system. This idea has been practised and taught in the Turkish schools since Ataturk. In a textbook used widely in Turkish schools since 1982 the explanation of the role of religion in modern Turkey is clearly presented.

“1n understanding the concept of secularism, religion does not involve itself in the state and politics. In short, religious men cannot make policy as if they were running the state ” (Mills Egitim GeneJik Ve Spor Bakanlighi (3), 1987).

Ataturk initiated the most rigorous attack against Islam in any country in the Muslim world. Firstly, he abolished the Caliphat which is the main part of the Islamic political system. He stopped the practice of Shari’a in Turkey and used instead European laws. He also changed the Azan (the calling for prayer) from Arabic to Turkish. He also changed the Weekend Holy Day from Friday, the Muslims Holy Day, to Sunday. He also prohibited the celebrations of the two yearly Islamic Eids (the first day of the tenth month and the tenth day of the twelfth month in the Hijry Calendar) (WAMY, 1989). Ataturk in his drive to secularise executed hundreds of Muslim scholars who tried to criticize his antiIslamic decisions. He stated the reason for the change in August, 1925:

“the aim of the revolutions which we have been and are now accomplishing is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society entirely modern and completely civilized in spirit and in form. This is the central pillar of our revolution and it is necessary utter/y to defeat those mentalities incapable of accepting this truth” (quted in Lewis, 1961 ; 410).

The modern and civilized society to which Ataturk refered to was the western society and the Western civilization. Pickering (1989) describes Ataturk’s attitude that there could be no civilization unless it was Western civilization

Some of the laws passed by Ataturk to civilize Turkey included a law which make Turks wear European suits and hats. Women were legally instructed to take off their Hijab. He changed the written letters of the Turkish language from its Arabic script to the Latin script. Not only that, but he also sent all the books that had been written in the Arabic script, to Afghanistan and India and abolished the old script (WAMY, 1989). Ozbudan describes these changes as:

“This was a period of radical secularizing reforms such as the banning of religious orders; the adoption of the Swiss civil code to reduce the Shari’a ^ts acceptance of other Western codes in the fields of penal, commercial and procedural law; the closing of religious schools; the outlawing of the fez; the adoption of a Latin alphabet and the international calendar; the repeal of the constitutional provisions that made Islam the officia/ religion of the state” (1989; 196).

Another example of Ataturk’s beliefs was his attempt to change the Islamic form of worship;

“In 1928 a committee was set up from the Faculty of Theology at Ankara University to make recommendations on possible ways of modernizing Islam and beginning the process of attitudinal change. They too came up with suggestions based on a Western design. They advocated a development of specia/ instrumental

music for the Mosque; pew-like seating in Mosques and generally they wanted the Mosque to fu/fi/ a similar function to that of a church” (Pickering, 1989; 29).

This was how Ataturk wanted Turkey, a modern nation. In realty “neither Ataturk’s example, nor his speeches, nor the changes in the law that he instigated could undermine centuries of tradition augmented by religious beliefs and customs” (Browning, 1 985; 33). As Akural (1 975) points out, the vast majority of Turks remained fundamentalist in religion, nativist in prejudice and conservative in life-style.

Under Ataturk Turkey was ruled by a single party regime; the Republican People’s Party (RPP). Ozbudun (1989) described the RPP as a coalition between the central military-bureaucratic elite and the local notables and it was dictated by the circumstances of the War of Independence, that made the RPP regime be described as a case of low political participation and a high political institutionalization.

In 1945 the RPP regime allowed the formation of an opposition party. This allowed the historic transition from a single party political system to a multi-party political system. Inonu also moved the country into long term alliance with the West” (Rustow, 1986: 59). An opposition party was formed from dissenting RPP members in the parliament and was named the Democratic Party (DP). After five years the Democratic Party won the free parliamentary elections on 14 May 1950.

The DP was led by Inonu who promised more democracy allowed religious schools to open its doors to students and returned on the Azan (calling for the prayer) to its Arabic words. In the second national election of 1954 the DP again won and remained in power until the military coup of 27 May 1960.

The strength of the DP, according to Ozbudun (1989) came from the ability to build a coalition of urban, liberal, commercial middle classes, the more modern sections of the rural population and the Nursi’s (the largest Islamic movement in Turkey in 1960).

The military coup of 1960 was welcomed and supported by the RPP who believed that Turkey under the DP was moving away from Kemalist principles

and doctrines. The military coup leaders expressed their allegiance to Kemalist principles and declared that these principles would continue as a symbol of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The coup generals formed the National Unity Committee (NUC) to rule the state. The NUC dissolved the parliament and banned the DP and arrested all its leaders and executed Manderes and imprisoned Bayar (Banks; 1990).

A new constitution was prepared according to Ozbudun (1989) in 1961, by the NUC and a co-opted representative assembly dominated by pro-RPP bureaucrats and intellectuals reflecting the basic political values and interests of the NUC. The importance of the 1 961 constitution was the introduction of judicial review of the constitutionality of law, the effective independence for the judiciary, the creation of Senate of the republic and the granting of substantial autonomy to certain public agencies such as the Universities and the Radio and Television Corporations.

Under the new constitution the 1 961 election was held and the RPP won with 36.7 percent of the votes, while the DP, that changed its name to become Justice Party (JP), got 34.8 percent. The JP returned to power when it got 53 percent of the popular votes in the 1 965 election and repeated its success again in the 1969 election with 46.5 percent of the popular vote.

Although the JP was a (right) secular party it made some concessions to the Islamic movement and went further than the DP when it appointed some ministers who supported the Nursi’s Islamic Movement to get the movement’s votes during the elections. However in 1971, the first Islamic Party the National Order Party (NOP) was founded, under the leadership of Erbakan. Its life was short lived because of the call for Islam and its denunciation of Ataturk secularization. The NOP was banned in 1972 (WAMY, 1989).

At the end of the 1960s there was increasing acts of violence by extremist leftwing groups who supported the RPP and the extremist right-wing groups who supported the JP. The violence led to the military memorandum of 12 March 1971 that forced the JP government to resign. Ozbudun (1989) believed that although the military did not dissolve the parliament it produced and encouraged the formation of an “above-party” or technocratic government under the veteran RPP.

The RPP emerged after many years to win the election of 1973 with 33.3 percent of the popular vote. The party’s direction was changed after the replacement of the party’s leader Inonu with the more socialist include Bulent Ecevit. The new image of the party appealed to the urban lower classes which allowed it to gains the strongholds of the DP and the JP (Ozbudun and Ulusan;

1 980)

The 1973 election witnessed the birth of the second Islamic party, the National Salvation Party (NSP). Started by a group of University professors and merchants led by Professor Erbakan, the founder of the NOP. As Turkey’s secularized constitution does not allow any religious parties, the NSP called for the defence of the Islamic moral and cultural values and for the defence of small merchants rather than for a full Islamic state. The NSP got 12 percent of the votes.

The outcome of the 1973 election a coalition government inevitable. The RPP with the NSP formed the first coalition government. This government did not survive for long. In 1974 the coalition collapsed and a new coalition called the Nationalist Front which contained the DP, NSP, National Action Party (NAP) and Republican Reliance Party (RRP) was formed. Erbakan, the leader of the NSP, was the deputy Prime Minister during this coalition which lasted until

1977

The position of the NSP in the government allowed the party to spread the message of Islam. The coalition established more religious schools (Imam and Khatip schools) and the party played a major role in bringing Turkey closer to other Muslim countries (The Welfare Party representative, 1 991). This government lost its parliamentary majority after the detection of some JP deputies.

A new government led by RPP with those JP deputies was formed and stayed in power until its resignation in November 1979.1n the elections the JP came to power with 47.8 percent of the votes. The JP formed a minority government with the NSP and the NAP and remained in power until the military coup of 12 September 1980.

The participation of the NSP, an Islamic party in the Nationalist Fronts during the 1970s was against the constitution.

Article 14 notes:

“None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State, its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas” (The Directorate General of Press and Information, 1982; 5).

In 1 980 the military return to power. According to Banks (1990) the widespread civil and political unrest throughout 1978 and 1979 and the failure of the National Assembly to elect a new president or to promulgate more drastic security legislation. Were the main reasons for the coup in September of that year.

The coup generals through the National Security Council (NSC) suspended the constitution, dissolved the Assembly, proclaimed martial law and in the same month designated a military-civilian government under Admiral Ulusu (Day and Degenhardt, 1984). The new government banned all political parties and detained many of their leaders as Demirel, Ecevit and ErbaKan and arrested more than 20,000 persons on political charges (Banks, 1990).

On 7 November 1982, a new constitution was approved with a national referendum. The coup head, General Evren became the president of the republic and for a period of seven years he and the other four members of the NSC ruled the country. By 1 983 the NSC allowed the establishment of new political parties and the holding of new elections, but the NSC exercised strict control over the entire party formation and election process. It permitted only three of the fifteen newly established parties to participate in the election (Magna’rella :1 987)

The three paäies that had the qualification to join the election of 1983 were the Motherland Party (MP), the Populist Party (P P) and Nationalist Democratic Pany (NDP).

“The 1983 election law is based on the d’Hondt system, preserving proportional representation, but disadvantaging small parties. The law assigns one GNA (Grand National Assembly) seat to each of Turkey’s sisty-seven provinces and allocates the remaining 333 by the populations of electoral distracts. Political parties failing to win at least 10 percent of the national vote get no seats, while the party receiving a plurality of the vote wins an additional bonus seats” (Magnarella, 1987; 1 124).

On the other hand the NSC political parties law of 1983 protected Turkey’s secularism and nationalism. According to the law;

“it was illega/ to form or join any communist-orientated party or any party which sought to impose the rule of one social class over another. To create a religious basis for the state. To establish a dictatorship.

Parties were banned from any trade union affiliation and were required to deposit their funds with the state banks” (Day and Degenhardt, 1984; 457).

Also the law provides restrictions on political activities of former political leaders for ten years. Then it was repeated by the Constitutional referendum of 1987.

The Motherland Party (MP) led by Turgut Ozal won the election with 45.2 percent of the votes. Ozal “had emerged as an effective organizer, a tireless campaigner, and Turkey’s first public figure to use television to full advantage”(Rustow, 1986; 59) After the election three more parties were allowed to be established, the Right Way party (RWP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and an Islamic party, the Welfare Party (WP).The new parties were allowed to participate in local elections in March 1984.

In the election of 1 987 the MP increased its majority. Its share of seats rose from 212 in 1983 to 251 in the 400 seats of the GNA.

In the local election of 1 989, the MP got only 22 percent of the votes with, according to Banks (1 990), no reduction in the cost of living and confronted with a governing style that was viewed in the citizens eyes as increasingly arrogant. But Ozal did secure the presidency for him as a successor to Evren in October 1 989.

This situation allowed Demirel the leader of RWP to come back to office after winning the election of 1991 .

Constitution:

The Turkish Constitution of 1 982 defines The Republic of Turkey as a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law. As Article 2 says:

The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and socia/ State governed by the rule of law; mindful of the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights, loya/ to the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental principles set forth in the Preamble.

From Article 2 it was clear that Turkey is a democratic and secular state and its loyalty goes to the nationalism of Ataturk. The constitution does not talk or mention that Islam is the religion of the State. On the other hand, it refers to:

“The concept of Nationalism and the principles and reforms set forth by the founder of the Turkish Republic, the immortal leader and unrivalled hero, Ataturk and the principle that no idea or opinion be contrary to Turkish national interests and to the indivisibility of the Turkish State and territory as well as Turkish historical and values and the ideas inherent in the nationalism, principles, reforms and modernizing mission set forth by Ataturk shall be granted protection and that as required by the principle of secularism there sha// be absolute/y no interjection of the sacred tenets of religion into State affairs and politics. ‘

The Islamic movements gain from the constitution’s focus on Nationalism and used this terms publicly during the elections campaigns and interpretated it as nationalism of Islam.

Political Parties:

The Right way (RWP):

This party is the successor of Grand Turk Party (GTP) that was banned shortly after its establishment in May 1983 because of its links with the former Justice Party (JP). The party came to power in the election of October 1 991 under its leader Demirel (the former prime minister and the party Chairman).

The party is a right-wing party calling for capitalism in Turkey (Banks :1990). According to Harb (1 985), the party, from its establishment, prepared Turks with an image that it is a possible party of Islam, despite Islam being different than the basic ideal of the party such as capitalism and Ataturk secularism which the party supported.

On November 1 987, the party was in third place in the National Assembly election. Then in 1991 the party won the election.

The party’s leader Demiral according to Soyasl (1 978), is a member of the mason temple in Turkey and Demiral, during the 1 970s, appointed many mason ministers in his cabinet as Ibrahim Driner, Saladin Qulige, Wedad Ozquan, Masoud Arz, Nihad Corshad, Ahmad Turk Al, and Esmat Sizkeen found. Soyasl also pointed out that the party’s constitution mentioned that the party would stick with secularism as it had been translated by Ataturk.

The RWP got some support from one of the factions of the Nursi movement called Gylar group who was publishing a newspaper called Y any Asia.

The Opposition Parties:

The major opposition parties ⁶are:

1. Motherland Party:

The party was founded in 1 983 with its leader Turgut Ozal (the former prime minister and the present president of Turkey). The party won the election of 1983 and 1987 but failed to win the 1 991 election. After inflation soared in 1987 and 1988 the party ran a poor third in the local election of 1989 (Banks, 1990).

The party called for “a free market economy and clear estimates for future spending and economic measures which would eliminate political terrorism” (Day and Degenhardt, 1984; 457).

The MP was considered as a right-wing party as Banks (1990) and Magnarella (1 987) suggested. Its founder, Ozal, was the designer and director of the economic recovery programme in ex-premier Demirel’s last government before the military took over in 1 980. Before he established the party, the NSC promoted him to Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economy from 1980 until

1 982.

2. The Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP):

The party was formed initially in late 1 985 by a merger of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Populist Party (PP). The SDP was founded jn 1983 by Erdal Inonu. He declared that a return to sound democracy would not be realized after his party was not allowed to take part in the national election of 1983 because of its roots in the RPP (Day and Degenhardt, 1984).

In the local election of 1 984 the SDP got 23.3 percent of the votes and became the second strongest party after the MP (Magnarella, 1987).

The PP was founded on 20 May 1983 by Necdet Calp. In the 1983 election the PP, according to Day and Degenhardt (1 984), had benefited from the exclusion of the former Socialist Parties. That benefit helped the party to get over 30 percent of the votes of 1983. But in the 1984 local election the party only got 8 percent of the vote.

The SDPP won 99 Assembly seats in the 1987 election despite the defection of 20 deputies from the party in December 1 986, most of whom joined the Democratic Left Party (DLP).

The party was considered was considered as a left-wing party and called for socialism (Banks : 1990; Magnarella 1987).

3. The Welfare Party (WP):

The party led by Ahmad Tekdal was allowed to contest the local election of 1 984. The party was organized by former NSP.The party got 7 percent of the votes in the 1984 local election.

Erbakan (the former NOP and NSP leader) became the leader of the WP when the pro-coup politicians were allowed the return to politics in 1987 of former banned politicians.

The party is an Islamic party favouring government support for religious education and pro-religious legislation (Magnarella, 1 987). The party also called for the Islamization of Turkey but not publicly because of the constitution that does not allow any religious party to call for the change of AtaturRs secularism. The party got its support from some of the supporters of the Nursi movement (Alb,1987).

Conclusion

This chapter has studied the political structure of the five countries of our study. We found that the political system in each country has played a role in the rise of the Islamic movements in its country. The Socialist system in Egypt and its war against the Islamic movements, that Nasser has started, made the Islamic movements more popular in Egypt. The Islamic movements used the economy record of the government to prove to the nation the false policies of socialist and presented Islam as the solution for this problem. Freedom of other political parties is also one of the false slogan that the government use, while its history show that the government was ruled by one party. This is also used by the Islamic movements to prove the false of the government practice to democracy.

In Afghanistan the communist government declare war openly against Islam and the Islamic movements since it come to power in 1978. This policy has also gain to the Islamic movements and show them as the defenders of

Islam and Afghanistan from communism and the Soviet Union. The Mujahedeen collation government presented as a democratic system of governing Afghanistan after it was under one ruling party.

The monarchical system in Kuwait used indirect policies to tie the Islamic movements, especially after their support to the return of the royal family after the liberation of Kuwait, by giving more media freedom to anti-Islam movements. The only country that gives the Islamic movements their right to preach and to form their political parties is Pakistan. The Islamic movements in Pakistan gain from this freedom by forming political parties and won the election with collation with other secular and nationalist parties and did many changes to Islamized the economy system and the education system.

In Turkey where secularism is used as an obstacle against the return of Islam to rule Turkey, the Islamic movements worked under secular and nationalist political parties or form their own party to present their ideas and to change the secular constitution. They use the economic problems and western fear of joining Turkey to Europe to prove the Islamic identity of Turkey and its belong to the Muslim world.

There are other small political parties such as;
1. National Party (NP)

A small party that was originally founded in Sudan and whose leader is Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was a prime minister of Sudan. The party was based in Khartoum the Capitat of Sudan. In the 1987 Assembly elections the party won only miniscule support (Banks, 1990).

Party of Social and Democratic Construction (PSDC)

The party was founded in 1986 by Sami Mubarak the president’s brother. Its leader was elected in the 1984 Assembly election as a member of the New Wafd Party.

The government laid the responsibility for the murder on the MY M Hekmatyar faction, but Karma’ in 1980, accused Amin (the former president of Afghanistan) of Khyber’s murder and hanged two brothers called Alamyars, from the Khalq faction, in June 1980, as the killers of Khyber.

There are some other small parties that have been established after Najib^ls plan “National reconciliation”. These parties are:

Revolutionary Organization of Working People of Afghanistan (ROWPA), also known as the Toiler’s Revolutionary Organization of Afghanistan. The party was registered as a political party in late 1987 with several of its leaders subsequently being awarded cabinet posts. The party were led by Koshani (Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers) Baghlani (Justice Minister) Kawa (Mines and Industries Minister).

Organization of the Working People of Afghanistan (OWPA). It was registered in 1 987 after having previously been merged with the PDPA in the National Fatherland Front.
- The Islamic Party of the People of Afghanistan (‘PPA) which was registered in 1 987.
- The Peasants’ Justice Party of Afghanistan (PJPA) which also was registered in

1987.

The Union of the Followers of God (UFG). Registered in 1988.
- The Solidarity Movement of Afghan People (SMAP). Registered in 1988.

Two other small parties were legalized in 1989. The Young Workers of Afghanistan (YWA) and the Pashtun Khwa Meli Party (PKMP).

⁴Such as:

Al Shur’a Party: It is a Shi’a party that demands autonomy for Hazarajat in Afghanistan. The leader of the party was Ali Beheshti.

The Islamic Movement: It is also a Shi’a party that, according to Anwar (1988) seeks a union with Iran. Its founder was Sheikh Mohasini.

⁵There are other oppositions parties:

National People’s Party (NPP)

The party was formed in 1986 by a group of the PPP moderates led by Jator. Although Jator was Benazir’s father associate he accused her of authoritarian tendencies prior to being removed as Sindh PPP president in May 1986. The party won one seat in the 1988 election.

Muhajir National Movement (MNM)

The party was founded in 1981 and it was primarily concerned with the rights of post-partition migrants to Pakistan who wanted to be recognized as constituting a fifth nationality. The MNM got a majority of local council seats at Karachi in the 1987 balloting and became the third largest National Assembly grouping after the

1988 election. The MNM ended its alliance with the PPP in 1989 and went opposition.

Assembly of Islamic Clergy (AIC)

The party was founded in 1950 and it is a progressive formation committed to constitutional government guided by Sunni Muslim sector.

Awami National Party (ANP

The party was formed in July 1986 by four left groups. The party was unusual in that each of its constituent formations were drawn primarily from one of the country’s four provinces. Awami Movement was organized as a Sindhi based youth group. It was involved in riots that claimed over 33 lives in September 1983. Its leader was gaoled in 1979 and then released from prison in June 1986 after having been held without trial. The second one is the Mazdoor Kissan which is a Punjabi based leftist grouping that has long been run by factionalism. The third group is National Democratic party which was organized in 1975 upon prescription of the NAP. The party was allegedly involved in terrorist activities aimed at succession of the Baluchistan and North West Frontier provinces. The fourth one is a group of Pakistan National Party dissidents led by Atridi.

Pakistan National Party (PNP)

The party was formed by a group of dissidents from the NDP in 1979 and joined the MRD in 1983. It is a moderately leftist group of Baluchi leadership.

All Pakistan Jammu and Kashmir Conference

Founded in 1948 by Ghulam Abbas as the Muslim Conference and known by its present name since the late 1 960s, the conference won one legislative seat at the election of March 1977. It has long urged that the status of Jammu and Kashmir be settled by means of a plebiscite.

Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP)

A former component of the PNA, the PDP is a strongly Islamic party organized in 1969, which joined the MRD in early 1983.

National Liberation Front (NLF Quami Mahaz Azadi)

The NLF is a left wing formation that participated in the MRD.

Khaksar Tehrik (Service Movement)

A right wing Islamic party advocating universal military training, the Khaksar Tehrik is also known as Bailcha Bardar (Shovel Carriers) because the group’s founder, Inayatullah Khan Mashriqi, adopted the spade as its symbol to symbolize self-reliance.

Progressive People’s Party

The Progressive People’s Party was organized by a group of PPP dissidents in 1978.

Tehrik-i-Nifaz Fiqh Jafariya (TNFJ Movement for the Implementation of Shi’a Jurisprudence)

As an activist group representing Pakistan’s Shi’a minority, the TNFJ launched a campaign in 1980 against the government’s Islamization campaign, insisting that it was entirely Sunni-based. In July 1987 it decided to reorganize as a political party committed to the principles of Iran’s Ayotollah Khomeini.

Punjabi Pakhtoon Ittehad (PPI Punjabi Pakhtoon Alliance)

The PPI was formed in 1987 to represent the conjoint interests of Punjabis and Pakhtoons (Pathans, Pushtuns).

Sindh National Alliance (SNA)

The SNA was formed in 1 988 by the octogenarian GM Syed, who organized a major demonstration in October 1989 demanding a separate homeland for the Sindhis.

Sindh National Front (SNF)

The SNF was launched by Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, an uncle of the prime minister, following the dissolution in March 1989 of the Sindh-Baluch-Pushtoon Front (SBPF), of which Bhutto had been a leader. The SNF reiterated the SBPF’s call for a confederation of Pakistan’s four provinces, with each “nation” free to establish its own domestic and foreign policies.

Baluchistan National Alliance (BNA)

In 1989 the BNA withdrew from a provincial coalition that it had formed with the PPP following the 1988 election.

Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP)

Founded in 1948, the CPP is a small, illegal formation that has consistently maintained a pro-Moscow orientation.

The Organization of Islam’s Ulama (OIU)

The party is the successor of the Organization of India’s Ulama before Pakistan’s independence. The party has, according to Richter (1987), a strong support in the North West Frontier Province and in Baluchistan. Mufi’ Mahmood who led the party in the Seventies had been Chief Minister of the North West Frontier Province in 1 972 and 1973. He was also the President of the Pakistan National Alliance during its struggle against Ali Bhutto.

⁶There are other oppositions parties such as: The Democratic Left party (DLP):

The party was formed in March 1984 by Rahson, the wife of Ecevit the former prime minister and the former leader of the RPP. Then, Bulent Ecevit became the leader of the party in 1987 when the old politicians were allowed to return to politics after the ban of 1982 (Day and Degenhard, 1987).

In the election of 1987 the party won less than 10 percent of the votes. The party was known for its left and socialist ideas (Banks, 1990).

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN EGYPT,

AFGHANISTAN, KUWAIT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, KUWAIT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY

Introduction

In our literature study in this thesis we studied firstly,lslam and the Muslim World in order to understand what Islam is and how it has been misunderstood in the West since its founding until the present time. We also studied how Islam has been progressively mispractised in political and social life through out the last fourteen centuries (following its perfect practise during the time of prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliph’as ). These studies show the difference between Islam in theory as the Islamic movements represent in their literatures, speeches and the press ,and Islam in practice in their countries.

Then in the second chapter the literature study focused on the role of the media in the rise of the social movements. The studies in these chapter outlined how the media has been used to promote political and social messages in societies and the structure of the media in the five countries of our study. These studies show how ,in theory, the social movement and the Islamic movements uses the media to send their messages though different channels. As in chapter six of the thesis, we the study will discus the Islamic movements’ use of media in practice, and what kind of alternative media the Islamic movements use when they do not have access to the mass media in their countries. Chapter three provide a basic back ground on the political, educational, and economic environment of the five countries of the study. This socio-economic literature study show the environments that the Islamic movements developed within.

In this chapter the study will discuss the rise of the Islamic movements in the five countries of our study :who they are ; when they were founded; how they developed ;what their objectives are;what their nature is; how their ideal state will be ruled politically,and what kind of economic system will exist in that future

These are the main points that the literature study of this chapter will address; although there is little literature available on these movements and for some almost none at all ,such as the Al Shari’ah society in Egypt , the Islamic party (Khalise) in Afghanistan,the organization of lhy’a Al Torath in Kuwait , the organization of Ahlo Hadith in Pakistan and the Sufi movements in Turkey.

The lack of literature on these movements has necessitated the study using the interviews conducted by the researcher in 1991 and 1992 as the main sources of information on some of these movements. The interviews have been used, as additional source material on the other movements,were some literature is available.

As we said in the introduction of the thesis ,we are going to study the major Islamic movements in the five countries. These movements are

-in Egypt; Sufism, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Al Shari’ah Society, and the Islamic Organisation.

-in Afghanistan; the Islamic Party(Hekmatyar),the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party (Khalise), and the Afghan National Liberation Front.

-in Kuwait; the Organisation of Social Improvement, and the Organisation of lhy’a Al Torath,

-in Pakistan; the Islamic Organisation ,the Organisation of Ahlo Hadith,and the Organisation of Islam’s Ulama.

-in Turkey; Nursi movement, the Sufi movements and the Welfare Party.

The chapter will be provided into five sections,each one discussing the Islamic movements in one of the five countries. In each section, the study will provide, firstly, a historical background on the establishment of these movements, then their objectives, and the methods they use to pursue these objectives. After that, the nature of these movements now compared with that at their establishments,the legality of the movements and their relationships with the government.

Lastly, in the interviews, the leaders or the representatives of these movements were asked some hypothetical questions on some political and economical issues. All of them answered these questions, except the Islamic movements in Turkey (for their reasons). The importance of these questions is to

show what kinds of political and economical systems these movements want to practise when they rule their countries.

When the interviews were completed there was no clear indication that any of these movements were close to being able to rule any country. Unfortunately in April 1992, the Islamic movements in Afghanistan succeeded in defeating the communists and come to power to practice what they where calling for when they were out of power.

The importance of the study in this chapter is to show the basic background of these movements and and with the study of chapter three, this chapter will provide information on the methods used by the Islamic movements as they occur in different political systems. While some movements are legal, others not, and yet others works under the umbrella of some other legal social organization.

This chapter together with the previous chapters,will cover the basic literature for this thesis. The discussion chapter on the role of the media and the rise of the Islamic movements will build on them.

4.2 The Islamic Movements in Egypt

The Islamic movements in Egypt, as throughout the Muslim World, have different approaches and different missions, but their missions will lead in the end to what they call the return of Islam. This return of Islam does not only refer to the ways of Islamic worship but also to a political system of Islam and a social order of Islam which means that they are calling for a political and social restructuring. Because religious parties are constitutionally banned from participation in any political activities or in formal politics, McDermott (1988) believes that this made Islam the panacea for the difficulties of daily life in Egypt and made it difficult to control the politico-religious movements.

In this part we are going to study four major Islamic movements to show what kind of restructuring they are working for. The four Islamic movements that have been chosen are:

1 . Sufism

The Muslim Brotherhood
The Al Shari’ah Society
The Islamic Organisation (which is known as Al Jihad)

These four movements are the largest Islamic movements in Egypt and they show different methods and missions in their preaching of Islam. Sufism as a historic movement is known for its spiritual method in preaching Islam, while the Al Shari’ah Society is known in Egypt as an Islamic social movement. The Muslim Brotherhood is known as a universal movement that wants to restructure politics, the economy, society, education and culture in the Islamic way. Al Jihad (the Islamic organization) is noted for its abrupt way of trying to restructure Egyptian society, an example of this was when five of its members killed President Sadat.

To study these four Islamic movements we have first to study how they were established and how they developed, from their beginnings, bearing in mind their field. After that we will discuss their objectives and the methods they use to achieve their objectives. We will also examine their nature and the relationships between them and the Egyptian government. Lastly, we will discuss their political ideas with regard to restructuring the political and economic systems.

This will help us to know what these movements stand for, socially and politically. It will also help us to understand what they have in common and the points of difference between them and will clarify the political position between them and the Egyptian government. Lastly, it will show us the shape of a future Islamic government as they see it.

The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Egypt:

1. Sufism

There are more than seventy Sufism doctrines that have a couple of million followers. Those Sufism doctrines are coordinated in one organization called the Highest Majles of Sufism doctrines.

Sufism as an ideology was founded in the Eighth Century and it was known as a “religious Movement that spread in the Muslim World, after the Islamic State became very large and wealthy, as a reaction to the misuse of the luxurious civilization by practising religious devotion and making spiritual practices to reach God’s knowledge” (WAMY, 1989; 341). This idea became a doctrine of some scholars and they practiced devotion and developed their own spiritual practices to reach the knowledge of Allah. With the help of their students these practices became different schools of spiritual doctrine.

There is disagreement between historians on the meaning of the name Sufism and where it came from. Al Baironi (the great Arab historian) believed that it came from Sufia the Greek word that means Wisdom. But the most popular interpretation of Sufism is that of Tafftazaani (1991) and a number of historians who think that it came from Suof (Wool) because in the early days of Sufism they used to wear Suof (Wool) as a symbol of humility and devotion.

In Egypt the first known Sufism doctrine to be found was in the Eleventh Century and the most famous scholar of this doctrine was Abdul Karim Althona’e. The first organizations within Sufism in Egypt were found, according to Tafftazaani (1991) , during the Presidency of Salahudeen who established a house for Sufism called Khanigua of Saeed Al Suadah, within which to establish themselves.

At present, as stated previously, there is an organization that gathers most of

Sufism’s doctrines in Egypt called the Highest Majles of Sufism Doctrines. The President of this organization is called the Shak of Sufism Doctrines Shaks and he must be appointed by the President of Egypt according to Law 1 18 of 1 976. This law also states that ten Sufist Shaks must be elected by the other Sufist

Shaks every three years to join the President of the organization in the Highest Majles of Sufism Doctrines with a representative of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Local Governors, the Ministry of Endowments and Alazhar. Though it is a religious organization created by government law and its President is appointed by the Egyptian President and has representatives of some ministries it still has some sort of independence through its ten elected members.

2. Muslim Brotherhood

In the beginning of this century, most of the Muslim World was under the control of European Imperialism. It was not only military colonialism but also political, economic, educational and social colonialism. Muslims during that time lost almost everything, their land, their economy, their identity and before that, their understanding of Islam as a way of life. Islam at that time was some sort of Ibadat (ways of worship) and not a political system or social order. At the same time they were very far from modern industrial civilization. At that time, the Muslim Brotherhood was established in April 1 928 in Al Ishmailiyah by its founder, Hassan Al Bana.

The movement was registered as an Islamic movement and immediately started to call for the return of Islam as a political, economic, educational and social system. At the same time it called for the adoption of a modern industrial and scientific civilization, the important thing about this movement as the WAMY (1 989) describes it, was that it contained in its definition, written by Al Bana, every aspect of human activity which made it acceptable to all sectors of Egyptian society. Al Bana (1 981 ) revealed some of the fundamental characteristics of the movement, as a :” fundamental call, Suni sect, Sufi in its meanings political movement, an ethietical group, scientific and thought group, an investment company and a social society”. (Al Bana; 1981 : 156 ).

In 1932 Al Bana moved from Al Ishmailiyah to Cairo and there they started their first weekly newspaper in 1 933 called Al E Khowan Al Muslimoun, a second one in 1 938 called Al Nazer, then a third one in 1947 called Al Shihab (Abdul Khaliq, 1 987). It had its first foundation committee in 1 941 with one hundred members who were appointed by the movements founder Mr Al Bana.

“Its expansion was impressive by 1932, it had 15 branches, by 1 940, 500 and by 1949, 2000. A parallel women’s movement, the Muslim Sisters was set up in 1936 by Zeinab Ghazall” (McDermott, 1988; 180). Then it became a part of the Muslim Brotherhood. Outside of Egypt there were hundreds of branches in Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. In Egypt alone there were, according to Al Hodibi (1991)in 1946, one million members registered in 2000 branches while the Egyptian population was 20 million at that time.

Dekimejian (1985) believed that Al Bana’s way of campaigning for the “Islamic Shari’a” with the civil society enabled his movement to attract different levels of Egyptian society.

McDermott (1988) believes that the Muslim Brotherhood’s way to win rural and urban hearts and minds was through social and educational work. This led them to build Mosques, schools and hospitals. Also, their volunteer phalanxes which fought in the Palestine War of 1948 with inspired distinction, made their numbers rise to something like two million (according to McDermott). Mr Neqrashi, the Egyptian Prime Minister, was particularly aware of their number and strength. Dekmejian (1 985) believes that, the movement during that time was very organized and covered all kinds of social activities. Dekmejian also believes that, at the end of 1948, Neqrashi was perceiving the movement as a threat to the monarchy.

On 8th November 1948, Al Neqrashi dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood and ordered the confiscation of all its money and holdings and the detention of all its leaders. After one month Al Neqrashi was assassinated by one of the Muslim Brotherhood, but Al Bana denied that the assassination had been done with the movement’s knowledge. Al Bana was also assassinated on 1 2th February 1 949; by government agents, according to Dekmejian (1985). In 1950 the movement again became legal when the Nahaas government restored its legal status.

The Muslim Brotherhood helped the Free Officers in their coup of July 1952 but they did not join them in the new republican government because the Free Officers broke their agreement with the Muslim Brotherhood on the practice of Islam (Abdul Khaliq, 1987 This division caused the Free Officers’ government in 1954 to dissolve the movement and arrest all the movement’s leaders and activists executing hundreds of them and jailing tens of thousands. In August 1965 Nasser announced the arrest of 700 more members of the Muslim Brotherhood and killed some of their leaders. The movement’s members stayed in jail until President Sadat released them in 1971 but their movement has remained dissolved until now, although they still work in secret.

The movement applied to become a political party four times but the government refused and also refused to let them publish any magazines or newspapers. However, the movement made an alliance with the new Wafd party in 1984 and another with the Liberal Socialist Party in 1 987 and won some seats in the People’s Assembly (Sonbol, 1988 ).

Al Shari’ah Society

During the late 1 940s following the Second World War, the Al Shari’ah Society was founded. Its founders, according to Faid (1991 ), established it to reject the secular and communist movements which were powerful during that time and , at the same time, to represent the Islamic political system and the Islamic social order.

The movement took a practical way towards achieving its objectives by building Mosques, schools, hospitals and polytechnic colleges. It gained publicity from its social work which meant that no government since the movement started has tried to stop its activities; although all governments tried to supervise it from outside (Faid, 1991).

The movement has an executive committee that must be elected by its members, but in July 1991 , the government dissolved the committee when it refused to dismiss one activist member. After the dissolution of the movement’s executive committee, the government appointed a new committee to run the movement and ordered more than one thousand soldiers to take over the main building of the movement in case the original committee did not agree to give everything to the government’s new committee. It was a surprise for the government, according to Faid (1991) when the original committee decided to leave one of its members in the building with all the office keys which were handed to the new committee that was backed up by more than one thousand soldiers.

The Islamic Organisation (Al Jihad)

In the beginning of the 1 970s, the Egyptian universities were full of communist, left wing, and nationalist ideologies. In the meantime the Muslim Brotherhood had just been released from jail. According to Kassim (1991) there was no

movement to present Islam in the Egyptian universities. As a result the Islamic Organization was established.

During its early days the movement came into conflict with student communists and nationalist movements. The movement did not register as an organization and only worked from the Student Unions in the Egyptian universities. The government did not respond to their actions against the communist and nationalist student movements, mainly because of President Sadat’s policy to change the direction of Egypt from the East to the West.

In 1978 the strength of the Islamic Associations, of which the Islamic Organization is a part within the main Students’ Union, in all the Egyptian Universities was considerable. For example, in Alexandria University the Islamic Association achieved this result in the election of 1 978 “in the faculties of medicine and engineering, 60 seats out of 60; in agriculture, 47 out of 48; law, 44 out of 48; pharmacy, 42 out of 48, and science, 43 out of 60…Outside the campuses, this growth in both Muslims and Cooptic activism led to clashes” (McDermott, 1988; 188).

It was then in 1 978, according to De Kmejian (1 985), that the Islamic organization became publically known when some of its members were caught because of their activities against Coopts and some Coopts also were caught because of activities against Muslims.

By the end of the seventies the movement had grown very quickly. The government tried most of its leaders in 1 981 when Sadat jailed all the opposition. The “Al Jihad Organization” is the name by which people now know this movement, and which became wellknown after five of its members killed President Sadat during the 6th of October Anniversary. The movement and its members became a target for the government to detain or kill, especially after it became more extreme as a result of the torture that its members and their wives and children underwent in the Egyptian jails.

Some of their wives and daughters were raped in front of them and some were killed in their prison cells. As the Amnesty International (1983) described the government arrests as a ruthless campaign of arrests, torture and assassination.

1 54

This treatment, and their belief that the government was not an Islamic government, caused five of them to kill President Sadat.

The government used the media against them and some Al Azhar scholars, who were loyal to the government, to change the masses’ ideas about the movement’s objectives by saying it had extreme objectives and that it was the most dangerous fundamental movement in Egypt. The movement has no legal status it has mass support especially in rural communities.

The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Egypt

1. Sufism

As an Islamic movement, Sufism’s first objective, as Kassim (1989) believes, is inviting Muslims to the path of Allah by practising the fundamental morals in their social life as Islam asks its followers to do. To that objective, Sufism intensively recommended its followers to improve their moral status by doing good deeds.

These main objectives caused the Sufist doctrine to focus on spiritual education and practice to give its followers immunity against materialistic ideologies and theories.

Another of their objectives is to reunite Muslims in one understanding and one nation. Although they look like a non-political movement because of their spiritual activities, they are calling for Islam as a system of life in every aspect. This objective caused them to call for an Islamic government in Egypt.

It may look strange for Sufism to call for an Islamic government after what is known about it as a non-political movement. According to Tafftazani (1 991)there is an enlightened Sufism which believes and practices these objectives and there is another Sufism, a simple or plain Sufism that is too poetic and rife with foolishness.

To reach its objectives Sufism used six methods:

making themselves a moral model in the way they live treat their neighbours and colleagues at work;
working as a collective group to help them to reach as large a number of people as they could;
using schools, hospitals and housing for the elderly that the movement owns to practice their objectives;
publishing the old Sufist books and what their current thinkers are writing about Sufism;
publishing their own magazine “the Islamic Sufism”;
doing a lot of television and broadcasting speeches;

2. The Muslim Brotherhood

Al Bana, in 1928, addressed the movement’s objectives, which were the reason for its establishment: the return to Islam as a system of life in politics, the economy, society and a way of worship. He also called for the cleansing of the Tawhid heresies and explained that the Tawhid is not a theoretical framework but a belief in the oneness of Allah which must include the obedience of the servant to Allah in every political and social part of his life.

The third objective was enlightening Muslims on the advantages of taking the European industrial civilization and adding to it as Muslims did during the Abassy’s Caliph’at. Then he called for the liberation of all the Muslim World from Western occupation militarily, politically, ideologically and economically. The fifth objective was related to the fourth , when he called for the establishment of an Islamic government in every Muslim country.

He then called for the reuniting of the Muslim World under one government and one Caliph’a. His last objective was to guide the World by making the Caliph’at state the model of justice and freedom for all humanity and to represent Islam as a solution for all humanity’s problems (Al Hodibi, 1991 ).

To practice these objectives Al Bana (1 981 )put forward seven methods to his followers to follow:

each must reform himself to meet the above conditions: to be a true believer in Tawhid, worship Allah in the way that prophet Muhammad did without any heresies, achieve high moral and educational standards to invest money for himself and his family and have a strong body;
establish an Islamic house by teaching his spouse to respect his belief and by practising Islam in his house according to the Islamic family teaching;
preach and call society to Islam as a system of life and not as a way of worship only;
help to liberate the Muslim world by joining, helping or establishing movements to liberate the Muslim World militarily, politically, economically and ideologically;
reform the governments in the Muslim World to become Islamic governments and practice Shari’a,
reunite the Muslim World to take its international status as before;
make the Islamic State the model of justice to guide mankind to Islam.

3. Al Shari’ah Society

When the AIShari’ah Society was established in the forties according to Faid (1991 ), it did not copy the other Islamic movement’s objectives at that time but tried to complete what they did not do. Most of the Islamic movements at that time concentrated on preaching politics and on liberating Egypt from the British but there was no Islamic movement that concentrated on social activities. This situation made the founders of the Al Shari’ah Society adopt their first objective, to practice Islam within the movement’s members, socially and economically.

As the second objective the movement moved in a practical direction when it called for the establishment of hospitals, schools, Islamic colleges, polytechnical colleges, disabled children’s schools and investment activities as a practical way of preaching and practising Islam in the communities. The third objective was to educate the masses about Islamic social teachings to develop a moral society as Islam requires.

The movement according to Faid (1991)used four methods to practice its objectives:

publishing books and magazines that concentrated on Tawhid and Islamic thought;
building mosques, hospitals, schools, Islamic colleges, polytechnic colleges, disabled children’s schools, and investment stores that deal within the Islamic conception of society and economics;
practising Islam within the movement’s environment in hospitals, schools, colleges and stores, economically and socially;
practising Islam in Egypt by setting up the movement’s social and economic activities as a model of how society should be.

4. The Islamic Organization (Al Jihad)

The Islamic organization has two general objectives to work for. The first one is to make people worship their Lord in the right way, as prophet Muhammad taught his companions. The second objective is to establish the Islamic Caliph’at as described in the Islamic Sharj’a (Kassim, 1991).

These are the two general objectives specified by the movement in its doctrines. Their methods according to Kassim (1991)are:

studying Islam in the right way by studying it from the old famous Muslim scholars’ books;
studying Islam must be with the correct curriculum that the scholars used when they were students to develop a clear conception of Islam;
preaching the path of Allah in every level of the society;
commanding people to do good and prohibiting them from doing evil;
make Jihad the path of Allah.

The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Egypt

1. Sufism

As a historic fact Sufism is usually known as a spiritual movement that uses humility and religious devotion to produce a perfect humanbeing. It was famous historically in introducing Islam to Indonesia, Europe and to the middle and the west of Africa before these parts of the World became a part of the Islamic strategy through preaching.

Sufism is also famous at the present time, as it was in the past, as a social movement that builds schools and hospitals, but it was also famous in its extreme respect for its leaders. To such an extent that some of this respect was unacceptable Islamically and rejected by Muslim scholars, both in the past and now, such as their respect for some leaders who believed in the Greek philosophies in God and in Heaven and Will. Some of the movement’s practices were also rejected by Muslim scholars, such as singing and dancing during their spiritual festivals. The movement has a historically good relationship in Egypts with political systems because of its not involvement in political activities. This relationship gave Sufism the opportunity to spread in all societies.

The movement has a legal status as a religious organization (which includes more than seventy Sufism doctrines)with governmental supervision by government representatives. These government representatives chose from the internal ministry, the endowments ministry, the local governors ministry and Al Azhar. Added to that, the head of this organization was appointed by the

President of Egypt. The only independence allowed is the election of ten of the leaders of Sufism to become members of the Highest Majles of Sufism Doctrines.

2. Muslim Brotherhood

The main nature of the Muslim Brotherhood is their view of Islam as a system of life. Their founder Al Bana (1979) said about the nature of his movement “it is a fundamental preaching, a Suni sect, a Sufism meaning, political movement, ethnic society, science and thought Legon, investment company and social idea”, AlBana, 1979.

Because of its nature, the Muslim Brotherhood has spread all over Egypt and in the Arab countries within the last few decades. The movement’s ideas attracted different levels of Egyptian society, especially students. Al Hodibi (1 991 ), described the movement’s nature as a Jihadi movement that no one could join without having faith in Jihad in its wide meaning which includes patience, strong will, strength, Fiquh and obedience to its leaders.

The movement is well organized movement with one million members in 3000 branches only 20 years after its establishment in Egypt. Also, it had the ability to organise its members in secret after tens of thousands of its leaders were jailed for twenty years and most of the famous leaders were killed.

Although the movement has been illegal since 1954, its ideas and secret organization make it the most powerful movement in Egypt. The movement gained 1,300,000 votes from 5 million voters during the 1987 Assembly Election when it joined with the Islamic Alliance and Al Amal party.

The movement members in the People’s Assembly “advocate replacing Egyptian civilian codes with Islamic Law, which they feel offer greater security and latitude to owners of private property…. They emphasize the moral bonds that constrain relations between employers and employees; they believe that the State should regulate markets to ensure that prices are fair and of course, they condemn all forms of interest as usury” (Sadowski, 1991 ; 133).

Al Shari’ah Society

Since the Al Shari’ah Society was established in the forties, it has concentrated on two main things. The first is to teach Muslims that Islam is a system of life and the second is to serve the society by building hospitals and schools and using these hospitals and schools to present the message of Islam.

This concentration on education and social service became central to the Al Shari’ah Society. It also made the way easy for its social activities because of the need for social services in a poor country such as Egypt. The Egyptian people supported this movement faithfully when they found out how honest its members were in directing their resources to the building of 500 dispensaries, 700 schools, 500 disabled and polytechnic schools and hundreds of mosques.

The movement nature as been described by Faid (1 991)an Islamic Social services movements.

The Islamic Organization

Because of its establishment in the early seventies, when there were no strong Islamic movements in the Egyptian universities, the Islamic Organization found itself in a struggle with communist, socialist, nationalist and left-wing student movements who had the government’s support during President Nasser’s time. “Sadat had encouraged the growth of the Islamic movements as a balance against his left-wing opponents. Only after 1 979 had he begun to recognize that the growing mass appeal of the Islamists posed a threat to his authority” (Sadowski, 1991 ; 130). This struggle at its birth made the movement call for two things at the same time. The first was to call for Islam as a system of life and the second was to command people to do good and not to do evil.

From the former the movement got publicity among students and from the latter the movement acquired the government’s hatred and hostility. Although the movement was never registered as a legal movement it was well known in Egypt as the government jailed most of its members at the end of the 1970s and in the early 1 980s and treated them very harshly and inhumanely. “The government actions have also helped intensify the militants’ overall impact and their success. This has been so because every act of militancy by an Islamic group has brought about an over reaction by the government (Sonbol; 1988.

The Islamic Movements and Politics

To know what kind of change would occur when these movements coming to power, there were some hypothetical questions in the interviews to find out what kind of political system they have in mind. The first question was what their position would be on practising shur’a (consultation) in choosing the President of the State or if their movement ruled Egypt. All the four movements believe that shur’a is an Islamic obligation that any Islamic government must perform to choose its best president (Tafftazani, 1991 , Al Hodibi, 1991 , Faid, 1991 and Kassem , 1 991 They present their opinion with two Qur’anic verses “and consult them in affairs (of movement)” (Qur’an;3:159) and “Who conduct their affairs by mutual consultation” (Qur’an;42:38). The first verse describes Muslim society as a constant society and the second orders the prophet to consult his community.

They all agreed that there is no specific way of choosing the president of the state that can be called the only way because when Islam obligated shur’a there was no mention of a specific kind of consultation and the four guidance Caliph’at each used different kinds of consultation.

The second question was what kind of political system they would use? They summarised it thus:

it will be a constitutional system
there must be an elected Majles or parliament
those who will be elected must have a minimum knowledge and practice of

Islam in their lives

this Majles will choose the president

the Majles’ decision on the president would not be confirmed until he got a majority acceptance from the people of the state by a vote or any way that could show their agreement or disagreement

The third question was, if they ruled Egypt, what kind of relationship would there be between their government and the western and eastern governments? Their answer was that they would have political and economic relationships but within the framework of Shari’a and with full independence. The condition of Shari’a means that no agreement will be signed whether it is a political, economic or educational agreement if it has any part that disagrees with Islam.

The last political question was what was their position on reuniting the Muslim World to become one Caliph’at state? They all believe that it will happen because of prophet Muhammad’s speech “After me there will be guidance Chaliph’aühen a Kingship systems, then a dictatorship systems, then it return the guidance Chaliph’at systems as it was during my presidency and the presidency of the guidance Chaliph’at.” but three of them believe that it is unlikely to happen these days and needs more work and time. Those three movements are Sufism, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al Shari’ah Society (Tafftazani, 1991 , Al Hodibi, 1991 , and Faid, 1991). The fourth movement, the Islamic Organization believes that it will be in the near future (Kassim, 1 991 ).

The Muslim Brotherhood believes that it will happen gradually, when some of the present countries become full Islamic countries and then unite to build the Caliph’at State. Sufism believes that the unity of the education systems in the present Muslim countries and the creating of an Islamic commonwealth will be the first steps towards the Caliph ^lat State (Al Hodibi, 1991 ). They all agreed that the Islamic uprising all over the Muslim World is the first signal of this dream. They also agreed that the failure of the present government in economic, political and social situations was because they choose western and eastern political and economic systems instead of the Islamic political and economic system. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its theories is one of the events that will foster the birth of the Islamic Caliph’at State. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic organization believe that Jihad in Afghanistan and the situation of Islam in Sudan, Algeria, Turkey and Pakistan are also signs of this coming state (Al Hodibi, 1991 , and Kassim 1991).

After these political questions, there were some economic questions to learn what kind of economic system the Islamic movements would use in the rule of Egypt. The first question was what was their position on privatisation of industry and trade?

In their answers they all mention that Islam calls for a free economy with social responsibility. Which means no one is allowed to monopolies all the food or any product that people need. Also, the free economy includes the paying of the Zaka (poor-due) and not selling or producing anything against Muslim belief or which may affect people health. Sufism and the Muslim Brotherhood believe that there can be some joint industry between the government and the private sector in those industries that need more than private investment can support, such as heavy industries, drug research, planning, car and rail industries (Tafftazani, 1 991 and Al Hodibi 1991 ). The Al Shari’ah Society believes that there must be some obligation on the transformation of the present government ownership to privatisation by selling the large companies and industries to the labourers who work for them with loans to the workforce to facilitate the transition (Faid, 1 991 ).

The second question was what is their position on the self-reliance of Egypt?

To this question, there were four different answers. Sufism believes that the whole economic system in Egypt needs to be reviewed on the basis of the availability of resources and labour (Tafftazani, 1 991 ), while the Muslim Brotherhood believe that if the 180,000,000,000 dollars of Egyption capital which has migrated as investment in the West and some of the Gulf countries is returned to Egypt it would make a major change in the Egyptian industry and trade (Al Hodibi, 1 991 ), They also believe that it will not return until there is a major change in the political and economic system in Egypt. The Al Shari’ah Society took the question from a different angle because they believe that the Islamic commonwealth will make a major change in the Egyptian and Muslim countries’ markets because of the different resources in the Muslim World (Faid, 1991). The Islamic Organization believes that Egypt has plentiful resources but that Egypt’s leaders are dishonest and do not want to make Egypt a self-reliant country because they follow their Western masters’ orders (Kassim, 1 991 ).

The third question was about what they were going to do with the usury banks and what their position on non-usurious banks was. Three of them, Sufism, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al Shari’ah Society believe that the practising of Shari’a must include banks and usury is prohibited in Islam, but they supported any type of move towards non-usurious banks such as the Faisal Bank and the International Islamic Bank (Tafftazani, 1991, Al Hodibi, 1991 and Faid, 1991 ). The Islamic Organization believes that usurious banks are not allowed in the Islamic state but they were against non-usurious banks unless they were part of a full programme to practice Shari’ah in Egypt (Kassim, 1991).

SUMARRY

As Islamic movements they all call for the practice of Islam in every social and political matter. They simply call for Egypt to change from a secular and socialist country to become a 100% Muslim country. The only difference between them is timing and gradation. Sufism, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Al Shari’ah Society believe that Islam must be practiced immediately in every aspect of Egyptian society, but when the government refused this call from their members in the People’s Assembly in 1987 they called for the practice of Islam although it was to be phased in gradually.

On the other hand, the Islamic Organization called for the immediate practice of Islam and the refusal of any kind of phasing in. Kassem (1991) believed that even if the Egyptian government practiced 99.99% of the Shari’a, his movement would fight until the government made the practice of Shari’a 100%.

The four Islamic movements in Egypt that we studied have many similarities and some differences. if we look to their objectives we find that Sufism is a movement that concentrate on moral values in the society, relationships between a Muslim and his lord and its anti materialist ideology.

The Al Shari’ah Society were mainly a social service movement that preaches Islam through its social activities and publications.

The Islamic Organization from its objectives show the youth soul of its

members that want to change the society within short term. That made the movement’s objectives more general and only concentrate on the establishment of the Islamic Caliph’at.

The Muslim brotherhood’s objectives gave more specific stages for its followers to follow. It started from calling Muslims to practice Islam in every aspect of their life with a true understanding of Tawhid as the bedrock of Islam. Then to use new civilization technology to serve the Muslim Umma to rebuild again. They also call for all types of liberalization from foreigners politics, ideology and economy. And concluded their objectives with the return of the Islamic Caliph’at gradually.

The Islamic movements objectives shaped their natures and practices in Egypt. Sufism works legally with a governmental direct supervision while Al Shari’ah Society work legally without the governmental supervision until what happened in summer of 1991 . While the Islamic Organization works secretly and became anti government movement since the Egyption government treated them harshly after Sadat’s assassinations. The Muslim Brotherhood works also secretly but uses every types of legal organization, unions and parties to spread their ideas from the National Assembly to Universities, to social movements.

4.2 The Islamic Movements in Afghanistan:

Afghanistan as a close tribe society keeps Islam as the only alternative for their life. The Afghani had practiced Islam socially and politically from the tribe cultural point of view, and had never agreed historically to rule with any law other than Shari ^ta. Abdul Baki (1992) in his study of the religious effect on the nomination or the removal of the Afghan governments between (1747-1992) found that ten out of the twenty four kings and presidents, who have governed Afghanistan, were nominated as kings and presidents because of religious support and six out of twenty four kings and presidents were removed from office because of religious disagreement. Also historically they have never accepted occupation by any foreign power since Islam entered Afghanistan in the sixth century.

This situation enabled the King Zahir Shah to rule Afghanistan for 40 years

without any major challenge because of his understanding of the Afghani’s attitude , power and need. But the situation changed after the return of Afghan students who had studied in the Soviet Union, Egypt, Pakistan and in the West during the fifties and sixties. Those students developed four political challenges to the King’s government (Anwer, 1988).

The first and main challenge came from the communists who studied in the Soviet Union and wanted a political change towards the Soviet Union. Their leader succeeded in 1 965 when they became the only legal party in Afghanistan under the name “The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan” (PDPA).

The second challenge came from those who studied in Egypt and Pakistan and had been affected by the preaching of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Islamic Organization of Pakistan. They could not become a political party but they established a student movement in 1968 under the name, the ” Muslim Youth Movement ” and won, within three years of its establishment, more than 60% of the Students’ Union seats.

The third challenge was not that powerful because it had few members. This challenge was from the secularly inclined students who studied in the West. The fourth challenge was also not that big for the same reason. It was from the nationalists, who called for more changes in citizens’ rights and in spreading education.

The Islamic movement started in Afghanistan by establishing the Muslim Youth Movement in 1968 calling for Islam as a system of life in politics, social matters, education, media and economics. This call was a new one in a tribele society, but it was also acceptable because of their religious formation. The movement worked very hard to get 6 seats in 1968 in the Students’ Union and then in 1971 it swept away the communists to gain 32 out of the 51 seats. This victory came although the government used intensive propaganda to change the students’ support to their members and representatives.

Then came the major political change in Afghanistan in 1973 when President

David, who was the Minister of Defence and the King’s cousin, with the support

of the communist officers in the Afghan Army and Air Force, started the first republican system in Afghanistan. This coup changed also the way the government treated the Islamic movements. The communists, in existence in all ministries, started jailing and killing their leaders and members.

This situation led the remainder to leave for the mountains and start Jihad, with the exception of one group, led by Mr Rabamy, who tried to solve the problem peacefully. This continued until the communist coup of 1978 and the start of a new political system which confronted the Islamic movement Mujahideen with tanks, air forces and missiles.

The first round went to the Mujahideen during 1978 and at the beginning of 1 979, when the communist government called in the Soviet Army (after the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation which was signed on 5th December 1 978)to help them crush this resistance. The Soviet Army remained almost ten years without any sign of victory in the establishment of a communist regime. Then the Soviet Army pulled out and left the two old enemies face to face again with two governments, one in Kabul and the other one in Beshour in Pakistan, with seven Islamic parties.

In this part we will discuss four of these movements:

The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)
The Islamic Society
The Islamic Party (Khalise)
The Afghan National Liberation Front.

We will discuss how they were established and their objectives. Then we will talk about the nature of their movements. Lastly, we will show what political and economic system they have in mind for the future Islamic state.

The Establishment of Islamic Movements in Afghanistan:

1. The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)

At the end of the sixties, the communist, nationalist and secular democratic movements in Afghanistan were very active and powerful in spreading their ideologies among the Afghans. During that time according to Zad (1991) the Muslim students were thinking of a way to present the Islamic political and social systems to the Afghans. To do this job, the students established the first organized Islamic movement in Afghanistan in 1968 called the Muslim Youth Movement.

The movement in its establishment obtained publicity because of its ideas and the way that Afghans feel about Islam, but it also struggled during its birth from two main enemies as Kanit (1991)suggested. The first was the government of King Zahir Shah who tried to prevent them from spreading as a political movement and changing the way that the Afghan bedouins understood Islam, so bedouins asked for more rights. The second enemy was other political movements, especially the Khalq and the Barshm communist movements that formed the only legal party in Afghanistan called the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. Although they had these enemies they succeeded in the first year in the Students’ Union election to get 6 out of the 51 seats and three years later they got 32 seats. All this happened under government propaganda against them and government restrictions which refused them the right to publish any newspaper (Zad, 1991 ).

After the coup of 1973 the King’s cousin became the president and changed the Kingdom into a republican country. President Daoud had a communist leader in the cabinet and as the head of the Afghan Army. This cooperation with the communists mean that the government attacked the Muslim Youth Movement and killed some of its leaders and jailed most of its members (Kanit, 1991 ). The government action against the MYM divided its leaders as to what action should be taken by the movement against the government. The first group was led by Hekmatyar the leader of the youth within the movement and believed that the movement should fight the government. The other group was led by Rubani who worked with the Islamic Organizations’ in Pakistan to talk

with Daoud’s governments. Hekmatyar ” fled to Pakistan to join other exiles in founding the original Hezb (Islamic Party) and inciting the anti-Daoud insurrection in Panjsher in 1975″ (Klass, 1990; 428). At this time the movement decided to fight the government as guerilla fighters. This guerilla fighting continued until the communist coup of 1978 (Kanit, 1 991 ).

When the communists ruled Afghanistan the movement leaders went to Pakistan and used it as a base to start a nationwide Jihad. “The first effort at unity was made. By then, Jamiat Islami (the Islamic Society) and Kudam ulFurqan (Qur’an’s Servants) had been formed in addition to the original Hizb-iIslami (the Islamic party). The three factions agreed to merge into a single party, Movement for the Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan to be ruled by Muhammadi…within a few months the alliance evaporated, as Hezb (the Islamic party) and Jamiat (the Islamic Society) pulled out and returned to independent status” (Klass, 1990; 21 1 ). The disagreement between the three factions was because, according to Klass the leadership failed to provide clear plans and a strategy for fighting the war.

In early 1 980 Sayyaf, one of the MY M leaders, freed from jail in Kabul and tried to bring the parties together. Three of them agreed, the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Party (Khalise) and they called the new alliance the Islamic Alliance under Sayyaf’s leadership. The new alliance did not survive long because of the way Sayyaf ruled it. He ignored the formal leaders of the parties and governed by himself, according to Klass (1 990). The formal parties returned to their former states and continued Jihad. They fought the Afghan communists first, then the Soviet troops, then the communist government after the Soviet withdrawal (Zad, 1 991 ). The first leader of this party was Mr Waquad, then Hekmatyar became the leader in 1979 until now. With the other Islamic parties the movement has made the temporary Afghan government in Pakistan the legal government after the collapse of the communist regime for one or two years until the first free election in Afghanistan.

2. The Islamic Society

This movement used to be a part of the Muslim Youth Movement but it separated and became a new movement during the time of President Daoud.

The division happened when the leader of this group Mr Rabany did not agree with the other group on the issue of fighting the government at that time.

However, after the communist coup, Mr Rabany went to Pakistan and established Jihad under the name of the Islamic society (Khalil, 1 991 ). The movement as the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) is one of the largest Islamic movements in Afghanistan (Gilani, 1987 ).

There is no ideological difference between this movement and the Islamic party because of the way they were established and because of their cooperation on political and military issues (Khalil, 1 991 ). The Islamic society is one of the Islamic parties that formed the temporary Afghan government in Pakistan and it controlled the North of Afghanistan militarily and politically.

The Islamic Party (Khalise)

When the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) was established in its new form in 1978, the party called all the Afghans to fight for their freedom. That call caused the party structure to change from being mostly students to containing Ulama, judges, tribal leaders and different classes of the Afghan society. But the leadership of the movement still remained with the leaders of the formal Muslim Youth Movement. A group of the Ulama tried to unify the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) with the Islamic Society (Khalise, 1991). This group was lead by Khalise who was one of the Islamic party’s field commandants.

When the group failed to unify them the group itself became a new party with the same name of the Islamic party. The two parties shared the same name and objectives and the only main difference between them was that the mass leaders of the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) were young and well-educated in different kinds of sciences, while the Islamic party’s mass leaders were Ulama and judges.

This movement controlled part of the South of Afghanistan and some of the Eastern parts of Afghanistan (Khalise, 1991) According to the Galop Institute (Gilani, 1987)this party is one of the medium parties in Afghanistan from the size and from the point of view of the land that it controlled. The party joined the other parties in the formation of the temporary Afghani government in Pakistan.

The Afghan National Liberation Front

When the communist coup occured in 1978, Mr Mujadidi the founder of this movement was working in Holland. Then he returned to Pakistan in 1 979 to establish a new movement to liberate Afghanistan. Klass (1990) believes his family’s history in Afghanistan, as one of the leading families of Sufism, helped him to gather his followers around him.

Although the movement is a Jihad movement, and its founder is a scholar in Shari’a, it is famous for its secular and national leaders in Pakistan and the historic relationship between Mujadidi and his family with the former King (in the past and during the present time) with the result that the movement has full support from the government of Saudi Arabia with the other two parties (the Islamic Revolutionary Movement and the Islamic National Revolutionary Front).This made the party untrustworthy among Mujahideen with the outcome that it has no significant military basis in Afghanistan according to Galop Institute of Pakistan (Gilani, 1987 ). The party’s programme is a “traditionalist nationalist orientation. Constitutional monarchy, based on the traditional institutions of preCommunist Afghanistan and possibly involving the former King” (Klass, 1990; 434).

The amazing thing is that Mujadidi was elected president of the temporary Afghan government when the seven Mujahideen parties’ representatives gathered in Islamabad to elect the president. The only interpretation is that the other two parties’ representatives had been fully supported by Saudi Arabia and had voted for him, while the other four parties had divided the vote because of the historic division among them.

The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Afghanistan:

1. The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)

When the movement was started 24 years ago its main objective was to present Islam as a system of life in politics,social matter sand thoughts (Zad, 1991 ). The movement succeeded in its few establishment years to spread its messages although the King’s government abused them and used media propaganda against them. Then Daoud came to power in 1973 with the support of the communist party the People’s Democratic party of Afghanistan and treated them very harshly.

President Daoud jailed and killed the movement’s leaders which shaped the second objective of their movement which was Jihad in the birth of Allah , to liberate Afghanistan from the secular government of Daoud. The third objective is related to the second, which is the establishment of an Islamic state in Afghanistan (Zad, 1991).

These were the three objectives of the Muslim Youth Movement before it became known with its new name of the Islamic Party after the coup of 1978. The objectives have remained, according to Zad the same with the Islamic party as they were with the Muslim Youth Movement.

The methods the Islamic party used to gain its objectives according to (Zad, 1 991 )are:

presenting the Islamic political system and the Islamic social order, during the time of King Zahir Shah and Daoud, to challenge the communist political and social theories, by publishing books and giving lectures;
organizing students into Islamic educational groups to teach them Islam as a system of life as they would not find this information in their schools;
spreading books and lecturing about the danger of communism amongst the masses;
establishing Jihad during the time of Daoud;
continuing Jihad and making it a massive one after the communist coup of

1 978 by calling all Afghans to fight for their freedom;

organizing the masses to fight against the Soviet army by organizing them into combat units and creating military colleges;
continuing Jihad after the withdrawal of the Soviet army to cause the Afghan communist regime to fail;
making Shir’a Majleses in the free states that had been liberated to choose the Amirs of these states and to help them in consultation;
joining the other parties in establishing a temporary Afghan government and sharing with the ministries and representatives in the Shur’a Assembly;
establishing an Islamic government with the other parties after the collapse of the communist regime.

2. The Islamic Society

Before the division between the two groups, the Islamic Society and the Islamic Party, they had the same objectives (during the time of King Zahir Shah and until the start of the republican regime lead by President Daoud.) These objectives were mainly to present the Islamic political system and the Islamic social order to defeat the new theories presented by the People’s Democratic Party (Khalil, 1 991 ). However, when the Islamic Party took the choice of going to war with the regime after the jailing and killing of the Muslim Youth Movement, the Islamic Society did not fight and tried to make some agreement with the government with the help of the Islamic Organization Party of Pakistan.

The objectives during this time were mainly to stop the jailing and killing of the leaders and members of the Muslim Youth Movement and to stop the communists from controlling the Defence Ministry. The Islamic Society advised President Daoud and spread to the masses the communist plans. But its hopes did not materialize, either in stopping the jailings and killings of the Muslim Youth Movement leaders or in the success of the advice the movement gave the government about the fast growth of the communist movements in Afghanistan.

After the communist coup of 1 978 the Islamic society went to Pakistan and started Jihad and used Pakistan as a base to work from. Jihad became their

third objective and from it they formed the fourth objective which is establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan that practices Islam as a system of life, not as a way of worship (Khalil, 1 991 ).

To achieve these objectives the Islamic society used according to Khalil these methods:

choosing individuals and educating them Islamically to develop from them good Muslims who believe in Islam and work for it;
spreading Islamic thoughts in politics and social life to the Afghan masses;
organizing those who accepted the call for Jihad into groups to fight the communist regime;
practising Shur’a in the parts that had been liberated in Afghanistan by electing members of the Shur’a Majles from the locals to choose the Amir of that part and consulting him;
practising Shari’a in those parts that had been liberated politically, socially and economically;
joining the other parties in forming the temporary Afghan government in Pakistan and running some of its ministries;
establishing an Islamic government in Kabul after the liberation of Afghanistan from the communist regime.

3. The Islamic Party (Khalise)

When this party separated from the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) it continued Jihad with three main objectives. The first one is calling for Islam as a system of life among the Afghan masses. Secondly, continuing Jihad to liberate Afghanistan from the communist regime. After doing this, Afghanistan would be ready for the third objective which is practising Islam in every part of life and activity in Afghanistan (Khalise, 1 991 )

The party used different methods to reach its objectives. These methods according to Khalise are:

spreading Islamic knowledge and understanding throughout the Afghan masses through scholars who work with the party;
organizing the Afghans who fight with the party into groups and militias;
electing Shur’a Majlises in the areas that are liberated to choose Amirs in those areas and to consult them;
forming, with the other parties, the temporary Afghan government in

Pakistan ;

establishing an Islamic government in Afghanistan after its liberation from the communists.

4. The Afghan National Liberation Front

This movement has had two main objectives since its establishment. The first is establishing a Jihad to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet Union and then from the communist regime. The second is related to the first and is the establishing of an Islamic state that rules with Shur’a (Rohani, 1991).

To practise these objectives the Afghan National Liberation Front used according to Rohani these methods:

calling for Jihad among the Afghans to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet

Army and the communist regime after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union;

opening the movement’s membership to any Afghani without condition that he must be an Islamic activist;
joining the temporary Afghan government and sharing some of its ministries;
calling for the practice of Shari’a in Afghanistan after its liberation.

The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Afghanistan

1. The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar)

Since the party was started in 1968 the first identifying aspect of its has been an ideological one that called for the return of Islam as a system of life in politics, socially, economically and in education. So it was a preaching party that was calling for Islam. Then it became a Jihad movement when the government became an obstacle to the practice of their objectives. This stage caused the movement to work as a militia in the mountains (during the time of President Daoud 1 973-1978)and as a political movement that wanted to hold power instead of the secular government.

When the communists came to power in the coup of 1978 this acted to make the Islamic Party become more than a political movement, to be a political party that fought for the liberation of the state from its communist government and to practise Islam in the country. The party did succeed in practising Islam in the liberated areas that were controlled by the party. In the mean time the party changed its way of fighting to become more organized with its own military college and well-educated officers.

The Islamic party also became, during the war-time, a well organized when its committees of education had a university and thousands of schools and polytechnical colleges. Also, its health committee had a considerable of field hospitals and clinics. The media committee also had its newspapers and magazines all over the world in different languages (Zad, 1 991 ).

in the meantime the party is one of the founders of the temporary Afghan government in Pakistan.

2. The Islamic Society

Although the Islamic society had its own ideas about the regime of President

Dauod and the ways the movement used to protect the Muslim Youth Movement leaders and members from jails and being killed, it never left its nature as an Islamic movement that preached and called for the return of Islam as a system of life.

The movement also used political talks with Daoud’s government to avoide the communists from coming to power during the time of president Daoud. Then the movement became a military movement and a political party since the start of the communist regime in 1978. With the movement’s victory in the war and its liberation of the north of Afghanistan, the Islamic Society has established military colleges to educate officers who could defeat the Soviet Army and control the militias (Khalil , 1 991 ).

This position made the Islamic society not only an ideological political and military party but also a social movement that had tens of hospitals and thousands of schools and polytechnic colleges all over Afghanistan. The Islamic Party also was the first movement to practise the Islamic economic system when it established the first Islamic Bank in the north of Afghanistan.

The Islamic Society is also one of the founders of the temporary Afghan government in Pakistan.

The Islamic Party (Khalise)

Because of the nature of the birth of the Islamic party (Khalise) during the war it became a combination between Jihad, to liberate Afghanistan, and Islamic thoughts in politics, social matters, economics and education. the party was formed not only as a military party but also as a political party that joined the other parties in forming the temporary Afghan government (Khalise, 1 991 ).

With the help of its scholar members, the party established hundreds of schools and had its Islamic college in Pakistan to graduate Muslim scholars who combined Islamic teaching with Jihad.

The Afghan National Liberation Front

The methods that this movement used to pursue its objectives made the movement more political than military. Its acceptance of non-Islamic activists, especially some Afghan scholars and nationalist figures, made it more acceptable to the West and to other governments of the region, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, than other parties like the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic Party (Khalise) and the Islamic Society.

But the movement still has one objective and continues to call for it, that might not be accepted by its secular and nationalist members. That is establishing Islam in Afghanistan as a political system after its liberation, but they could not reject this objective because one of the movement’s regulations is not to accept any member who is against Islam.

The movement worked with the other parties in the formation of the temporary Afghan government and Mr Mujadidi is the president of this government.

The Islamic Movements and Politics in Afghanistan

Just as the Islamic movements in Egypt were asked hypothetical political questions, the Islamic movements in Afghanistan were asked the same question to find out their ideas about the future Islamic State they have in mind; especially as they are closer to this future state than are the Egyptian Islamic Movements.

The first question is what would be the movement’s position on practising Shur’a in choosing the President of the State, if they ruled Afghanistan?

They all believe that Shur’a is one of the fundamental pillars the Islamic political system was built on. Shur’a for them is an obligation in choosing the president and not optional. They also said that the Shur’a Majles is responsible for choosing the president of the state.

The second question is what kind of political system will these movements use if they came to power in Afghanistan?

The Islamic party believe that Shur’a is a fundamental pillar in the Islamic political system and they think that it could be practised by:

firstly, a public election for choosing the members of the Shur’a Majles
a closed election within the Shur’a Majles for choosing the president
the president to suggest the components and the assistant committees
the Shur’a Majles to approve or disapprove of these components and committees

The Islamic party (Khalise) agreed with what the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) thought about Shur’a but they added one condition. This condition comes after the Shuffa Majles choose the president ; he must get the public to acknowledge him as president by majority vote.

While the other two parties believe that he must be chosen by the Shur’a Majles, they did not explain how the Majles would be chosen and whether the president needed a majority vote to be acknowledged or if it was enough for him to be chosen by the Shur’a Majles.

The third question is what kind of relationships will there be between their government and the Eastern and Western governments?

The Islamic party (Hekmatyar) believe that the East which existed before the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan has almost disappeared, but the party believes that the West has remained with its belief that it is the only super power in the world, under the leadership of the United States of America. The party believes that the Western states are the most dangerous power against Islam because of what they said during the Gulf War about the danger of Islam to their interests. But the party also believes that there must be political and economic relationships with all the countries which are not anti-Islam. The Islamic Society shares the same opinion with the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and they added that any agreement between the Islamic government and Western or Eastern governments must be framed in the term of the Islamic Shari’a. The Islamic party (Khalise) also shares the same opinion with these parties adding that these diplomatic and economic relationships must be used for spreading Islam in those countries. The Afghan National Liberation Front said that relationships with any country depend on the country’s interest with those countries.

The last political question is what is the position of these movements position on reuniting the Muslim world in one state?

Two parties, the Islamic party (Khalise) and the Afghan National Front hopes and believes that it will come back but it needs more time. They think that the collapse of the Soviet Union is one signal of its coming. The Islamic party (Hekmatyar), although it is the Muslims’ hope, believe it is difficult to be seen in this situation where Muslims live under Muslim governments who ignore Islam and fight those who want to practise it, but the party think that the changes that the Islamic movements are trying to bring about in preaching Islam as a system of life will help the changing of these regimes in the Muslim world. When these movements come to power it will be easy for them to unite. The party believes that one of the signals of these changes is what is happening in Sudan and Algeria. The Islamic Society believes that Caliph’at is simply unity among Muslims and that is why the Muslims’ enemies are afraid of it coming. The party think it is difficult to specify a date or a time for the coming because of the Muslims’ situations in their countries, but the party believes that it is an obligation that every Muslim must work for. The party believe that there are some events that signal its nearness. These signals are:

the establishment of Islamic movements all over the world with the same objectives
the return of Jihad as a simple defence for Islam
the failing of the Eastern and Western philosophies and theories in solving humanity’s problems
the spreading of Islam in the Muslim world as a solution for Muslims’ problems.

The party think that it will take some steps to bring this unity to reality. These steps are:

the liberation of the Muslim world from imperialism and from anti-Islamic governments in the Muslim world
the practice of Shari’a in some of the Muslim countries
unity between some of those countries who practise Shari’a, and then the others will join.

The researcher also asked them some hypothetical economic questions to discover the economic system they have in mind when they establish their Islamic state. The first question was what is their movement’s position on privatisation of industry and trade?

All the four movements agreed that Islam called for individual ownership but with some conditions, such as not selling or producing anything that had been prohibited in Islam such as wine. Also, not allowing any person to forestall the market for anything that people needed and paying poor-due to help the poor people in the society.

The second question is what is their position on the self reliance of Afghanistan after its liberation?

They all think that because Afghanistan is one of the less developed countries and one of the poor countries it might need cooperation between the government and businessmen in establishing heavy industry instead of opening the door to the foreign companies or Western loans. They believe by doing that the country with its green lands, rivers and cheap labour will be self reliant within a few years in food and will need another few years for industry.

The third question was about their position on changing usurious banks to non-usurious banks?

Three of them; the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic party (Khalise) and the Afghan National Liberation Front said that the practice of Shari’a includes banking and the way it works and because Islam prohibited usury then the future Islamic government must change the usurious bank to an Islamic bank. The Islamic Society took a practical step when it opened the first Islamic bank in the Noäh of Afghanistan and called it “The Islamic Bank” It has branches in 15 provinces ruled by the North Field Commanders from all the Majahideen parties under the leadership of Ahamad Shah Musoud the Islamic society’s

Summary

If we look to the first three movements in our study, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic Society and the Islamic Party (Khalise) when they were one movement called the Muslim Youth Movement in 1968, we find that their movement was an Islamic political movement because the environment and the time in which it was established its members found themselves in a position where communists, secularists and nationalists were presenting their theories but no one tried to present the Islamic political system. They also found themselves in a kingdom that gave the King absolute right to allow or stop any political or social movement.

The movement was born three years after the birth of the first and only official political party; People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan that was organized by two communist factions; Khalq, led by Nur Taraki, and Parsham, led by Babrak Karma’. Against all these obstacles, the Muslim Youth Movement started as a student organization in Kabul University to present Islam in Afghanistan.

Although the movement used the peaceful way in presenting Islam, the King’s government was against their approach and used its power to stop their activities by preventing them spreading their leaflets or newsletters. In the meantime the government used its media propaganda and its loyalist Ulama to change the good image of the movement among students, especially after the movement had 32 seats in the Students’ Union of 51 seats in 1971.

Then came the Coup of Daoud in 1 973 to change the government system from

a kingship to a republican system and also to change the treatment of the Muslim Youth Movement. The government started jailing and killing the movement’s leaders and members. The remains of the movement’s members went to the mountains to escape from the government. During this time the first division started among the movement. Rabany (the Islamic Society’s leader) worked in a peaceful way with the Islamic organization of Pakistan to solve the problem peacefully, while Mr Hekmatyar (the Islamic Party’s leader) took the military way as a result of what the government did.

Five years later, in 1978 the communists made the Coup to start aggressive war against Hekmatyar’s group, as well as Rabany’s group. This war united the two groups’ ideas on the approach they had to choose with the communist government, but it failed to unite them as one group. Although there were many times when they united formally they separated again after a few months of their unification. This separation led to the birth of the two parties, the Islamic Party (Khalise) and the Islamic Union who have the same objectives and those leaders were among the founders of the Muslim Youth Movement.

The fourth party is the Afghan National Liberation Front which is different from the other three parties of our study. First of all in its establishment. The party was established in 1982 during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Secondly, it is a political party created, according to his founder, to establish a resistance to liberate Afghanistan from the Soviet Army and the Communist Government and to call for the practise of Shari’a after its liberation. But the party does not focus on how or when the party will practise Shari ^ta. Also, the party has no problem with the former King and supported the idea that the King could come back and rule Afghanistan again. This is because of the party’s relationships with the West, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia who want the King rather than a fundamental government. This relationship with the West, Pakistan’s government and Saudi’s government caused the party to accept any Afghan citizen to be as a member of the party; although if a nationalist or secularist on the condition that he must not be against Islam.

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The Islamic Movements in Kuwait

Kuwait, as a small Arab State, has no original Islamic movement, nor nationalist, secular or communist movements. However all the ideologies found in the Arab World are found in Kuwait.

The Islamic movement, in Kuwait, was firstly found during the early forties of this century, while Kuwait was under British Occupation. This movement was an inversion of the famous Islamic movement in the Muslim World, the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement was known in Kuwait as the Muslim Brotherhood, although their official name is the Organization of Social Improvement.

Then, at the end of the 1960s another movement was founded that related theologically to the movement of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahabe in Saudi Arabia. This movement was known in Kuwait as the Salafi movement, although their official name is the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath.

In this section we are going to study these two movements,

– The Organization of Social Improvement – The Organization of lhy’a Al Torath

their establishment, objectives and nature. Then we will study their ideas about the political and economic change they are seeking

This study in this section will help us to understand the ideologies and thoughts of two Islamic movements working in a monarchy state.

The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Kuwait

1. The Organization of Social Improvement:

The Organization of Social Improvement is the successor of the Guidance Organization that was established in 1952 under the leadership of Abdul Azize Al Mouta’a (Kostiner, 1 988 ). Both organizations have been the official structure that the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait has worked through (Abdullah Al

Mouta’a, 1988).

In 1940, Abdul Azize Al Mouta’a met in Egypt with Hassan A Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and accepted his mission to carry home with him. He was active in the movement with Abdullah (Al Khatrash, 1992 ).

In 1 952, the Al mouta’a brothers, with other members of the Iraqi Muslim brotherhood, who were very active during the 1940s and the beginning of the 19502, established the guidance Organization. Kuwait, according to AIKhatrashi, (1992) during this period, was open to accepting ideas. This period was called the Organizational and Clubs Cultural Movements Period, which transmitted all the and ideas in the Arab World to Kuwait.

The Guidance Organization did not survive long when disagreement occurred among the leading members combined with pressure from the uprise of the Nasserism Movement (followers of Egypt’s President Nasser’s ideas nationalism)when Nasser crushed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This division ended the Organization and also ended the relationship between Abdul Azize Al Mouta’a and the Muslim Brotherhood. This division marked the end of his active political life (AIKhatrash, 1992).

On 8th June 1 963, thirty of Kuwait’s intellectuals, in the House of Fahad AJKhaljd, decided to establish an organization that would carry on the Islamic mission in Kuwait and practise the moral code of Kuwaiti society. They named it the Organization of Social Improvement (Abdullah Al Mouta ^la, 1988). The organization was registered on 22nd July 1963 (Kuwait Al Youm, 1963).

Although the movement had a weak start, as Alkhatrash (1992 )saw it, it attracted all the figures of the Muslim Brotherhood and others who worked for the spreading of Islam but were not from the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the early 1970s, the new movement of the Muslim Brotherhood was founded. This new movement was more organized and comprised of mostly students (AIKhatrash, 1992). The new movement also used the Organization of Social Improvement as an official structure and Abdullah Al Mouta’a played a major role in uniting the old and new movement of the Muslim Brotherhood when he became the leader of the Organization of Social Improvement.

In 1971 , the organization of Social Improvement and the Social Educational Organization, both backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, attempted to impose separate higher education for female and male students in Kuwait University (Kostiner, 1988) until succeeded to do so.

Because the Organization of Social Improvement could not act in politics the Muslim Brotherhood ran independent candidates in the National Assembly Elections. The Muslim Brotherhood also used other organizations, such as

students’ and teachers’ organization, that influenced the activities of the Organization of Social Improvement and, on the other hand, gave more alternatives to the Muslim Brotherhood.

2. The Organization of lhy’a Al Torath:

The organization was established officially and registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1 981 . It is the official structure for the Salafi Movement in Kuwait, which was established at the end of the 1960s (Al Oune, 1 992).

After the defeat of the 1967 Arab/lsraeli War Nationalism and Nasserism in Kuwait as in the rest of the Arab World were also defeated as ideologies (Dekmejian, 1988). Their collapse opened the road for students, who had studied the thoughts and books of Imam Ibn Taimia (1 263-1328), Ibn Al Qayem (1 293-1350) and Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahab (1 703-1 791 ) to organize themselves and start preaching for Islam through the understanding of these three famous scholars, call from their members in the People’s Assembly in 1987 they called for the practice of Islam although it was to be phased in gradually.

On the other hand, the Islamic organization called for the immediate practice of Islam. The movement ran some candidates in the National Assembly of 1 981 and 1985 and gained some seats.

The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Kuwait

The Organization of Social Improvement:

The objectives of the Organization of Social Improvement, as set out by the organization itself (1 988)are:

Protecting society from social problems and bad behaviour such as drugs, alcohol, prostitution, usuary and gambling.
- Guiding youths along the right path and filling their free time with good and valuable things.

Presenting books, courses and methods to the Ministries of Education and Information to improve the practice of these ministries according to the Islamic Shari’a.

Presenting solutions for the problems that face Muslim society and trying to practise these solutions.
- Preaching for Islam and its morals among individuals to protect the identity of the society and its values.
- Encouraging all good deeds such as donations for the needy, supporting the rights of individuals and justice for everyone according to the Islamic conception.
- Uniting the Muslim world according to the Islamic principles and calling Muslims to practise Islam as a belief and a system of life.

To practise these objectives the Organization of Social Improvement used these methods:

Establishing schools for teaching and memorising the Qur’an.

Lectures and cultural weeks through the Cultural Committee.
- Publishing books in different languages.

Organizing a yearly exposition for Islamic books, cassettes and video cassettes.

Establishing a Youth Center in 1 974 that cared for teenage youth to educate them Islamically.
- Establishing Women’s Committees in 1 983 to care for women’s issues and children’s education according to the Islamic conception.
- Establishing a committee for collecting Zaka (in 1978) and for distributing help to the needy.
- Establishing the Al Mujtam’a Magazine in 1969 to spread their messages.
- Establishing a Committee of the Muslim World in 1983 to care for Muslim issues, giving donations, distributing books in different languages and preaching Islam in Muslim countries.
- Establishing the Islamic Preaching Committee in 1984 that was responsible for missionary planning in Kuwait and the Muslim world.
- Establishing Palestine and Lebanon Aid Committees in 1 986 to help Palestinians and Lebanese specifically (Youth Center of the Organization of Social Improvement, 1983 and The Organization of Social Movements, 1988).

The Muslim Brotherhood who established and organized the Organization of Social Improvement have other methods that they use to practise the same objectives through the Organization of Social Improvement. These methods, according to AIKhatrash (1992) are:

Directing the National Union of Kuwaiti Students since 1 979 by getting an overall majority every year.
- Directing the Organization of Teachers by getting an overall majority every year.
- Presenting some candidates in the National Assembly elections during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (AIKhatrash, 1992).
The Organization of Ihy’a Al Torath:

The objectives of the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath and the Salafi Movement according to Al Oune (1992) are:

The main and the longterm objective is the establishment of Allah’s rule in the world but to reach this there are many objectives to be achieved first, such as:
Clarifying to mankind the right religion.

Clarifying to Muslims the concept of Tawhid as it was clarified in the Qur’an and by Prophet Muahammad.

Explaining to Muslims that Islam is the religion of justice and rights and other social slogans or religions do not serve the mission that human beings were created on this earth to fulfil.

To practice these objectives the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath used these methods:

lectures and speeches in Mosques.
publishing books and other publications.
participating in the National Assembly.
working with the Ministry of Education to Islamize the schools textbooks.
spreading their messages through the Al Forqan magazine.
the Committee of Projects that collects donations to build mosques, hospitals, schools, and distribute food and clothes to the needy in the Muslim world.
sending books to non-Muslims in Europe and America explaining what Islam is?.

The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Kuwait

The Organization of Social Improvement:

The Organization is a social movement that works to improve social and political life in Kuwait according to Islam (the Organization of Social improvement, 1988). The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait (who are illegal at the movement) established the Organization of Social Improvement to be their official agency in Kuwait. They also use other agencies, such as their independent members in the National Assembly, the National Union of Kuwait Student and other Unions, to spread their political and social messages all activities that the Organization of Social Improvement’s Constitution does not permit.

After the liberation of Kuwait in 1 991 the Muslim Brotherhood established a new organization called the Constitutional Islamic Movement. The new movement focused mainly, according to AIKhatrash (1992), on the political frame work and the organization of political parties within the movement.

The Organization of lhy’a Al Torath:

The nature of this organization according to Al Oune (1992) is based on the Sajafi mission founded by Ibn Taimia and his student Ibn Al Qayem. Later came Ibn Abdul Wahabe to carry on their mission. It is an ideological movement that focuses on Tawhid as the bedrock for understanding Islam.

The Salafi mission also, according to Al Oune, uses political and social activities as a step to reach the main objective which is the establishment of Allah’s rule in the world.

The Islamic Movements and Politics in Kuwait:

The political and social environment associated with a monarchy tends to be conservative in nature. In common with other societies, Kuwait has many different competing and conflicting interest groups. It is within this type of environment that the Islamic Movement has operated, sometimes supporting, sometimes opposing the policies of the government (Al Khatrash, 1992 and Al Oune, 1992).

In the same way that hypothetical political questions had been asked of other Islamic movement, we put the same questions to the movements in Kuwait, in order to discover their ideas on the political system.

The first question was on the subject of the movement’s positions on practicing Shur’a in the choosing of the president of the State should they ever rule Kuwait.

The two movements believe that their objectives were not to chang the monarchy in Kuwait for a different political system but to improve it. However, they both call for consultation through the National Assembly as an important factor in assisting the Emir in the ruling of the State (Al Khatrash, 1992 and Al Oune, 1992 ).

The second question concerned the kind of political system the the Islamic movements would use, again if they should every come to power in Kuwait.

Both movements repeated that it is not part of their objective to chang the Kuwaiti regime, so they would not answer the question (Al Khatrash 1992 and Al Oune 1992). But Al Oune did add that, in any Muslim Country, the Shur’a system (according to Shari ^ta) must be the political system used to rule the state.

The third question addressed the issue of international relationships and asked what kind of relationship the Islamic movements might look for in contacts with Eastern and Western governments.

Their responses again were that they are not looking to bring down the present regime in Kuwait (Al Khatrash, 1992 and Al Oune, 1992 ).

The fourth and final questions was directed towards discovering their attitude towards uniting the Muslim world in one state.

The two movement said that this is the dream of all the Islamic movements, but the contemporary political situation in the Muslim World makes it obvious that this is still a distant dream (Al Khatrash 1992, and Al Oune, 1992).

The four hypothetical questions were followed by a series of questions on the movements’ views concerning the economic system they might choose to use should they attain political power in Kuwait.

The first questions was on the movement’s attitudes towards the privatization of trade and industry in Kuwait.

Both movements pointed to the fact that the Islamic economic system allows for private ownership. They also said that Islam, when it allowed private ownership, also called upon Muslims to pay the poor-due and not monopolize food or other human needs.(AI Khatrash, 1992 and Al Oune , 1992).

The second question concerned what action the movements might take against usurious banks and what their position was on non-usurious practices.

Al Khatrash (1 992) said they had established the Kuwaiti Finance House as an Islamic bank in Kuwait, but it is difficult to influence, let alone change, the practices of usurious banks because of the power of their owners who have large amounts of capitals on deposit in those banks. Al Oune (1992)believes that the Islamic movements must try their best to change the system of usury with regards to the banking system and that his movement puts this as one of its main objectives.

Summary

The political and social system that the Islamic movements in Kuwait exist

in is a monarchy and inherently conservative, compared with other Arab societies (that were for a long time British or French colonies). The ruling family has no thoughts on the subject of changing Kuwait society towards other systems such as Ba’athism, nationalism or communism (Al Khatrash, 1992 ). the only thing that the Al Sabah family is looking to do is to stay in power.

The two movements understand this fact and that is why their objectives make no mention of changing the government, to one that is fully Islamic, but simply of improving it.

On the other hand, because Kuwaiti society is generally conservative, their objectives is to protect the society from non-Islamic ideologies such as Nasserism, nationalism and communism all ideas that spread to Kuwait during the 1950s and 1960s,

The difference between the two movements is their approach in presenting Islam to the public. The organization of Social Improvement (as part of the Muslim brotherhood)follows that movement’s approach is calling for Islam s a whole system of life in politicis, economics and social life. Meanwhile, the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath, which is a Salafi movement, concentrates on calling firstly for clarification of Tawhid in Muslims’ minds and then for policies that reflect this concept in the areas of politics, economics and social arrangements.

The Islamic movements in Pakistan:

Pakistan was the first state born out of Islam. During the 1920s and the 1930s, Dr. Iqbal, the famous Indian poet, had the dream of seeing an Islamic state in Northern India where Muslims were in the majority. This dream was taken up by the All Indian Muslim League, which represented Indian Muslims at that time, and efforts were made to find a way to turn the dream into a practical political reality. Another champion of this cause was the famous Indian journalist, Mr. Mudoudi, editor of the journal, Turjoman Al Qur’an. The combination of the political activities of All Muslim League with the writings of Mudoudi helped to developed the dream to its reality in 1 947 with the announcement of Pakistan’s independence.

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Although Pakistan gained its independence as an Islamic state it does not in fact practise Islam in its fullest sense as it has had a secular government since independence. The only time that the Pakistani government has been serious about practising Islam was during the Presidency of Zia UI Haqu (19771988). However, it must be admitted that Pakistan’s democratic constitution has allowed all Parties, whatever their different ideologies, to be seen in the country.

This democratic atmospheres allowed the Islamic movements in Pakistan to distribute their thoughts on the Islamic political system and social order throughout the society and gave them leave to practise such ideas through the National Assembly, and when some of these movements joined other political parties to form a colletion government. Such efforts as they made to sepread their ideas were thus able to be conducted quite openly; unlike similar movements in the Middle East which have had to work underground. This ability of the Islamic movements to make their case publicly also enabled the movements to test public acceptance of their political and social approaches. In this section, three of the major Pakistani Islamic movements will be studied:

-the Islamic Organization;

-the Organization of Ahlo Hadith;

-the Organization of Islam’s Ulama.

Studying these movements will reveal how they worked within the democratic political system of that country. It will show also the background to their establishment and their objectives. From the vantage point of this background, their political nature will be discussed and it will be shown how they would intend to rule Pakistan, politically and economically, should they accede to power.

The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Pakistan:

1. The Islamic Organisation

During the 1930s the founder of this movement, Mr Mudoudi, was publishing a

monthly journal called Turjoman Al Qur’an. Through this monthly journal he advocated the idea of a trial Islamic policy in the Islamic State (Ahmad, 1 991 ). In those days Dr Iqbal, the famous poet in India, was alive and was thinking along the same lines. Dr Iqbal invited Mudoudi to establish a cenrer in East Banjab which is now in India. Mudoudi established this center and named it Dar-ul-lslam and thought how he would establish a trial Islamic State and trial Islamic Society while India was under British Colonialism.

In August 1 941 Mudoudi established the Islamic Organization in Lahour; He call for the confirmation an Islamic government and an Islamic state in a conference that attended by 75 Muslim scholars from different parts of India. The movement obtained its name after the establishment of Pakistan in 1947. The movement was registered as a political party and joined with other Islamic parties to form the government in Pakistan to Islamise the society and move scholars from power (Ahmad, 1992).

In 1 971 Pakistan became two countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but the movement kept the same name in Pakistan and in Bangladesh and each worked separately although they had the same objectives (WAMY, 1989 ). The party’s objection to allowing Pakistan to become a secular state made it a target for government suppression during the sixties and seventies. Many of its activists, including its founder, have spent long periods in jail, particularly under Bhutto’s government during the seventies, which saw the Islamic organization as a conspiratory group (Alhamidi, 1987 ).

The movement supported the Islamisation programme of President Ziau Haqu but in the main it criticised him for not being sincere enough in his Islamisation efforts and for delaying elections several times. The Islamic Organization still worked on reaching its objectives to form an Islamic society and an Islamic political policy (Ahmad, 1991 ). It had tens of thousands of activists in most of the student movements, labour unions, farmers unions, teachers unions and other social movements. The movement also joined the Islamic Democratic Alliance in forming the present government of Mr Sharif (Banks, 1990 ).

The Organisation of Ahlo Hadith

When Pakistan was formed in 1947 and the people came from India, Mulana Dawod and Mulana Ismail, who were famous scholars of Prophet Muhammad’s speeches, felt that their followers had dispersed into various areas of Pakistan. They came from India in a worried state and spread out into various areas. This was the source of organizing these people into an organization (Lacwi, 1 991 ).

In 1947 Mulana Dawod and Mulana Ismail established the organization of Ahlo Hadith to preach Islam in an organized way according to Lacwi, in order to establish an Islamic state in Pakistan. it had a large number of followers and tried with other Islamic parties to force Mr Sharif’s goverment to practice shari’a in Pakistan through the Pakistan parliament.

The Organization of Islam’s Ulama

This movement is the successor to the Conference of Ulama of India which played a role in the independence struggle as an ally of the Indian Congress party from the British colonialism. The Ulama supported the idea of Pakistan’s independence and worked for it. After Pakistan became an independent country, some of the Ulama did not agree with the Pakistani government’s political programmes because of their secularisation. The Ulama who helped in the struggle of the establishment of Pakistan saw that the power should go to those who had a belief in Islam as a political, social and economic system and not to those who were scholars (Hossain, 1 991 ).

To do this, some I-llama, such as Maulana Mufti Mahmood and Abdullah Darkhwasti established the organization of Islam’s Ulama to be involved with other Islamic parties in changing the political environment in Pakistan to become more Islamic (Hossain, 1991 ). Then the atmosphere would be ready to practise Islam in Pakistan.

The party had a strong base in the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Mulana Mufti Mahmood was the famous leader of the party when he was chief minister of the North West Frontier Province in 1972 and he was also the president of the Pakistan National Alliance during its struggle against the Bhutto government during the 1970s.

The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Pakistan

I . The Islamic Organisation

Before Mudoudi established the Islamic Organization he called for Muslims in India to establish Islamic policy in an Islamic state. He then emphasised in his newspaper, Turjuman Al Qur’an, that an Islamic society and an Islamic government could not be established unless Muslims followed the four steps that Prophet Muhammad gave to build the first Islamic state in history.

These four steps Mudoudi made as the objectives of his movement. The first step was preaching Islam to humanity and calling people to understand Islam and believe in it as a system for their life. He then called for organizing those who accepted Islam as a system of their life by joining them in the Islamic Organization and training them to call others for the same thing. The third step was to use this party who believed in Islam as a system of life to train and organize them to bring more members, to command people to do good and to prohibit them to do evil to and change the society to become more Islamic. The fourth step was to establish an Islamic government and an Islamic state so that the power should be transferred from non-Muslims and secular Muslims to those who believed in Allah and in Islam as a system of people’s lives.

But Ahmad (1 991), the present leader of the movement, believed that the long term objective is to unite humanity under the power of Islam because it is the way of life which is just and one under which the people of all races, colour and language can come together in one system.

To practise these objectives the Islamic organization according to Ahmad used these methods:

practising Islam in its individual members’ daily lives establishing an Islamic education group to educate its members Islamically working as a political party to present Islam in the Pakistani parliament and by joining other pafties in forming a government that practises Islam or at least does not prohibit those who work for this objective
establishing an Islamic government that practises Islam as a system of life to develop an Islamic society when the last step has been taken, Pakistan will be a model for other Muslim countries to follow because there are other Islamic movements who have the same objectives and methods in Bangladesh, India, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and Turkey reuniting the Muslim world again when there are a number of Islamic governments in the Muslim world at the same time the Islamic Organization had already opened a dialogue with European, American, former USSR, Asian and African countries hoping that these non-Muslim societies would be convinced by the system of Islam which is the last message from Allah to humanity uniting humanity under the power of Islam because of its justice and in which people of all races, colour and language could join in its equal system.

2. The Organisation of Ahlo Hadith

There are two main objectives to the organization of Ahlo Hadith. The first one was to spread Islam as Prophet Muhammad taught his companions, through creating a large center of learning that has the ability to educate thousands of the movement’s activist members every year and to cover the areas left out or little researched, in other Islamic movements.

The second objective was to run Pakistan with the Islamic system and make Islam supreme in it (Lacwi, 1991 ).

These two objectives according to Lacwi gave the movement the ability to use these methods:

building a university in Faisalabad called the Salfiyyah University to graduate preachers to preach about Islam in Pakistan joining other Islamic political parties during elections to push the Islamic system closer to power making Pakistan, when it practised Islam, a model for Muslim countries in the world to follow

3. The Organisation of Islam’s Ulama

Because the founders of this movement were all scholars of Islam in Pakistan they set their first objective as spreading Islam as a system of life in the minds and hearts of the Pakistani people, so Islam would be seen in Pakistani society after the secularisation of the colonial period (Hossain, 1991 ).

To do that, the Organization of Islam’s Ulama according to Hossain called for a change of the secular political governments that had ruled Pakistan since independence. This change would bring the Islamic project to light and to return Pakistan to Islam the cause, because of which, it was liberated.

The movement used these methods to fulfill these objectives:

using Mosques and Islamic schools to preach about Islam to the masses
establishing a political party that called for Islam as a system of life in Pakistan – involving other Islamic political parties in changing the political environment to become more Islamic after it had been secular.

The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Pakistan:

1. The Islamic Organization

The main nature of the Islamic Organization was its combination of ideological preaching and political practice. The movement was very clear from its establishment that it was a preaching movement that called for purity of thought (away from non-Muslim ideology)and the improvement of each individual according to Islam, and that it was also a political movement that called for the improvement of the society and the government according to the Islamic social order and the Islamic political system.

At that time, Mudoudi specified his movements, Jihad, against four directions:

the theory of one nation in India that had been called by the Conference Party in India during British colonialism the control of Western civilization
leaders who adopted theories and thoughts against the Islamic thought thoughts that carried a religious inertia.

This position gave the movement’s ideas strong support from Muslims in India and then in Pakistan, when it obtained its independence. Also, the movement’s policy was one of public activity and not to be secret in reaching its objectives with its conception of using constitutional and legal methods to improve the society and the government Islamically which made the movement’s popularity grow day by day (Ahmad, 1991 ¹).

In theoretical terms the movement was affected according to Ahmad by three Islamic preaching schools. The first was Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahaab School in the 17th Century in Arabia on Tawhid and its practical meaning in society and the political system. The second was the school of Dr Iqbal who was an Islamic philosopher and the father of Pakistan’s independence when he wrote about his dream of a Muslim state separate from India. The third school that the Islamic Organization embraced was the school of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in its understanding of Islam as a system of life.

Because of its nature the movement attracted different levels of Pakistani society. Its members came from every student and social movement in Pakistan. Mudoudi according to Ahmad made these methods for his organization as a definition of its nature:

farmers’ methods, by planting and waiting for the fruit
doctors’ methods by finding the pain and administering the right medication classification methods by classifying the society that the movement wants to reach – students, lawyers etc. and preaching to each group with understanding
the most important matter before the important matter present the model before presenting the word in preaching Islam.

2. The Organization of Ahlo Hadith

The nature of the Organization of Ahlo Hadith is mainly an Islamic traditional education school that teaches Islam from the Islamic traditional books of the famous scholars of the first three centuries, since Islam was founded. At the

same time it is a political movement that called for the practising of Islam in Pakistan in politics and social life.

The movement in ideological terms is a copy of the preaching of Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wahaab of the 17th Century in Arabia on Tawhid by calling people to worship Allah exclusively and not to pray to any human being, but the movement added to Abdul Wahaab’s school the political part when the Organization of Ahlo Hadith established a political movement to combine its preaching with political pressure to change the secular government to an Islamic government that adopted Islam as a system of life (Lacwi, 1991

The movement used mainly Mosques to preach its teachings and political message, also through its schools and its Salifiyah University.

3. The Organization of Islam’s Ulama

The nature of this movement was drawn before the independence of Pakistan when it was a part of the Conference of Ulama of India and joined with the Congress Party in the struggle to liberate India. The struggle to free India from the British, made the movement anti-colonialiser whether it was political, social, economic or thought colonialism.

This nature caused the movement, after the independence of Pakistan, to call for the ideological independence in the Pakistani governments when secularism became the face of several governments; especially by the movement’s leader Mufti Mahmood; during the presidency of the Pakistani National Alliance and its struggle against the Bhutto government in the seventies (Hossain,1991 ).

Also, as an Islamic movement, it was a preaching movement that mainly used Mosques to preach about Islam and teach the Islamic traditional books of Imam Ibu Hanifah, the founder of the Hanifi school in Shari ^ta in the seventh century.

The Islamic Movements and Politics in Pakistan:

There were some hypothetical political questions in the interview that were asked of the Islamic movements in Pakistan to find out their opinions on the political system they had in mind.

The first question was what would be the movement’s position on practising shur’a in choosing the president of the state if they ruled Pakistan ?

The three movements believe that the Islamic political system was negatively affected in history when it became a kingship system and shur’a was frozen. They, needless to say, practise it in their own parties to choose the party leaders (Ahmad, 1991, Lacwi, 1991 and Hossain 1991 ).

The Islamic Organization had different shur’a majles to consult the movement’s committees and it had its high shur’a majles that had the authority to elect the movement’s leader, create the movement’s policies, and approve the committee’s programmes (Ahmad, 1991 ). But the organization of Islam’s Ulama and the organization of Ahlo Hadith used shur’a in major matters such as electing the party’s leader or joining other political parties in elections. That was because these two movements did not share the same interests in joining social, student, labour and farmer’s movements and because most of their regular activities were based on their scholars preaching in Mosques (Lacwi, 1991 and Hossain 1991 ).

The second question was what kind of political system would these movements use if they came to power in Pakistan?

The Islamic Organization believed that firstly the government must admit that its power came from its obedience to Allah’s law and when the government left Allah’s law it became another government but not an Islamic one. Secondly, the government must bear in mind that shur’a is a fundamental pillar in the Islamic political system and it had no right to freeze it or jump decisions over it (Ahmad, 1 991 ).

If the government agreed on that then according to Ahmad it could do the following:

a public election to chose the members of the country’s shur’a majles or parliament
another election but inside the shur’a majles to chose the president of the state when the public acknowledged their new president by a majority vote, he would be the official president of the state.

The organization of Ahlo Hadith and the organization of Islam’s Ulama agreed with the steps that the Islamic Organization put forward but they added that the number of the shur’a majles and the way of votes and age of voters could be discussed when this government is founded (Lacwi, 1991 and Hossain , 1991).

The third question was what kind of relationships would there be between their government and the Eastern and Western governments?

The Islamic Organization said that it was anti-colonialist and did not want the Islamic government to become a slave to the East or West (Ahmad, 1991). While the Organization of Ahlo Hadith according to Lacwi (1991 )believed that the Islamic government must not follow any Eastern or Western policy. It should consider Allah the Lord of the East and the West.

The Organization of Islam’s Ulama according to Hossain said that when Benazer Bhutto came to be elected the Western governments gave her not only millions of dollars but also she brought with her an American company to organise her election campaign. The company taught her how to speak in public, how to buy newspaper support and even how to ply people’s consciences. The East also destroyed Afghanistan and its people. This is how they treated the Muslims and Muslims should be careful in relationships with them.

But, the three movements agreed that it is not right to cut relationships with the East or West. They believed that it could be a political and economic relationship within the framework of shari’a and an equal human beings and not as they have treated Muslims in Third World countries.

The last political question was what was the movement’s positions on reuniting the Muslim world in one state?

The Islamic Organization believed that there must be a just system according to Islam for all humanity and because it is for humanity there must be a center for it which is the Muslim Umma. Therefore, the movement was for the revival of Caliph’at on the path of prophethood and that is one of its basic objectives, but the movement believed that it needed more time come about (Ahmad, 1991).

The Organization of Ahlo Hadith believed that every Muslim is in the Kingdom of Allah and must submit to Allah. Allah asked them to be one nation that had every race, colour and language in it and to throw away nationalist and other non-Islamic identities. These borders must not divide Muslim mentality as they divided them in different nations and as their division took time, the movement believed that their reunion also needed time (Lacwi, 1991).

The Organization of Islam’s Ulama said that a reunion of Muslims is a dream but there is no model country that could start this reunion (Hossain, 1991 ).

The three movements believe that the reunion of the Muslim world is a fact that needs time for it to happen and the Islamic uprising all over the Muslim world Jihad in Afghanistan and the failing of the practice of the non-Islamic political and social theories in Muslim countries made Islam the only choice for Muslim problems. They also agreed that the steps towards reunion would begin the establishment of Islamic states in different parts of the Muslim world which could then unite and become the model for other Muslim states.

Also, there were some economic hypothetical questions to find out what economic system they would use when they established their Islamic state.

The first question was what was their movement’s position on privatisation of industry and trade?

The Islamic organization called for a mixed economy that allowed all types of industry and trade to be run by private investors but that the strategic and heavy industry could be run by the State (Ahmad, 1 991 ). The organization of Ahlo Hadith believed that Islam allowed for privatisation of trade and Industry but also asked Muslims to pay the poor-due and not to form monopolies any kind of food or anything necessary to people (Lacwi, 1991 ). The Organization of Islam’s

Ulama added to what the Islamic Organization said and gave a condition which was that no industry or trade was allowed to sell or produce anything that had been prohibited in Islam (Hossain, 1 991 ).

The second question was what was their position on the self-reliance of Pakistan?

The three movements believed that the Western countries were putting economic pressure on Pakistan to remain as a Third World country. They also believed that the Western countries were biased with India against Pakistan in exporting industrial and nuclear technology because India had accepted Western civilization and Western culture while Pakistan wanted its own identity (Ahmad, 1991, Lacwi 1 991 and Hossain 1 991 ).

The Islamic Organization had given Sharif’s government a programme that could make Pakistan a self-reliant country within three years. This programme was based on refusing Western loans and using the Pakistani natural resources such as rivers, sunshine, green land, skilled cheap labour and educated Pakistanis who worked outside of Pakistan (Ahmad, 1 991 ).

The third question was what they were going to do with the usurious banks and what their position was on the non-usurious banks?

The three movements said that calling for the practice of shari’a included economic policies and this necessarily included banks. Ahmad (1991 )thought that what President Ziaul Haqu had done about the Islamisation of Pakistani banks was a good step that needed to be continued by the present government.

Summary

In Pakistan the Islamic movements have the best democratic and free environment in the Muslim world. At the same time they were the only movements who could present their approach about restructuring the country in the Islamic way without fearing any constitutional law being used against them, as in Turkey.

Also, their long experience in using democratic tools to present their opinions made them respected by their enemies as well as their followers. For example when they called for the resignation of Prime Minister Benazer Bhutto they used the parliamentary means to achieved this end instead of killing her or calling on people to break the law of the country.

They also joined with the governments when they created an alliance during the elections with other political parties as the attendance of the Islamic Organization with the present government. This experience led these movements to practise a lot of their ideas and objectives, especially in education, health and foreign policies towards Afghanistan and Kashmir.

The Islamic Movements in Turkey

After the collapse of the Ottoman Caliph’at in 1924, Ataturk tried to secularize Turkey. He formed many laws and many military courts to ban any relations between the new Turkey and Islam.

In this environment there were two main Islamic movements that survived. The first was the Sufi Movement, with its different groups such as Kadiri’a and Nukshibandi’a, who tried to keep Islam in the hearts and minds of Turkish children by teaching them in secret until the 1950s and they were allowed to establish Imam and Khatib schools.

The second group was Said Nursi and his students’ who distributed his letters “Nur letters” day and night for more than sixty years clarifying Tawhid and the meaning of Islam.

Then, at the beginning of the 1970s a new party was founded, based on Islam, called the National Order Party (NOP) founded by Erbakan.

After the NOP was dissolved, Erbakan established the NSP less than ten years later the NSP was also dissolved Erbakan was jailed but his friends established another party called the Welfare Party.

These are the main Islamic movements in Turkey that we are going to study.

The Nursi movement
The Sufi movement
The Welfare Party

Firstly, their establishment, then their objectives and lastly, the nature of these movements.

We are not going to study the hypothetical political and economic questions because the three movements refused to answer them for their own security. They also refused to give the names of those who answered the questions because if they became known to the Turkish government they would face jail.

The Establishment of the Islamic Movements in Turkey

1. The Nursi Movement:

The Nursi Movement is different from other Islamic movements. Firstly, it is a movement based on the study of the literature of the movements, founder. Secondly, the followers of the movement also act in the same way that Said Nursi acted. That is why it is important to study Said Nursi’s life, letters and acts in order to understand the Nursi movement (Nursi Movement Representative, 1 991 ).

The Nursi Movement got its name from its founder’s last name, Said Nursi. He was born in 1873 in a valley called Nurs, from which he received the name Nursi, in eastern Anatolia. In that valley he received his first Islamic and scientific education in a private traditional school that was equal to a university college (Sahiner, 1988).

Ottoman Society, during the nineteenth century was afflicted by different political and ideological movements that worked hard to destroy the Caliph’at, as Alb (1987) described the situation. These movements, such as You Turkey (YT) and the Unity and Modernization Organization (UMO) worked to westernize Turkey, to make a secular state and establish nationalism among Turks to divide them from other parts of the Caliph’at state. Alb believes that western influence, through these movements and through secret movements that had been established by Turkish Jews, grew more pronounced.

This was the environment that Said Nursi found the Ottoman Caliph’at in. This bad situation gave him the strength to start working to rescue the state. After he finished his education in his valley in 1 891 he went to a city called Van and worked as a teacher for fifteen years. From there his teaching on; Islam as a system of life was started (Nursi Movement Representative, 1991).

He attempted to establish an Islamic University called Al Zahra’a University in Van, similar to Al Azhar University in Egypt. This ambition caused him go to

Istanbul in 1907. There, he was influenced by the IJMO which had dismissed Sultan Abdul Hamid Il with the help of Ottoman officers from Salunik (Alb, 1987).

One of the important points that spread during the uprising of March 1909 (among politicians and intellectuals) was the called for “a Constitutional Government)”. Said Nursi was one of the supporters of this idea but from a different angle. Politicians and intellectuals looked to a Constitutional Government from a western viewpoint while he was writing about it in the daily newspapers in Istanbul, and through his speeches in and around Istambul, from the Islamic point of view. He was calling for a Constitutional Government that had a parliament and which practised Shur’a. This shows that he adhered to the Islamic principles in politics as well as in social life. He also established, according to WAMY (1989), an organization called Muhammadi Unity to spread his ideas on Constitutional Government according to Islam. He also wrote a great deal, according to Alb (1987) on the adoption of the Islamic principle of freedom in the Constitutional Government which would means that the government would work according to the Shur’a system in Islam and not as a dictatorship.

Because of his support for ” Constitutional Government” “he was arrested and court-marshalled on the charge of inciting the disturbance although he had tried to calm events….he made a heroic defence and in the end was acquitted” (Sehiner, 1988; 5). After that, Said Nursi returned to eastern Anatolia explaining to people that the movement for freedom was not contrary to Islam and that all kinds of dictatorship were rejected by Islam, which would flourish and manifest its virtues in a free atmosphere.

In 1 91 1 he returned to Istanbul to continue his efforts to establish Alzahia ^la Islamic University in Van in Eastern Anatolia when the government promised to fund the university. He received some of the funding and went back to Van to establish the university but the construction was not completed because of the out break of World War I (Alb, 1987).

Said Nursi served in the Turkish Army as an officer during the war. He used his position to teach his soldiers about Islam. He served in Kukaz during the war and there he wrote his book “Miracle Signals” about the Qur’anic miracles. At the end of the war, twenty of his students had been killed and he was incaptivity with some of his students. He was sent to a prisons camp in Kostroma, in North Western Russia, where he spent two years.

In the prison camp he was sentenced to death when he refused to stand up for the Russian General, Nikolay Nikolaevich, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front. When the general asked him why he did not stand up before him he said”l am a Muslim scholar and have beliefs in my heart. Whoever has belief in hisheart is superior to one who does not I cannot act against my belief” (Sehiner, 1988: 7).

He managed to escape from prison through Leningrad, to Warsaw, to Venice then to Istanbul. When he arrived in Istanbul in 1 918 he was appointed as a member of the Islamic Dar-UI-Hikma, the religious academy of the time. He did not object to the appointment as it was a purely scientific position (Nursi Movement Representative, 1 991). He tried to resign from the Islamic Dar-UlHikma many times but his students and friends did not want him to. The reason for his resigning was, as he said, to have more time for studying the Qur’an as a guidance for humanity (Alb, 1987).

When the first World War ended with the defeat of the Ottoman Calipha’t and the invasion of the British, French and Italians from the West and the Armians from the East, Said Nursi stayed in Istanbul calling on people to defend the country against the invading troops. He wrote articles and spread underground pamphlets, showing the historic hatred of Western imperialism against Muslims in general and Turks in particular (Sahiner, 1988 ).

The invasion of the Western states caused Said Nursi to support the Liberation Movement in Anatolia faithfully, but after liberation he went to Ankara and found that members of parliament were negligent in their Islamic obligations. Ataturk offered Said Nursi many positions as a Member of Parliament, Member of the Islamic Dar-UI-Hikma and a religious position for guidance in Eastern Anatolia to take him in his side. When the war of 1925 started between Ataturk and Said Kurdi Movement that supported the Caliphat system when Ataturk abolished it in 1924 (WAMY, 1989). Said Nursi refused all these positions and went to Van, staying isolated from public life, saying, “l seek protection by Allah from Satan and Politics”. He stayed in a cave in the Iryk mountains in Van, studying the Qur’an and living a very basic and humble life. He continued writing his Nur letter about the Qur’an and Islam during his isolation (Alb, 1987).

At the beginning of the Ataturk Movement to secularise Turkey, Said Nursi, with other scholars, wrote against the government’s laws that counselled the Shari’a Ministry, Shari’a Courts, all Islamic Courses in schools and Universities and established the Linguistics Center of the Turkish Language that changed the Arabic alphabet of the Turkish to the Latin alphabet withdrew Islamic terms and words with Arabic roots and replaced them with European and Old Turkish terms and words (Drwaza, 1980). There were number of scholars writing against these laws caused the government to “re-educate” hundreds of them and jail thousands of others. Said Nursi was put in prison and given the death sentence several times but because of the government, afriad of his students’ reaction, his sentence was not carried out (Nursi Movement Representative,

1991

The Court put him into exile under house arrest in Van then in Isparta and ordered him not to write any Nurs letters. He did stop writing the letters. He also sent them secretly to his students who rewrote them and spread them in Turkey until he died on 23 March 1960 (Nursi Movements Representative, 1991). Sahinar said: “Said and his students formed their own postal organization called ‘the Nur postmen’, 600,000 copies of the treatise were distributed throughout Anatolia” (1988: 12).

Because of his life in prison, in exile and under house arrest, Said Nursi did not organize his movement as an organization; it was more a “thought movement”.

After his death, the Nursi did not become one leadership. They increased distributing the Nurs letters and exhibited their activity in publications. They published many newspapers in different periods, such as Zulfigar, Aukuat and Itihad, until 1971 when they were stopped by the military coup government.

These newspapers, as well as Nursis during the 1950s and 1960s supported the Democratic Party led by Adnan Mandarise (the former Prime Minister) because of Said Nursi’s letters of support to Madarise for his allowing religious freedom on some issues (such as the return of Azan to Arabic, after Ataturk changed it to Turkish, and his promise to reopen the Islamic schools of Imam and Khatib) (Harb, 1987).

With political life still in disarray after the 1971 military coup, the Nursis established a newspaper called Yeni Asya. This was a turning point in their activities. The main principles of this newspaper were consultation, democracy, the fight against communism and support for human rights. Its basic idea was to establish a civilized relationship with the free world in the West without misunderstanding or misuse of Islam.

These changes compared with the teaching of Said Nursi divided the movement into three main groups:

The main group of the Nursis supported the Justice Party then the Wight Way Party which claimed it was the successor to Mandarise’s Democratic Party. This group was led by the organizer of Yeni Asya (Nursi Movement Representative, 1 99 1 ).
The second group, headed by Tawfik Paksu, Gundus and Sudi Reset left the main group with Erbakan of the National Order Party (then the National Salvation Party and then the Welfare Party) (Harb, 1987).
There is still a small group that does not get involved in politics, repeating

what Said Nursi said, “l seek protection by Allah from Satan and Politics” (Alb, 1 987).

On 12 September 1980, the military coup regime closed down Y eni Asya. In response, the main group brought out a new newspaper called “New Generation”, but it was also closed by the regime.

They established a third newspaper, called Photography which was also closed on (1 October 1983). In spite of all this closure of their publications, the main group managed to gain government approval to publish “New Generation” again on 5th November 1983.

In 1990, serious differences arose within this group and many famous writers left. The reason they gave was that the owners of the newspaper acted on a parallel with the government’s policies and, according to the Chief Editor of “New Generation”, they did not want only to support Demiral. They also wanted to publish a newspaper that would attract a wider community, by changing the rhythm and way of addressing their ideas instead of acting in a radical way (Nursi Movement Representative, 1 991).

On 15 June 1990, Muhammad Kuthular, Mustafa Kaplan, and Burhan Bozgeyik published a newspaper with the old name, “Y eni Asya”. They were accused by the other group of trying to establish a bridge between democracy and Islam, while knowing that Islamic Shur’a is different from democracy (Nursi Movement Representative, 1 991

2. Sufi Movements:

Sufi ideology, as we said before when we talked about the Sufi movements in Egypt, established itself in the eighth century This movement developed different spiritual practices in schools known by their founders’ names of Kadiri’a and Nakshibandi’a.

The Sufis in Turkey were known as Sufi Tarikat (doctrine). In 1925, Ataturk banned all Tarikat orders and this is still valid in Turkey today (Pickering, 1989). In 1 981 , the coup’s commander in chief, General Kenan Euren, talked about Tarikat by quoting part of Ataturk’s speech in 1925:

“Gentlemen and citizens, please note well that the Republic of Turkey will never be a country of Sheiks, dervishes, disciples or fools” (FTI 7.5.82).

But the Sufi operated through legal religious institutions or schools of Imam and Khatib which they owned (Pickering, 1989). They also operated through their ownership of newspapers and magazines.

One of the famous Tarikat in Turkey now is Kadiri’a. The leader of this group is a businessman named Hedar Bas. Their headquarters is in Trabzon and there they publish their two magazines lcmal and Ogut (Kadiri’a Representative,

1 991

The second famous Tarikat in Turkey is Nakshibandi’a. The founder of this group is Muhammad Sami Ramazanoglu who was born in Adana in 1892. He finished his studies at the School of Art in then participated in Nakshiband Zawi’a (Sufi spiritual schools in Mosques) of Sheik Muhammad Asad Al Arbirlly (1847-1931). After the ban on all Tarikat Zawi’as, in 1925, Rama Zanoglu stayed in Adana preaching secretly until 1 951 when he went to Istanbul. There he became more active in preaching. He established a Mosque called Zihni Pasa.

In 1 979 he immigrated to Saudi Arabia and died there on 12 February 1984. After his death the group was run by a committee and a publication house was established to publish his books and a magazine called Alton.

3. The Welfare Party

The party was founded in 1983 but from its ideas and present leaders of this party it is clear that it is the successor of two parties, the National Order Party (NOP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) according to WAMY (1 989); Harb (1 987); Pickering (1988) and the Welfare Representative (1991).

The founder of the three parties is Erbakan who graduated from Engineering College in Istanbul in 1948; he obtained his PhD from Aakchenhn University in

Germany in 1953. During his studies in Germany, his university file says about him “he makes two things, a lot praying and projects” (WAMY, 1989; 265). From 1953 until 1968 he worked in different high positions in Turkish Universities and in 1968 his first political experience was established when he became a member of the Management Committee of the Turkish Trade and Industrial Union.

In the election of 1969 he was elected as an independent candidate of Qunia and won with a majority. Ten thousand Imam and Khatib school students helped him during his Campaign (WAMY, 1989). After the election Erbakan, with some of his friends, established the first Islamic Party in Turkey under the name of the National Order Party, on 26 January 1971 (Welfare Representative, 1 991).

The NOP called for Islam as a base of the political system in Turkey (Harb, 1987). In April 1971 , the Constitutional Court called for the dissolution of the NOP because of its call for Islam. The party was dissolved on May 20 1 971 by the Constitutional Court for Offences, on the grounds that it was in contradiction of the political parties’ law that forbids the use of religion for political purposes (Pickering, 1988). The Court also ordered the seizure of all the party’s property and a ban of all its leaders on establishing any other party or participating as independents in any elections (WAMY, 1989).

During the political disorder at the beginning of 1 971 the military, which was governing from behind the scenes, according to Ozbudun (1989), allowed the establishment of the National Salvation Party. Erbakan could not appeal for the NSP himself because of the Constitutional Court’s decision but Abdul Karim Togar and Torhan Akuol appealed for him and the party was established on 1 1 October 1972.

After the founding of the NSP, the party established branches in 42 administrative districts out of 67 and approximately 300 countries (Pickering, 1964). This gives some idea of the relationship between the NOP and the NSP, as a result of which, as Picking (1 988) believes, it was reasonable to suggest that the NOP following was reflected and taken up in the NSP following.

Harb (1987) characterized the groups that participated in the establishment of the NPS as follows:

the Muslim technologists who follow the Nakshibandi’a Tarikat.
the Turkish students who studied in Western States and who contacted followers of other Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization in Pakistan.
some followers of Said Nursi.

The election of 1973 gave the party the opportunity to join the RPP (Republican reliance party) in forming the government (Ozbudun, 1989). Erbakan became Deputy Prime Minister and his party had seven ministers in the Interal, Justice, Industrial and Agriculture Ministries amongst others. (Welfare Representative, 1 991). The government failed after nine and a half months.

In 1977 the NSP joined the National Front Coalition with the Justice Party, the National Action Pad)/ and the Republican Reliance Party under the leadership of Demiral and which won the election (Ozbudun, 1989). Erbakan and his party returned to power and his Islamization became more publicly known.This led to the Turkish people (on 5 December 1 978) calling for the dismissal of Erbakan from his party because of his mixing Islam with politics, which is against Ataturk’s Secularism (WAMY, 1989) but they failed to prove this.

The National Front lost its majority after a division between the JP’s deputies. In November 1979 the RPP government resigned and the National Front brought the NSP back to power.

On 26 April 1980 Erbakan addressed the Turkish Assembly about his party’s views on solving the political and economic problems of the Muslim World by calling for the establishment of:

United Islamic Nations
Islamic Common Market
Single Islamic Currency (Islamic Dinar)
Military force to defend the Muslim World
Cultural associations to build the united theology and culture of the Muslim World on the basis of Islam (WAMY, 1989).After five months of this, General Euren, the military leader dissolved all the parties, including the NSP. Erbakan and 33 of the NSP leaders were jailed and remained in prison until 1985, when he was released, only to be put under house arrest until the end of 1985.

On 1981 Ahmad Tukudal established the Welfare Party with the same objectives and supporters as those of the NSP(Welfare Representative, 1991). When Erbakan was allowed to return to politics he became the Welfare Party leader and Tukudal was his deputy (Banks, 1990).

The Objectives of the Islamic Movements in Turkey

I . The Nursi Movement:

The Nursi objectives as set out by Ishik (1991) (one of the famous Nursi writers):

the main objective for every Nursi individual as well as a group is to salvage Iman (belief) in Allah and strengthen it;
another important objective is to stop the dangers to the nation from secularism and communism;
understanding and practising Qur’an in full.
because of the third objective, secular groups will fight the movement using false accusations to try and cause problems between the movement and the government.
because the movement has no political power or party members it must act patiently and positively using the Nurs letters as a guide to defeat the

movement’s enemy;

the main source of the movement’s strength is loyalty to Qur’an;
the movement’s objective is to gain the blessing of Allah and his mercy that will protect the movement and this will not happen until they act positively and loyally.

To pursue these objectives the movement employed methods described by one of the Nursi leaders, Mursel (1991).

All events should be evaluated from the Islamic point of view. – Events should be viewed in reality.
1. Explanations should be based on proof (positive approach)
1. Practical life experience not theories should be utilized in evaluating events.
1. A constructive ideology should be set between Western culture and technology and Islam.
1. Evaluation should be based on objective rather than subjective areas.
1. Social events should be evaluated in a complete way.

Alb (1 987) believed that although the Nursi rise was based on the Nursi slogan “t seek protection by Allah from Satan and Politics” they have strongly supported Prime Minister Demiral and his party since the 1960s and through the party they try to change the secular government towards the Islamization of Turkey. On the other hand, Harb (1987) focused on the relationship between the NOP, NSP and WP the parties of the Nursi movement in calling for political and social changes towards Islam in Turkey.

Sufi Movements:

The first objective of the Sufi Movement according to Kadiri’a (1991) is to call

people to the path of Allah. The second main objective is to spread the Sufi thoughts. Thirdly, to try to create a balance between materialism and morals. Forthly, they believe that Sufism has an impact on every aspect of life and believe that instead of trying to apply radical moves to change the society towards Islam, Muslims should understand their religion and its applications and then change will come gradually (Nakshibandi’a Representative, 1991).

To pursue these objectives while still being are illegal the Sufi Movement share used these methods:

Establishing schools of Imam and Khatib all over Turkey.
- Establishing Waqfes (houses given as a charity to the Tarikat) to fund the Tarikat through their heirs.
- Using magazines to spread their ideas and Sufi thoughts.
- Supporting the anti-communist parties.
- Supporting democracy by supporting the parliament.
- The Nakshibandi’a Movement supported the NSP but during the 1980s they supported the MP because one of their leading figures, Ayman Pasa, was a member of the MP. Then they returned to the support of the WP (originally NSP) in the 1990s.
The Welfare Party:

As we have said before, the WP is actually the same as the NSP and the NOP in ideas and objectives. The objectives of the party are, according to WAMY ( 1 989) :

Peace and security in Turkey.
- The mixture between the nation and the state.
- Great turkey again.
- Moral regeneration.
- Industrial regeneration.

To pursue these objectives the party used these methods according to WAMY

(1989) and Welfare Representatives (1 991

Calling for the return of Muslims to their religion.
Using education as a tool for directing society to Islamic morals and values.
Establishing factories in Anatolia to create jobs youths to stem their migration to Europe (which led to them losing their Islamic identity and morals).
Calling for boycotting the European Common Market.
Reforming the media to serve the nation’s interest and to develop its own culture.
Establishing heavy industrial and military industries.
While the NSP was in power it called for a factory for each province and started to build them but th is was stopped after the NSP left office.
Working for awakening Islamic identity through:
establishing large numbers of Imam and Khatib schools
establishing a course in schools called “morals” and making this an obligatory course
allowing Turks to go to Hajj in Saudi Arabia by bus which allow poor Turk to go also
political amnesty for all prisoner including members of the Islamic movements
calling for the return of the Arabic alphabet and refusing to use the Latin alphabet.
establishing mosques in cities and villages.

While the NSP were in power the party encouraged the Turkish Government to participate in the Cypriot issues.

Calling for changes to the Ataturk Secularism Constitution.
The NSP, in 1975, got from the parliament a law allowing the sons of the Ottoman Caliph’at to come home, after Ataturk’s decision on 3 March 1924 to send them into exile.
Using two newspapers to spread the party’s messages Millie Gazette and Y ene Dur.

The Nature of the Islamic Movements in Turkey

1. The Nursi Movement:

The ideology of this movement was based on what Said Nursi wrote. This tight focus is inclined to give the impression to anyone studying the movement that it would be difficult to find another famous fighter in the movement’s literature.

When the movement was started, Said Nursi and his students opposed the secularization revolution, led by Ataturk. The revolution changed the Islamic face of Turkey by force and made the preaching of Islam illegal. This threat of force steered the movement towards adopting a tactical strategy based on not facing the government directly but on facing secularism as a thought (WAMY, 1 989).

The movement was known publicly as a non-political movement. However, after Said Nursi’s death, the movement was divided into three groups, two of which were working in politics with Demiral or Erbakan. The remaining group was small, did not want to be involved in politics, and only studied Said Nursi’s literature (Alb, 1987).

“The Nursi Movement’s followers amounts to more than a million people.

Rewriting the Nurs letters and distributing them especially to young girls, who were very active in that” (WAMY, 1989; 526).

2. Sufi Movements:

Because of Ataturk’s ban on Sufism in 1925 which is still in operation now, the movements used other ways of preaching and spreading their messages, such as the ownership of newspapers or magazines, and using legal institutions which, in fact, they owned (Pickering, 1989).

On the other hand they tried not to stand against the government. This position gave them the ability to own more magazines and more Wakfes because:

“in order to establish a Wakfe a document explaining its aims and rules must be submitted to the authorities. Once it is accepted, the Wakfe remains the best way, within the Turkish law and tax system, for an organization to avoid governmental control and taxation while maintaining officia/ recognition” (Pickering, 1989; 109).

One of the main characteristics of Sufi Movements in Turkey is their opposition to communism and socialism which has led them to support some right-wing parties.

3. The Welfare Party

The nature of this party is as described by WAMY (1989) the NSP was established as an explicitly religious party”. It is an Islamic and political party working for the rebuilding of social, economic and political life according to Islam.

The party’s ideas came from three main resources: Sufism, Nursi Movements and books of Al Bana and Qutop of Muslim Brotherhood and Mudoudi, the founder of the Islamic organization in Pakistan (Harb, 1987). This combination gave the party the ability to attract different types of classes and passions.

The party is famous for its large number of intellectuals especially professors, doctors and engineers. In one of his speeches in parliament, Erbakan said:

“they prosecuted us and called us backward and ignorant, but they wi// be shameful when they know that the deputies of the NSP in the parliament and they are fifty deputies, accounted for 95% of the Assembly’s intellectuals” (WAMY, 1989; 269).

The Islamic movements and poFitics in Turkey:

All the three movements refused to answer the hypothetical political and economic questions (as asked of all the Islamic movements in the other four countries)for security reasons.

Summary

The Islamic movements in Turkey have lived in an anti Islamic political environment since 1 923. They are illegal as being Islamic movements, their practice of Islam (or preaching)is considered as to be an act against the secular constitution of the republic.

The movements have experienced different political systems. Firstly, a one party system in the 1 920s, 1 930s, and the first half of the 1 940s. Then a multi party system until now. But, during all these periods, the political parties worked according to the secular constitution founded by Ataturk. Otherwise, the Army, which is the defender of the constitution would according to the Welfare representation (1992), make one of its regular coups as has been done at the beginning of each decade since the 1960s.

This environment has led the Islamic movements in Turkey to struggle harder to practice Islam secretly or through political parties. The three Islamic movements in Turkey used these two methods to survive building the movements secretly and supporting the political parties that allowed some religious freedom or introduced Islamic policies in their election campaigns.

The difference between the three movements in their approach to

changing Turkish society, Nursis believe that concentrating on spreading and teaching the contents of Said Nursi’s letter on, for example, Tawhid, Islamic morals and thoughts and supporting Demiral’s JP and RWP are the main ways to effect this change.

Sufi movements believes that working through religious school and Mosques teaching Qur’an, making the Mouled fistful, and giving support to Demiral, Ozad, or Erbakan is the way to Islamic Turkish society.

Erbakan and his three Parties, NOP, NSP, WP is taking a totally different approach. He is trying to change the society from at the upper level and he is succeeded during the 1970s in changing many laws and in presenting to the country Islamic activities and issues. On the other hand, the party is working (as do other Islamic movements)behind the scenes to build a strong ideological movements within its members. The ideological basis of the WP was taken from the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization (in Pakistan)schools of thought.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have studied the Islamic movements, in the five countries of our study, from different sides. The first was their establishment and we found that only Sufism in Egypt and the Sufi and Nursi movements in Turkey had been established and active before the collapse of the Ottoman Caliph’at, while all the other movements were established after this period. The reason for that, according to Ahodibi (1 991), was that although the Ottoman Caliph’at was very weak before it ended it was still the symbol for Islam and Muslim unity. After it collapsed, Muslims divided into nations and ideologies other than Islam. At the same time, Muslim countries were under occupation.ln this situation, some Muslim scholars called for the return of Islam and encouraging Muslims to defend their lands.

Some of these scholars used the organizational way to spread their ideas (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Organization in Pakistan and the Islamic Organization in Egypt). Others concentrated on one school of thought teaching it and publishing and distributing books on it as their way to spread their ideas (such as the Salafi movements in Kuwait, the Organization of Ahlo Hadith, the Organization of Islams Ulama, Sufism in Egypt and Turkey and the Nursi movement). The third group was composed of scholars who worked through political parties to spread their ideas (as in Afghanistan, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party (Khalise), the Afghan National Liberation Front, the Islam’s Ulama and the Welfare Party in Turkey). The fourth group used the social services way to spread their ideas (such as the Al Shari’ah Society in Egypt, the Organization of Social Improvement and the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath in Kuwait).

The objectives of all these movements started with their call for the implementation of Islam as a system of life for individuals as well as Muslim societies as a whole. To pursue these objectives they used different methods, as just mentioned: Organizations to teach and distribute ideas and literature of one school of thought, political parties, and social services organizations.Because the Islamic movements had different approaches they had different classifications of priorities on the issue of from were to start the Islamization of society. Some of these movements want to clarify Tawhid in the hearts and minds of the Muslims as the first step towards society’s transformation. This approach is exemplified by the Salafi movement, the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath and the Nursi movement.

Other movements want to improve the relationship between a Muslim and his Lord through different religious spiritual acts as the first step towards Islamizing the society. Representative of this course of action are the Sufi movements in Egypt and Turkey. The third group call for a combination of methods aimed at achieving gradual change in all aspects of life without ignoring any Tawhid, Worship, Political, Social, economic, industrial, educational and cultural aspect. These movements are the Al Shari’ah Society, the Islamic Organization, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party (Khalise) in Afghanistan, the Islamic Organization, the Organization of Islam’s Ulama in Pakistan and the Welfare Party in Turkey.

There is one movement which uses a ‘shortcut’ method, by calling for the mixing of Islam with Nationalism to gather as many supporters as possible in its

political career. This movement is the Afghan national liberation Front in Afghanistan.

To pursue these objectives some Islamic movements work through legal channel that their government make available to them (such as Sufism,the Al Shari’ah Society in Egypt, the Organization of Social Improvement, the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath in Kuwait, the Islamic Organization, Organization of Ahlo Hadith, the Organization of Islam’s Ulama in Pakistan and the Welfare party in Turkey). Others work secretly, as do the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Organization in Egypt, the Nursi movement and the Sufi movements in Turkey.

The third group fought the communist government in Afghanistan and has come to power after liberating their country. These types of practices shaped the outlooks of these movements as well as their natures.

In the answers to hypothetical questions, it was obvious that some of these movements have a clear conception of the shape of the future Islamic government they dream of. These movements are the Muslim Brotherhood, the Al Shari’ah Society in Egypt, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic Society, the Islamic Party (Khalise) in Afghanistan and the Islamic Organization in Pakistan.

The two Islamic movements in Kuwait have no such project in mind because, according to Al Khatrash (1992)and Al Oune (1992), they do not want to change the Kuwaiti political system but only to improve it. The remaining movements had no clear picture, and only answered the questions in general terms.

The next chapter will be on methodology and will explain the problems that faced the researcher in interviewing the leaders and representatives of those movements in their countries.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

To find out how the sixteen Islamic movements of our study use the media to spread their messages, the researcher visited these Islamic movements in their countries. The purpose of the visit was to interview the leaders and the key actors in these movements. The interviews were conducted in order to ascertain the strategy devised by these groups to use mass media channels as well as interpersonal communication channels to reach their audience. The problems and obstacles to using these channels was also discussed.

The data gathered for this thesis was primarily by means of the interview. It is, therefore, important to explain the reasons for choosing the interview method as opposed to other methods. It is also important in this chapter to explain the problems and the difficulties that confronted the researcher during the field trip.

This chapter will firstly discuss the interview as a research tool. We will then compare the interview with other methods and techniques of data gathering. The difficulties of selecting who to interview, the problems involved in the drawing up of the questions to ask them and the process of negotiation in gaining the researcher access to the interviewees will be discussed. The last part of the chapter will explain the problems that faced the researcher during translating the data from Arabic, Urdo, Pushto, and Turkish into English.

Research interviews

The researcher used in depth interviews as the method of data gathering for this thesis. Kerlinger has stated that “the simplest and the best way to state the research problem is to ask questions. “(1986: 1 7). The in depth interview is the most straightforward method of asking questions. According to Berger it “is really an extended conversation, but it has a different purpose from an ordinary conversation. In a typical conversation we talk about our work, our families, events, in the news, people e know, and so on. The conversation can ramble and move in many different directions. The depth interview, on the other hand, is highly focused. It js conducted to get at matters such as hidden feelings or attitudes and beliefs that respondents may not be aware of or that are only dimly in their consciousness. 1 991 :57)

McCracken believes that

“the long interview is one of the most powerful methods in the qualitative armory. For certain descriptive and analytic purposes, no instrument of inquiry is more revealing.”(1988:9)

The in depth interview was thought to be able to produce more clear answers to this study’s questions than survey questions. Berger contrasts survey methods with in depth interviews. He says that “because surveys must have some focus, they must be limited in scope. The list of questions must be fixed, and there is no room for maneuver, as in the depth interview”(Berger; 1991 : 41).

It was also clear that the in depth interview would produce more information than a survey given the kind of information the study was seeking. The movements under scrutiny are often closed to the outside and are careful about revealing the kinds of media channels they use as well as the kind of messages they are trying to get across. Therefore in terms of finding out about the channels, messages and audiences of these movements open ended discussion was seen as being more effective. As Berger put it ” the more people talk, the more they reveal (give away) about themselves “(1991: 59)

Using this method the researcher by face to face discussion was also able to manoeuvre interviewees to develop a point whenever

would not be used. The possibility of an abuse of confidentiality was addressed by the researcher and every effort was made to assure the interviewee of total confidentiality

The researcher also explained to all interviewees that they have the right to refuse to answer any question that they thought could be used by their government against them. This clearly indicated to interviewees that the researcher was aware of the sensitivities surrounding the discussion and that he was empathetic to their situation. By establishing a bond of empathy – but not necessarily sympathy the researcher was able to build up confidence in his intentions and motives. He also gave each interviewee the right to record the answers or to write them and give them to the researcher thereby helping to avoid differences of interpretation that might have appeared later.

The importance of these assurances did make the interviewees more comfortable and allowed them to speak more freely. One further problem that did occur was that the researcher was based in a “Journalism Studies” department. It had to be stressed that the researcher was not conducting a journalistic interview. It was emphasized that a piece of social scientific research was being carried out. The researcher asked them to speak using facts, figures, and examples to support their answers, and not to generalize as they did with journalists thereby reinforcing the academic endeavor at hand..

The researcher was faced with problems concerning the kinds of questions to be asked. In particular the balance between unstructured and structured questions. Both types of question had to be asked given some of the problems mentioned above. The technique that the researcher used was to ask detailed questions at the beginning, such as why the founder of their movement established the movement? Such structured questions assisted the researcher to establish the academic credentials of the study and allowed him to build the bond of confidence between interviewer and interviewee. After building some trust with him, it is important to let the interviewees speak as much as they can about his movement’s

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they gave unexpected information. It was also possible through such talk to encourage interviewees to present their opinions more fully. The use of this method also enables the researcher to avoid putting words in the interviewees’ mouths, by letting them speak in their own words and in their own languages.

The methods and techniques of data gathering

After having decided to choose the in depth interview as the basic research method for the study the researcher had to confront the problem of “trust”. The problem of interviewing have been discussed in detail bu social researchers (see, for example, American Journal of Sociology, 1956). Establishing trust between the researcher and the interviewee is a key factor in the success of any kind of interview. In order to gain the trust of his interviewee the first step that the researcher did before each interview was to break the ice with the interviewee. This was a very important step in this study because of two particular things. First, the researcher is a student in a western country, a western institution. Many of the interviewees were suspicious of his motives. Thirteen out of the sixteen interviewees asked the researcher who had told him to do this interview. They wondered why he was doing it? Secondly, the nationality of the researcher (Saudi Arabian) made ten interviewees suspicious. It was apparent that they were concerned as to whether the Saudi government had sent the researcher or not. This problem was acutely felt in light of the bad timing of these interviews they were done just after the end of the Gulf war in 1991.

The researcher built trust with his interviewees through letters of recommendation and introduction he had brought from some senior figures of Islamic movements in different countries who had known the researcher. The researcher explained to every interviewee that he should answer questions from his movement’s point of view and not his own. It was also pointed out that while the data would be used for academic purposes and that it might be published the interviewees had a right to confidentiality. Interviewees could ask for the tape recorder to be stopped at any point they wanted and discussion could proceed “off the record” with the guarantee that it

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founder objectives, methods, and obstacles. It was also important in the beginning, because of the amount of time consumed, that another time was arranged to continue the interview, as happened with Ahmad in Pakistan where the interview was done in two parts in three days. Some of the interviewees might feel bored after one hour of recording and the last questions answers in one or two sentence as it happened with Al Oune.

After the detailed questions, the researcher started questions that needs specific answers such as what kinds of mass media channels their movement used to send its messages? This technique helped the researcher to get hard answers that he wanted without going into unnecessary details about who was the man in charge and how much money the workers got and so on.

The researcher also used another technique by asking them some hypothetical questions on the political and economic systems they will practice in their countries when they come to power. It was difficult for some of the interviewees to co-operate in answering this questions without generalization especially in Egypt, while on the other hand the answers of the Islamic movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan were more specific and showed the success of using this technique. That was because the Islamic movements in Pakistan were closer to gaining power than the other Islamic movements in the other countries. In Afghanistan they had already established their government in Pakistan and in 1992 they had established it in Afghanistan.

After recording each interview with the interpreter, the researcher checked with the interpreter some of the questions whose interpretations were weak. Then the researcher checked again the translation in Cardiff with Pakistani and Turkish students in the University of Wales.

In Cardiff all cassettes were transcribed and translated into English. After that a final check of the translation was done with the help of some Pakistani students and Iraqi lecturers who have

two native languages, Arabic and Turkish, and have a good English language background.

The difficulties of choosing the interviewees

To identify representatives of each of the sixteen movements of our study, the researcher laid down three main conditions. The interviewees had to be a member of one of the main committees of the movement or the president of the movement. The interviewees must have the authority from their movement to speak on its behalf. The last condition was that the interviewees should be the person in movement who is designated to speak to reporters and researchers. As a result in one case the researcher refused to interview one representative of the Organization of Social Improvement in Kuwait Dr. Al Shati, because during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait he had gained a reputation as presenting his own views rather than those of the movement although he was the editor of Al Mojtama’a magazine.

It was not always easy to find the people who had these qualifications and enough time to be interviewed. The researcher went to Pakistan in March 1 991 and spent the first ten days travelling between Islamabad and Lahore trying to arrange access to the leaders of the Islamic movements in Pakistan. Things were further complicated because during this time the National Assembly was studying the project of the Islamization of Pakistan’s judiciary and all the key people in the main Islamic movements were involved in the process. The leaders of these movements travelled between Islamabad and other cities where headquarters are to consult with their movements. During the first ten days in Pakistan the researcher only succeeded in interviewing one leader, the President of the Islamic Organization, Ahmad.

Ahmad had been a friend of the researcher for many years and was able to arrange an introduction to the leaders of other Islamic movements in Pakistan. Ahmad’s access to the other Islamic movements’ leaders enabled the researcher to met Lacwi, one of the founders of the Organization of Ahlo Hadith and member of central committee. In his last day in Pakistan the researcher succeeded in meeting Hossain, one of the the leading figures of the Organization of Islam’s Ulama The interview with Hossain was set up through the assistance of Julaidane, a friend of the researcher from Saudi Arabia, who worked in Pakistan as the head of the Muslim World League in South Asia. Through personal contacts the researcher gained access to several key interviewees in Pakistan.

This was also the case in Afghanistan. Julaidane helped the researcher to meet Khalise, the founder of the Islamic party (Khalise) in Afghanistan. He also helped to arrange the interview with Zad, one of the leading figures of the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) and the vice president of the party’s political committee. Khalil, the editor of Al Mujahideen, the leading magazine of the Islamic Society was interviewed through the arrangements of Julaidane, as well as Rohani, the secretary and consul of Mujadidi the president of Afghanistan National Liberation Front.

In Pakistan the researcher had the opportunity to meet Kassem, the vice president of the Islamic organization in Egypt. He was living in Peshour helping the Afghan refugees and Mujahideen. This interview was organized with the help of Helpawi, a friend of the researcher from Egypt, and the editor of International Issues , a magazine in Pakistan.

Gaining access to leaders of the Islamic movements in Turkey proved to be more difficult. The researcher was again able to met with the representatives of the Islamic movements through the good offices of a friend. However confidentiality had to be preserved at all times. The researcher was asked not to mention his name for security reasons. The guarantee of secrecy of the names of all interviewees that the researcher met was the first condition for interviewing them. The second condition was that the interviews should not be recorded and that all the questions should be given in advance and they would provide written answers. Finally they asked that their views on public issues should not be mentioned, only their views about their movement.

The researcher accepted all those conditions despite some of the difficulties that this would raise in relation to making comparisons between the movements. However access would only be granted on these conditions and as a result it was felt that they would have to be met. The outcome was that the researcher met with the one of the leading figures of the Welfare Party, a leading figure in the Nursi movement who worked for one of the newspapers loyal to the Nursi movement and at the end of the journey to Turkey, the Naqshabandi representative who is known to many in Sufi movements as one of the key figures of Sufism in Istanbul.

In Egypt, the researcher started the interviews with Al Hodibi, the spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood and an international figure. Maksood, the editor of Lew Al Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood helped the researcher in gaining access to the leaders of Sufism and Al Shari’ah Society. Then the researcher met with Tafftazani, the president of the High Majless of Sufism Doctrines and with Faid, the vice president of the Al Shari’ah Society.

The upheavals in the wake of the Gulf War provided many obstacles to arranging interviews with representatives of the Islamic movement in Kuwait. The researcher tried without any success to set up interviews in Kuwait. In London, February 1 992, the researcher succeeded in interviewing Al Oune, one of the founders of the Salafi movement and member of the central committee of the Organization of Social Improvement.

From the above we can see that personal acquaintances and relations played a major part in introducing the researcher to the leaders of the movements. It saved the researcher time in negotiating access to the leaders of these movements. It also enabled the researcher though the intercession of a trusted part to gain the confidence of the interviewees. However it raised some questions regarding the validity of the data and the representativeness of the interview sample. Being too close to the subjects of your research has been identified as a problem in social science research. However given the nature of the organizations that are the focus of study in this thesis, their secretiveness and insecurity, access could only be gained by establishing the credentials and sympathy of the researcher. While only 16 individuals were interviewed all these people were in key positions in the movements. They were able to provided an overview of the activities of the movements as well as being powerful actors in the decision making process. As with research on elites and the powerful in western countries compromises had to be made but the number of interviewees, representing the upper echelons in the movements did give a valuable and unique insight into the workings of the movements and their use of the media.

The problems that faces the researcher in translating the data

It was not an easy job to translate from one language to another especially when the data of each interview’s transcription was more than fifteen pages. It was also difficult before the interviews to find a person who could translate from Urdo, Pushto, and Turkish to English. Because of these problems, the researcher did the translations in three stages. The first stage was during the interviews. Then after transcribing all the cassettes, the researcher asked some students whose native languages were Urdo, Pushto, Turkish and Arabic to check the translations and to check and explain nonsense words and sentences. After that stage the researcher gave the data to other students and a lecturer (from South Glamorgan University) who all have two native languages, because their parents are from two different countries. They also been asked to check the translations from the original transcriptions.

Conclusion

The researcher went to the countries of our study and did indepth interviews with the leaders and key actors of the sixteen Islamic movements of our study. These interviews have been recorded and translated.

Those who been interviewed were the founders, presidents or members of one of the movements’ top committees. It was not easy to interview these people without the assistance of friends and acquaintances of the researcher. While arranging access in this way did pose some problems for the researcher and the validity of his data these problems were not unlike the difficulties faced by westem researchers in gaining access to powerful and elite sources in their own countries. Translating the material proved difficult but through a process of scrutiny and double checking using the linguistic abilities of the researcher and others translations were produced.

The field trip took five and a half months and the transcription of the cassettes and their translations took another two months were not time consuming for the researcher.

CHAPTER SIX

COMMUNICATION AND THE RISE OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS

Introduction

The chapter will discuss the findings of the interviews with the leaders and representatives of the sixteen Islamic movements in our study. It is divided into five main sections concerning the countries of this study. Each section examines the following: the audiences for the communication effort of the Islamic movements; the main communications channels used to send messages; the main obstacles to the dissemination of these messages and the mechanisms set up to assess the impact of the messages.

The chapter will highlight the audiences to which the Islamic movements direct their messages and discuss the reasons why certain groups are targeted and not others. We will also gain an insight into which channels are selected to research these audiences and why. The extent to which the nature of political regimes in each country determine how the Islamic movements spread their ideas will be examined. The other factors that condition how the movements use the mass media and other channels of communication will also be discussed, in particular the financial, social, and ideological obstacles. The main methods that the Islamic movements use to discover the effectiveness of their messages will also be analysed.

Audiences: Recipients of Islamic movements messages in Egypt.

The Islamic movements in Egypt divide their audience into a number of key groups. The purpose is to send the right message to the right audience. Before we discuss the categorization of the groups it is important to bear in mind that Sufism and Al Shari’ah are legal movements that are able to practise their activities in public, through open communication channels. In contrast the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization are illegal movements and therefore are obliged to use different means to convey their messages. Often umbrella organisations are established for them to work under, such as Student, Lawyer or Doctors’ Unions. This inability to utilize mass media channels has led them to depend on alternative means of reaching their audiences, often relying on the more traditional means of collective and interpersonal communication associated with the Muslim world.

We should also bear in mind the difference between the objectives of these movements. The Al Shari’ah Society is an organization which aims to provide a social service while the others are more ideologically orientated, seeking to proseiytise and propagandise. Of the three ideological movements, two (the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization) have as their main objective to change Egypt from a “Social Democratic Country” to an Islamic State that practises Islam throughout its political and social system. The other group, Sufism, is less politbally inclined, focussing on improving people’s belief in Allah.

For all the movements the first target audience are their members. The members differ from one movement to another. Sufism members are “those who believe in Sufism as a path for their real faith in Allah and who have joined one of the Sufism doctrines” (Taftazani, 1991). For the Muslim Brotherhood, the members are “those who accept the movement’s objectives and have been chosen by the movement’s representatives from among the Muslim activists, committed to the tslamisation of society” (Al Hodibi, 1991). These activists according to Al Hodibi, must go through certain tests to prove their faith, their ability to work clandestinely and their willingness to dedicate their whole life to the movement’s objectives. Islamic Organization members also believe in the Islamisation of Egypt and accept working in secrecy (Kassem, 1991). Al Shari ^lah Society members are “those committed to the idea of providing a social service for their communities and do this work through the movement’s various branches” (Faid, 1991).

The membership of all four movements are drawn from all social and educational levels. They are also from different

occupations and from city and rural areas. One social group of particular importance for all the movements are students in universities and high schools. Hence the considerable effort made by the movements to reach these students with their messages. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization concentrate on students becoming involved in their movement. The threat of secularisation is seen as most keenly felt in this area of society but there are also long term considerations for the movements in this area. As Al Hodibi states:

“The long term objective of altering society needs manpower specialized in different areas” (Al Hodibi, 1991).

Sufism is also active in the universities and high schools. The government has in the past encouraged Sufi Sheikes to deliver speeches in universities against extremist fundamentalists. Sufism however has developed its own schools in order to promote its doctrines amongst the young (Taftazani, 1991). Al Shari’ah Society also has established its own high schools to educate young people Islamically (Faid, 1991).

Members of the National Assembly, the main legislative body in Egypt, are another important target audience for the Islamic movements. Their role in the legal process has resulted in the Islamic movement trying to contact them in a number of different ways. The Muslim Brotherhood communicates with the legislators directly, “through organized meetings, social gatherings and visits to them in their offices through the Muslim Brotherhood’s members in the National Assembly” (Al Hodibi, 1991). Sufism and Al Shari’ah Society, communicate with the National Assembly members through personal communication that involve “letters, visits and invitations for some of them to be the main gest in the opening ceremonies of new schools and hospitals built by the society “(Faid, 1991). The Islamic Organization use an indirect communication channel, the underground pamphlet containing the movement’s opinions and requests regarding issues and policies “because of government’s refusal to open dialogue with the movement and the movement’s lack of a legal organization to represent it” (Kassem, 1991).

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There is also the need to communicate with the government. Sufism and Al Shari’ah Society use their legal status to communicate with the government officially. The Muslim Brotherhood uses its members in the National Assembly to communicate with the government. The Islamic Organization does not because of its poor relationship with the government.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization send their messages to labourers, farmers, engineers, doctors and lawyers. The two movements use their “members in the unions of these groups to communicate with workers and professionals in unions conferences, meetings and social gatherings” (Kassem, 1 991).

The main channels the Islamic movements use to send their message

The legal status of the Islamic movements in Egypt is crucial to any discussion of the channels of communication used by the Islamic movements in Egypt.

Sufism

The legality of Sufism and the government’s involvement in its “High Majless of Sufism Doctrine” allows the movement more access to a range of mass communication channels and outlets that belong to the government (Tafftazani, 1 99 1 ) . Besides having access to television and radio, the Sufist movement also gain access to newspapers allied to the government, such as Al Ihram and Al Akhbar.

The use of such mass media channels provides the movement with two benefits. First, popular familiarity; the name of the movement’s Sheikes, such as Al Shaerawi and Tafftazani, are known at all levels of Egyptian Society. Recognition is a particularly important component in political communication and as a result of access to the main media outlets in Egypt the leaders of the Sufist movement have build a profile. The second benefit is the nil cost of

using mass media channels, because of government’s invitations to the movement’s Sheikes to speak and write in the national media and the newspapers allied to the government.

On the other hand such access is only gained at the expense of a decline in the ability of the Sufist movement to control the content of the messages. The government’s use of Sufism Sheikes to attack what the government calls “extremist fundamentalism”, particularly Al Takfir and the Islamic Organization, through television, radio and newspapers has meant that a large number of Muslims are less inclined to listen to what Sufism has to say. For these people the Sheiks are seen as government agents. As the credibility of the spokesmen is impaired by their association with government, so the effectiveness of their message is reduced.

Sufism, however, owns the Al Tasuf Al Islmi magazine. The magazine, according to Tafftazani (1 991), concentrates on Sufi ideology and thought, and carries interviews with famous Sufi Sheikes all over the Muslim world. The movement also publish tens of thousands of books about Sufism, including the poetry of the famous Sufi poets and record cassettes of Mouled gatherings. This material is mainly directed at Sufi followers who are able to understand the terms and the ideas contained in these books, poetry and cassettes. By using its own outlets the movement is able to cater for its own adherents, reinforcing their beliefs and commitment to the movement.

Sufism also uses three other kinds of organization communication channels. These can be categorized as an open channels. These are first the Mosques. Sufi Imams lead five daily prayers and deliver the Friday speeches. The movement gains from the respect Egyptian society has for Imams of Mosques in the rural areas, which are very conservative and easy guided by religious scholars and Imams.

The second channel is the conference. Conferences are held on Sufism ideology and history which, according to Tafftazani (1 991), concentrate on the intellectual elite inside the movement.

Conferences have been done with the co-operation of Al Azhar University, the famous Islamic university, and include topics such as “Islam after Fifteen Century”.

The third organizational communication channel is Mouled gatherings. The movement gains from people gathering to celebrate the birthday of prophet Muhammad. According to Tafftazani (1991) it encourages adherents to be faithful to their prophet and to Sufism as a movement that protects the footpath of prophet Muhammad.

The Muslim Brotherhood

As an illegal movement, the Muslim Brotherhood cannot gain much access to any type of established mass media channel. The Brotherhood’s official mouth piece, the Daw”a magazine, which was licensed to one of the movement’s member, was baned by the government at the beginning of the 1980s, when this member died. The movement did continue to publish the magazine in Austri for a couple of years following its banning. However it was not successful because of the difficulty of getting material from contributors and writers in Egypt. The government was able to prevent supporters of the Brotherhood from being able to produce copy and send it out of the country. The Daw’a magazine was mainly political magazine that focussed on Islam’s opinion upon the government acts and laws. it also covered news of Muslims around the world and the news of similar Islamic movements in other Muslim counties.

The movement tried again at the end of the 1980s to publish the Daw’a magazine by taking the case to the High Court and succeeded in obtaining an order to the government to licence the magazine again. The movement succeeded in using a legal magazine called Lew’a Al Islam as the voice of the movement after its licensed owner married one of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leading members. Lew’a Al Islam remained the movement voice until the

summer of 1991 when its owner withdrew the agreement between her and the Muslim Brotherhood after their stance during the Gulf War, and pressure from the Egyptian government upon her to the withdraw the agreement.

Although most doors were closed to the Muslim Brotherhood to re-establish their own magazine, “new hope arose for them when the Al Sha’b newspaper of the Liberal Party, opened its pages to the movement’s writers” (Al Hodibi, 1991). This happened during the 1987 election when the Muslim Brotherhood and the Liberal Party were in alliance. The use of Al Sha’b newspaper gave the movement two advantages: firstly, it is a daily newspaper. As their magazine was a monthly publication access to a regular outlet meant the Muslim Brotherhood’s view on contemporary events could be heard at the time they were occurring. Secondly, the popularity of the newspaper as an opposition newspaper with its own audience which comprised mostly leftists and secular intellectuals gave the movement an opportunity to propagandise to a new group who played a crucial role in Egyptian society. The Muslim Brotherhood also in the late 1980s gained access to other opposition newspapers, such as the Al Wafd newspaper. The popularity of some of the movement’s writers was a crucial factor in gaining such access.

The ban on their use of established mass media channel forced the movement to use as part of its communications strategy, according to Al Hodibi (1991), many alternative channels of public communication. “In our movement, we believe in using all kinds of communication channels that we can, and have the financial ability to use them, in order to spread our message” (Al Hodibi, 1991). The Muslim Brotherhood was very active in publishing books, novels and poetry, from its inception during the 1970s. Under a well planned strategy the movement survived the 1970s, by publishing the books of the two Qutop’ brothers who are two of the most influential Islamic thinkers of the century. Then the Brotherhood published many novels and much poetry about how Nasser had persecuted its members. The end of 1970s witnessed a “revolution” in Islamic books, novels and poetry. Through the efforts of the Brotherhood Islamic literature achieved the highest book sales in Egyptian bookshops in that period. The movement established many publishing houses under different names such as Daw’s House and Al Waf ^la House and continue to develop new titles that concentrate on how Islam can be the system of each Muslim’s life.

Audio cassettes and videotapes are also used by the Muslim Brotherhood. Products for these channels were created by the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s. They contain the speeches of some of their famous Imams and speakers, and video films that talk about Islamic morality and behaviour. Children were particularly targeted to give them an Islamic education. To produce video films and cassettes for children the movement encouraged Islamic activists, who are not members of the Brotherhood, to establish production companies such as the Safir and Al Zahr’a production companies.

The cassettes and video tapes are distributed in large quantities all over Egypt and the Muslim world. The speeches on the cassettes were used to influence public opinion on issues such as the Gulf crisis and the call for the Islamization of the Egyptian constitution and judiciary. The movement has also used video tapes to show the public and the government its popularity and the size of its following, such as the video film that shows more than 500,000 people walking in the funeral cortege of the ex-president of the movement, Al Telmisani.

The movement also uses journals to spread its message to intellectuals. This is done in a sensitive way. Because of the illegality of the movement, Muslim Brotherhood members in the professions, lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers and economists publish academic and professional journals that discuss the role of Islamic teaching in academic credibility in the intellectual environment. The success of these journals among professionals helps to give the movement’s members more strength in their unions. This strength can be seen in the continuing success of movement representatives in these unions’ elections.

The movement only uses pamphlets during National Assembly elections when they produce different types of pamphlets to support their candidates. The pamphlets used by the movement, according to Al Hodibi (1991), are not only for propaganda purposes but also present the only information about the objectives and ideas of the movement in an open way. It is only during elections that the Brotherhood can play a public role in the political process in Egypt. After the elections, when it has no legal right to publish pamphlets, the movement produces uhderground material to present its opinions on issues that neither the opposition’s newspaper allow nor for which cassettes and video tapes could be used. These underground pamphlets are sometimes signed with the name of the movement’s president or sometimes left without any signature.

In a closed political system such as Egypt this type of communication channel is very successful. It does not cost a lot. The first few hundred copies are printed by the movement and then they can be re-copied and distributed by ordinary members of the public or movement. Such material is important in uniting the movement as a secret organization. In addition the movement communicates with its members through personal communication channels centæd on the Working Units. The Working Unit according to Al Hodibi (1991), is a group of members who accept the movement’s mission and objectives and promise to work their whole lives to see them turned into a practical reality. These cadres are central to the distribution of material. They also promise to keep all the movement’s plans and names secret. The units transfer messages among the secret committees of the movement. Members of the Working Units also make visits to the houses of movement members. These visits are planned by the Working Units to inform the recipient of the latest information about the movement. Such direct contacts allows the Brotherhood to clear up any tnisunderstands brought about by misinformation from other communication sources. The visits are also used as an education tool, teaching them Islamically, as well as a method of gaining feedback from the rank and file of the movement on the movement’s opinions toward the issues of the day. Visits also have another objective, such as getting their donation for the movement, particularly to cover the cost of election campaigns (Al Hodibi, 1 991 ) .

The movement also uses organizational communication channels such as Mosques, conferences and demonstrations. In the Mosque, where some of the movement’s Imams lead the five times daily prayers and &liver the Friday speech, they have another mission, to spread the movement’s ideas, objectives and to discuss with local people the current political and social issues. This direct communication channel gives the movement the ability to inform the public about the movement’s opinions on these issues. It also uses the respect of the society to the status of Imams to educate the locals on Islamic teachings and social behaviour. The Imams of the movement use the Friday speech to clarify the Islamic opinions on political, social and economic issues and to attack the non-Islamic government policies.

The movement’s members in Legal, medical and other unions, assist the movement when they hold conferences on issues related to the movement’s objectives. The conference channel encourages into the movement new members mainly scientists, professors and professionals. It also gains the movement direct contact and an opportunity for discussion with them to obtain their support.

The movement’s illegality means that the Muslim Brotherhood hold many conferences outside of Egypt. This is done with the help of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood which gathers all Muslim brothers throughout the world under one umbrella. These conferences clarify the movement’s opinions on different issues, studies the future of the Muslim world and recommends to the movement how it should react towards new issues (Al Hodibi, 1991). Conference guests are mainly from the movement’s members, the ranks of Islamic activists and members of other Islamic movements. The environment of these conferences, held as they are in Western countries or some of the more democratic Islamic countries, give researchers the freedom to discuss matters and express their opinion without fear of government restriction as would be the case in Egypt.

The movement also uses demonstrations to express its attitude toward some issues, For example, during the Gulf War and after the Camp David agreement, the Muslim Brotherhood held large demonstrations calling for the government to change its policies. The movement did not expect the government to act on their calls. But the demonstrations were used to raise Islamic identity amount the public and to promote the profile of the Brotherhood.

The movement also uses its member in the professions, according to Al Hodibi (1991), to help organize public meetings under their umbrellas groupings to discuss political, social and economic issues with the locals. Public meetings cannot be organised under the auspices of the Brotherhood; hence the use of these other organisations to hold public meetings. The only times when the movement’s members can go to the public with their movement’s name are during the election campaigns. The movement plans carefully during elections to communicate on political and social affairs what it cannot outside of election times. The movement uses the campaign to show the public what the movement stands for and how it will achieve its objectives. Talking to people face to face in their local areas, in cities and countryside returns the movement to the spirit of its past when it was legal and, at the same time, helps to raise its profile which is essential for an organisation which has to operate secretly for most of the time.

Al Shari’h Society

The Al Shari’ah Society is not a political movement in the sense of the previous organisations we have discussed. It is a legal social services organization and as such communication plays a significant role in introducing the organisation’s services to the people. When it was founded the movement own magazine, Al Letisam. The magazine was the main channel that the movement used to communicate until it was banned by the government. “The ban resulted from the increasing calls from the organisation for the Islamization of Egypt” (Faid, 1991). After the banning of Al Letsam, the movement used the opposition’s newspapers to spread their ideas on the Islamization of the systems in Egypt. Newspapers such as Al Wafd and Al Sha’b opened their columns to all opposition leaders and movements, and became a mass media channel for those with no legal mass media channel to attract Islamist readers and to gain their votes in elections. The movement’s relationship with the government became more sensitive as its leaders became more vociferous in calling for political and social change. These actions caused the government to categorize the movement’s leaders as part of the opposition. The relationship became worse in the summer of 1990, with the government’s order to change the movement’s committee to include people allied to the government.

The lack of traditional mass media channels made the movement, according to Faid (1991), concentrate on alternative means of communications. These channels include the publishing of books, novels and poetry which furthered the movement’s objectives. The publication of these books gave the movement the ability to discuss some issues, such as the Islamic political system and Islamic concept of some social acts, in some detail then if discussed in the columns in a magazine or newspaper.

The movement also used cassettes as a channel by recording some of the famous speeches of its scholars and distributing them. The use of this channel put the movement’s messages in easy reach of illiterate people in the rural areas. An important channel used by the movement, as a social service organization, is the pamphlet. “Pamphlets were used to highlight the organization’s projects, such as new schools and hospitals and call on people to make donation “(Faid, 1991). The pamphlet channel has been proved effective when we look to the number of schools and hospitals that the organization has built without any government support, relying only on donations.

The Al Shari’ah Society as a legal organization has tens of branches in Egypt and uses letters, facsimiles, telephones, computers and telegrams as channels of communication between the headquarters in Cairo and the branches in other cities and villages. The organization as an open legal movement uses these channels to send messages and plans and to receive reports. The movement also uses two on communication channels to reach two different audiences: Mosques, where the movement’s Imams reach people from all levels of society and conferences, to send specific messages

to intellectuals on issues that the Al Shari’ah Society is interested in discussing with them, such as Islam and Secularism and the Islamic Economic System.

The Islamic Organization:

This movement, like the Muslim Brotherhood, has no legal status. That means the movement has no right to use mass media such as television and radio and is also not allowed to establish any newspaper, magazine or film. This situation caused the movement to establish its own magazine, Al Moura ^lbetoon in Pakistan and distribute it outside of Egypt. Al Moura’betoon concentrates on defining the movement’s ideas and countering the government’s propaganda polici• es toward the organization. It also announces the names of its members in prison and describes the atrocities they face in prison.

Because of the magazine’s ineligibility for distribution in Egypt “it enters Egypt secretly and is then copied in thousands to be distributed clandestinely” (Kassem, 1991). The Organisation also uses books to explain the movement’s objectives and methods of achieving these objectives (Kassem, 1991). Like other Islamic groupings it also uses audio cassettes of the speeches of the movement’s Imams and speakers. Video tapes of interviews with the movement’s leaders (undertaken outside of Egypt) and speeches of some of the movement’s leaders are also distributed. To produce these films the movement has established a small video studio in Pakistan responsible for video and audio cassette production.

But, according to Kassem (1991), the main channel used to communicate its ideas is underground pamphlets. The written word is seen as being more effective than the spoken or visual. Pamphlets can be read out by activists to an audience and have recently concerned issues such as policies towards Israel and the Egyptian government’s alliance with the western countries. Calls for people to boycott the Jewish products has been another focus of these pamphlets.

The Islamic Organization, as an illegal movement, uses as the Muslim Brotherhood Working Units to transfer plans, orders and information between the movement’s leaders and members. The effectiveness of these organisational channels of communication was indicated by the ability of the Organisation to plan the assassination of President Sadat. As we said before when we discussed the Working Units of the Muslim Brotherhood, these units have the role of cementing the movement together. The Working Units act as a personal communication channel responsible for informing and educating locally wherever the movement has members. To do this job, the movement uses visits to people in their homes by the Working Units as an effective personal communication channel.

The movement activities are centred on the Mosques. With the huge rise in popular interest in things Islamic in Egypt, the number of people going to Mosques increases every day. The increase in the worshippers has resulted in the Organisation focussing its activities on the Mosques (Kassem, 1991). The Mosque has become not only a place for worship but also a social organisation. Mosques now have football teams, books and cassette libraries as well as weekly religious lessons. They attract youth and university students and create an Islamic environment for them. The Mosques have therefore become a means of organized communication through the provision of a social setting which is conducive to the spreading of the movement’s messages, opinions and information.

Similarities and the differences between the Islamic movements In using communication channels In Egypt

The four movements studied all had access to a magazine at one time or another although the Islamic Organization and the Muslim Brotherhood (for some time) have published their magazines outside of Egypt: However all have suffered from government pressure, direct and indirect. Publications have been banned and at this point in time the only legal magazine that is published is that by the Sufism movement.

Sufism as a result of its ties with the government enjoys access to mass media such as radio md television while the rest of the movements are prevent from using television or radio. Sufism also has access to the official newspapers allied to the government. While the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Shari’ah use opposition newspapers to send their messages, the Islamic Organization has no access to any kind of newspaper. As a result it is fair to say that the Islamic movements in Egypt have very little access to the main means of communication in Egypt. The government has rigourously denied such access. However this has not prevented the message of such movements being spread throughout the people of Egypt. By utilising alternative communication channels such as cassettes and video tapes the movements have successfully promoted the work of Islam.

Traditional means of communication have also proved effective. The movements use pamphlets for different purposes: Al Shari’ah Society to explain its services and to raise donations while the Muslim Brotherhood use them during the elections to get people’s support for their candidates. The Islamic Organisation stresses the importance of the pamphlet to all its activities. Novels and poetry are also used by the Muslim Brotherhood to show citizens (dhat President Nasser did to members of the movement and for Sufism, the poetry of historic Sufi poets about prophet Muhammad is the subject of their publications. Al Shari’ah Society’s publishes poetry that talks about Islamic morality.

The four movements use personal, face to face communication. Such communication is essential for pros ,cribed organisations. But most effective has been the Mosques which have provided the main organization communication channel which the four movements have used to spread their ideas. The social setting of the Mosque indicated the power of the “pulpit” in the days of modern media technology should not be neglected.

The movement have all found it necessary to a greater or lesser extent to use other organizations, such as the Students Union for the Islamic Organization, to promote their messages. Professional peoples in Egyptian society have also been targeted by all the movements. This is where the struggle against secularism is most keenly felt. By using professional bodies to promote Islamic teaching the movements hope to wage a successful war against antiIslamic works in this quarter. The movements introduced the slogan of “Islam is the Solution” and asked their members in these unions to focus on this slogan.

The Main Obstacles that Faces the Islamic Movements in Egypt and Disseminating of Their Messages.

The Islamic movements in Egypt face different kinds of obstacles to their messages reaching their audiences. These obstacles can be divided into three main categories: political, financial and ideological.

Political obstacles

The illegal status of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization is the main obstacle they face (Al Hodibi, 1991 ). Although they are popular and known all over Egypt and their membership is growing day by day, their illegality denies them the opportunity to use mass media channels. In the case of the Al Shari’ah Society which is a legal organization the government banned its only magazine after its decision to introduce into its columns calls for the Islamization of Egypt and support of some of the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies (Faid, 1991). The movement also has no access to national television and radio for sending its messages, even though it is the biggest social services organization in Egypt.

The movements face government propaganda against them on national television and radio as well as government censorship of all mass media channels they want to use (Al Hodibi, 1991 ; Faid, 1 991 ). Lack of access has left these movements unable to defend themselves. But, on the other hand, government propaganda against them has raised their popularity among Islamic activists and highlighted these movements as the opposition forces that would carry their hopes (Kassem, 1991 \

The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization face another, more serious political obstacle when the government imposes bans on their preachers from giving speeches in the Mosques and streets. This ban means that anyone from these movements found preaching in a Mosque or on the streets using the movement’s name will be imprisoned. The government has also banned all the cassettes and video tapes that contain speeches of the movements Imams from being sold in record shops. However enforcing such bans is not easy attesting to the power of alternative communication.

The government has recently gone further with these two movements by transferring their members who work as teachers from cities to rural areas or transfering them from teaching to other jobs, secretarial, for example. This policy seeks to break their connection with students. However such moves have benefitted these movements by providing them with greater opportunities to spread their messages in rural areas. The policy also gave the movements’ members the chance to preach among secretaries and other occupations.

The government has jailed the activist members of these two movements and punished their wives and children in front of them to make them give more names and plans of their movements. Some of this abuse involved the raping of wives and children in front of the prisoners (Kassem, 1991 ). This has made everyone in these movements aware of the consequences of acting publicly: if caught they could face the same situation. It also increased pressure on the movement to make its plans and communication channels more secret. Such incidents have also fuelled the propaganda effort of these movements.

It is government involvement in its decision-making process that poses the main obstacles to the Al Shari’ah Society. The government has dismissed some members of the Society and appointed other loyal to them in order to change the movement’s

policies on the Islamization of the Egyptian political, social and economic systems. Resistance by the movement to the government’s policy of appointing or dismissing members, resulted in the summer of 1 991 with the government’s occupation of the movement’s leaders and replacing them with new leaders working with the government.

Sufism is the only movement that has almost no direct political obstacles as a result of the government involvement in its High Majlees. The only political obstacle that Sufism face according to Tafftazani (1991) is from ministries who do not practise the movement’s decisions throughout their ministries.

Financial obstacle

Three movements, the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Shari’ah Society and the Islamic Organization identified a lack of capital as the main problem facing their use of the media (Al Hodibi, 1 991 ; Faid, 1 991 Kassem, 1 991). This lack of capital has also slowed development of their communication strategies. The reason for their financial problem is that the activities of these three movements depends upon members support and donations from a small number of merchants

Ideological obstacles

The Islamic movements also face other ideological movements that are anti-Islam, such as secularist, Nasserist, socialist, nationalist and communist organizations. These anti-Islam movements distribute their ideas in the same way the Islamic movements do. In this propaganda war the anti-Islam movements have more freedom and licence to establish new magazines. This media freedom available to the anti-Islamic forces, according to Faid (1991), creates an unfair disadvantage to the Islamic movements. The numerous attacks on Islam and the Islamic movements from different angles requires they defend their ideas on a variety of fronts.

The Islamic movements in Egypt also have to confront propaganda against them from western international broadcast services that are directed at Egypt (Al Hodibi, 1 991 Western propaganda compares the Islamic movements with the Iranian revolution, and focuses on some of the extremist acts by some members of the Islamic Organization using them as examples of the Islamic movements’ behaviour in general. Western propaganda against the Islamic movements stresses the stereotype that the Egyptian government used during President Nasser’s time. This stereotype paints the Islamic movements as being agents of other countries (Al Hodibi, 1 991). However by identifying itself with the government, western propaganda has diluted the effectiveness of its message to the people of Egypt. General suspicions of the west linked to an unpopular government have meant that the messages have been discredited by the image of the sender.

Research methods used by the Islamic movements in Egypt to assess the effectiveness of their messages

To examine the effectiveness of their communication efforts the movements in Egypt use a number of methods. The most simple and direct is to study the figures of those attending events or activities organised by the movements or their umbrella organisations. This direct way is used because of the lack of independent statistical centers doing these kinds of research and the illegality of the movements. They also collect information during the movements’ regular committee meetings and through visits to members’ homes. The information helps the Islamic movements in many ways, such as in the improvement of the use of communication channels and the clarity and precision of the messages they are using.

All four movements claim that their messages reach their audience and are effective in changing attitudes and opinions. These claims are based on the research carried out by the movement. Two movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Shari’ah Society, have study committees responsible for the collection and analysis of data (Al Hodibi, 1991 , and Faid, 1991). members of the Sufist movement and the Islamic Organization also send such information to their headquarters for analysis (Tafftazani, 1991, and Kassem, 1991).

The four movements use the increased number of members, attendances and subscribers to their magazines as proof for their claim that their messages are getting through. They also use the increase in the number of their movements’ books that they reprinted every year. The Muslim Brotherhood and Al Shari’ah Society use the results of a yearly questionnaire carried out by the study committees to check their messages’ effectiveness (Faid, 1991). They also use the increase of circulation of each of their magazines in some Muslim countries, what readers report to them in their letters, and the increased numbers of students in their schools and patients in their hospitals and clinics as other signs of the effectiveness of their communication strategy.

The Muslim Brotherhood argues that the increase in the number of seats the movement has in the National Assembly and the number of people attending the movement’s demonstrations is proof of their messages’ popularity (Al Hodibi, 1991). They also use, as the Islamic Organization does, the number of the movement’s books translated into other languages as a sign of the success of their messages outside the Arab world. Sufists see the increased number of people attending their Mouled gatherings and the increased number of Sufi doctrines registered with the High Maness of Sufism Doctrines as two signs of the effectiveness of their messages (Tafftazani, 1991).

The four movements’ members are asked by their leaders to report to the headquarters of the movements (for Sufism and the Islamic Organization) or to the Study Committees (for the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Shari’ah Society). The four movements use similar methods to get this information; their representatives’ personal communication with the recipients, reports during regular meetings and calls from their magazines to readers.

Three movements, Sufism, the Muslim Brotherhood and Al Sharia’ah Society used personal communication in Mosques as another way of Judging the effectiveness of their messages. The Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization “use student, labour, farmers, medical, lawyers, engineers and teachers unions to know the effectiveness of their messages through the surveys these unions do” (Al Hodibi, 1991). The two movements also believe that their success in gaining the presidencies of such unions is a sign of their messages’ success. Research into the reports of their representatives in these unions supports this assessment.

Al Shari ^lah Society and the Muslim Brotherhood after studying the reports of their local Shour’a councils and the general Shour^la Council found that their messages influenced their recipients (Faid, 1991). Both movements have held conferences for their members to find out how effective their messages. “The Muslim brotherhood found that their movement gaining position after position in unions and opposition parties. They also found that the number of followers is increasing day by day.

Audiences: Recipients of the Islamic Movements Messages in Afghanistan.

The Islamic movements in Afghanistan operate in a different environment than the other Islamic movements of our study. They are at war in Afghanistan. The Afghan Islamic movements are not taking part in political process but are actively fighting to overthrow the established government of the country. As a result of the armed struggle they now control ninety percent of Afghanistan during the war ^l

As we discussed in chapter Four there are four groupings which comprise the Islamic movements in Afghanistan. Three of them have similar objectives and methods, the Islamic Party (Hekmtayar), the Islamic Society and the Islamic Party (Khalise). The Afghanistan National Liberation Front has its own peculiar brand of Islam, combining nationalism and secularism. It is also important to note the considerable amount of work these groups do outside of Afghanistan including the supervision of the education, health, social and legal needs.of five million refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

All four movements pay particular attention to informing their members. Links need to be made between the fighters in the field and political leadership outside the country. In addition the morale of the members must be maintained. Hence the need for an effective propaganda strategy. The movements also target students, teachers, labours, and farmers’ unions as another important recipients. These bodies are important opinion formers within Afghanistan. The communist government used such organisations to exert their control over the Afghan society. Key followers of the government were placed in positions of power and the unions were used to build support for the regime in key sectors of Afghan society. Members of the Islamic movements in order to continue their struggle against the Communist government infiltrated these groups and used the unions structures to send their messages to ordinary students, teachers labours and farmers.

However in a war situation the main target of the Islamic movements’ communication effort was the Communist regime itself. The aim was to discredit the regime in the eyes of Afghan citizens and international opinion. There was also the objective of sowing dissent and disagreement within the Communist regime as we have seen communism in Afghanistan throughout its history and been an uneasy alliance between different forces and groupings. By directing propaganda efforts at members of the National Assembly in Kabul the Islamic movements hoped to increase dissension and division inside the regime.

The Channels that the Islamic Movements in Afghanistan use to send their messages,

The Islamic movements send communication from two different kinds of sources, their offices in Pakistan and from their military bases in Afghanistan. The main communication effort was organised in Pakistan. However as they had to act with the respect for Pakistani laws and agreements care had to be taken as regards the content and kinds of operation they undertook. Inside Afghanistan they were able to act more freely in the areas they had liberated but with ever present fear of the government air forces destroying their lines of communication, especially their radio stations which were the basis of their effort during the closing period of the war.

The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Society:

The two largest parties in Afghanistan, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Society used a variety of communication channels to reach their targets audiences. Their main channels were radio stations inside Afghanistan that covered Afghanistan, the East of Iran, the North of Pakistan and the South of Uzbekistan (Zad, 1991 and Khalil, 1991).

Radio programmes were used to counter misinformation

-j put out by the media of the Communist regime in Kabul as well as to promote the teaching of Islam. The medium was also used as part of the war effort to send messages to commanders in the field using secret signals, such as the British Broadcasting Corporation was used during the Second World War. As part of the propaganda effort the radio stations broadened the struggle against Communism by directing efforts at the Muslim populations in the Soviet Union. They constantly broadcast, the Uzbekies reminding them of their Muslims roots and their Islamic history. By taking the struggle to the Soviet Union they played a part in undermining communism in its heart land. Such effort played a role in the destabilising of the Soviet Union.

The second communication channel used were newspapers and magazines. The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) has thirteen publication and and the Islamic Society has ten. They publish them in Dure, Pashto, Arabic, Urdu, English, French and German languages. Some of these newspapers and magazines are weekly and others are monthly. These newspapers and magazines are published in Pakistan, the United State of America, France and Germany .

“These newspapers and magazines have succeeded in explaining the parties’ objectives and what its stands

for to the Arab world and in the Western countries. They also distribute the news of the two parties and Afghanistan in general and to the Afghan minorities in Iran, Pakistan, the Arab world and the Western countries” (Zad, 1991).

These two parties also publish books and journals explaining the movements’ attitudes towards the main issues of the day including the problems of the Afghan society and the Afghan economy. As part of their education effort they have also published hundreds of thousands of school textbooks. These books explain Islam as a system of life and provide an Islamic explanation of nature (Zad, 1991). The other type of publication are concerned with the maintenance of Afghan identity. Histories of the country, national poetry and prose as well as the main speeches of the leading Afghan scholars and teachers are published. Finally are pamphlets explaining the Islamic attitude towards communism and encouraging Afghans to fight for their freedom. These are distributed inside Afghanistan, through clandestine channels exorting Afghans to fight against the government.

Outside Afghanistan, the two parties have used three kinds of communication channels, according to Zad (1991) and Khalil (1991). Firstly, pamphlets were widely used in different languages to explain the parties objectives, the Afghan tragedy and the military situation in Afghanistan. They also used to call on people to give donation to the Afghan widows,orphans and injured. Secondly, documentaries are shot on video tapes and distributed worldwide. The aim of these channels was to show the world what the Red Army did in Afghanistan with the help of the Afghan communist government. Such documentaries stressed atrocity propaganda.

Thirdly, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) co-operated with a Pakistani producer to produce a film about jihad in Afghanistan. The film , ‘The Gift of Gunpowder’, was shown in Pakistan in 1991 and distributed as a video cassette to the United Kingdom and the United State in the same year. Most of the film was shot in Afghanistan, in the areas controlled by the party. The film used tanks and live ammunitions. It also used emotional Islamic songs written by a famous Pakistani poet to appeal to its audience.

Much use is made of small media technology such as facsimile, telegrams, telexes and computers are used to send reports to newspapers and magazines world wide. They are also used to receive reports for the parties magazines and newspapers.

The mosques are used to communicate directly with the Afghans in their refugee camps. Through mosques, they have merged their popularity and the people’ acceptance of their policies. The two parties also held tens of conferences to discuss their political, social, economic, educational, media and military problems with educated Afghans. These conferences took place in Pakistan. The parties’ held many public meetings and demonstrations in the refugee camps. These meeting and demonstrations help the two parties in communicating with people directly and finding how much they support them.

The two parties have also established unions for students in their colleges to gain student support for their policies. They have also worked hard to place some of their members in Kabul University Student Union (runs by the communists since the 1978 coup). Through their members in this union they have tried to spread the strength of the Mujahedeen among students and through them the two parties have obtained got valuable information about the division between the two communist parties in Kabul.

The Islamic Party (Khalise) and Afghanistan National Liberation Front.

These two parties have many similarities in the channels they use to send their messages because of the limited number of party members and lack of capital. Both use magazines to spread their ideas. The two magazines are published in limited numbers and distributed in the refugee camps in Pakistan to gain their support for the parties policies and ideas. The Islamic Party (Khalise) also

has a quarterly magazine published in Arabic called “Manba’o-UlJihad”.

“Through this magazine the party introduce itself to Arab readers, informing them about the political and military situations in Afghanistan. Another aim of the magazine was to obtain moral and financial support from the Arabs for the Jihad in Afghanistan.” (Khalise, 1991)

They also use a limited number of radio stations to send their messages. For the Islamic Party (Khalise), the party’s radio station covers all Pakitya state which is mainly controlled by the party. The Afghanistan National Liberation Front used a mobile radio in Afghanistan which cover a limited area. According to Rohany (1991), it moved from one place to another to cover different areas around the cities under siege.

The two radio stations enable the voices of the two parties to be heard in selected parts of Afghanistan. They also give to the two parties the ability to defend their policies and ideas through their broadcasting. On the other hand the limitations of these two radio stations allow the two parties’ ideas and policies to be known only in the areas reached by them. The rest of Afghanistan was left to the radio stations of the other two parties, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Society. In this sense communication helped in the fragmentation of the country after the Mujahideen’s victory.

The two parties also used some alternative mass media channels in their struggle. They both use cassettes, containing speeches of the two parties’ scholars and have distributed videotapes on the war in Afghanistan. They also published many pamphlets, on the war.

The Islamic Party (Khalise) prints its own textbooks to be distributed to schools the party established in refugee camps. Through Imams who are members in the parties, the mosques are

used as a direct communication channel to introduce their ideas and to defend their policies. .

The leaders of the two parties also represent the people of Afghanistan with other Mujahedeen leaders in many international conferences in the Muslim world and in the United Nations. Their representation provides to the two parties with another channel to explain their political and economic problems. They have also presented an opportunity ‘for them to introduce their political and economic solutions to the Afghan fight.

Inside the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran, the two parties use two organizational communication channels to reach more recipients: public meetings and demonstrations. Through these two channels, the two parties merged their weight in the refugee camps and encouraged more Afghans to join them as members and as Mujahedeen.

The Afghanistan National Liberation Front uses Mouled gatherings as another organizational communication channel. As a Sufi movement, the party uses the annual Mouled gatherings to explain and spread its ideas among Sufis. It also helped the party to collect more donations from Sufis and to show itself as the representatives of Sufism in Afghanistan.

The Similarities and the Differences between the Islamic Movements jn using Communication Channels in Afghanistan.

There are many similarities between the Islamic movements in using communication channels. For example, all of the four movements use radio, magazines and newspapers although there are clear differences between them in the number of newspapers and the areas their radio stations cover. This occurs because of the difference in size between the two larger parties, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Society, and the other two smaller parties, the Islamic Party (Khalise) and the Afghanistan National Liberation Front.

The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) is the only party to have used film as a channel of mass communication to send its messages, by co-operating with a Pakistani company to make a film.

.0) The four parties also use similar alternative channels such as publishing school books, distributing cassettes, pamphlets and documentaries on video tapes. The two larger parties also channels publish journals and Jihad poetry.

The two large parties also use students unions in their colleges to spread their messages, in an organizational way, to the Afghan students. They also use the student union in Kabul University through their secret members as a channel to highlight the power of the Mujahedeen among the local students. The four parties use, similarly, Mosques, public meetings and demonstrations as an organized channel to reach the Afghans in the refugee camps. They also use conferences to reach the educated Afghans to work with them to solve the tragedy of Afghanistan.

The Main Obstacles that Faces the Islamic Movements in Afghanistan and Disseminating of Their Messages.

There are different types of obstacles that face the Islamic Movement in Afghanistan. Four kinds of obstacles are particularly significant: political, financial, social and ideological. Above all the fact that Afghans are at war is a critical factor in all this discussion.

Political obstacle.

All the four Islamic parties in Afghanistan faced the same political obstacles during their war with the communist government in Kabul. The first obstacle was the illegality of their movements.

Censorship was rigourous implemented by the communist government in Kabul. The government censured all the mass media channels that it controls and all the newspaper and magazines that come from outside.

“The objective was to prevent the circulation of Islamic ideas that could help the Mujahedeen in their ideological fight against communism.” (Zad, 1991).

The government also tried to ban all the four movements newspapers, magazines and cassettes that contain speeches of the movement scholars. It also made it difficult when the government jail anyone who had or distributed these newspapers and cassettes.

Censorship was not only on the media but also on mosques and streets when the government banned all preachers and Imams who were related to any of the four parties. (Khalise, 1991).

To prevent the distribution of the newspapers, pamphlets, magazines and cassettes the government jailed any person found with such material. It went further when it jailed their wives and children. However throughout the war such literature entered clandestinely the country.

Another obstacle came from ties with Muslim and Western countries who gave conditional aid to the movements. Those who give conditional aid exercised their influence at times, including a famous incident when they cut all aid to the Mujahedeen in 1990. Such involvement open restricted what movements could do.

Some Muslim countries banned newspapers and magazine from entering their countries accusing Mujahedeen of being extreme fundamentalists. These obstacles make the news and information about Jihad and Mujahedeen known only from the western media.

Financial obstacle.

Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world as we mention in chapter Three, and the Islamic movements in Afghanistan is face major financial problems. According to Khalil (1991) the Mujahedeen rely for their financial support from other Muslims, Western countries, Muslim aid organizations and international aid organizations.

The dependency on foreign aid made the Islamic movements’ programs limited and temporary in schools, colleges, media and others. It also led to their weekly and monthly newspapers and magazines being delayed for a few weeks because of a lack of capital to pay for the publisher’s company in Pakistan.

Social obstacles.

The Islamic Movements in Afghanistan faced a number of social obstacle that other Islamic Movements do not faces in their society. One obstacle is illiteracy. In the 1970s the estimation of the Afghans who cannot read and write is 90% according to (Khalil, 1 991).

Ideological obstacle.

Communism, secularism and nationalism ideologies all have their supporters in Afghanistan. Nationalism and secularism have many supporters, especially those who favour the return of King Zaher Shah, and those who call for a broad government that includes communist, secular, tribal leaders and some Mujahedeen. These according to Zad (1991), are supported by the Western government and the United Nations. Such support according to Khalil (1991) gives them the opportunity to introduce their views through the Western media from the BBC and the Voice of America .

The nationalist and the secularist accuse, the Mujahedeen of being are the fundamentalist who want a radical change in the politics of Afghanistan. This accusation affects tribal leaders, who think that they may lose power. The suspicion of tribal leaders did not make it easy in the early years of Jihad, according to Hakani (1991), when tribal leaders refused to cover and shelter Mujahedeen. Then as Hakani mention, the picture changed through good communications with the tribal leaders and clear explanations about the objectives of the Islamic movements.

The western media further divides Mujahedeen parties into two groups, according to Zad (1991). They play on a division between fundamentalist and moderates. The aim, according to Khalil (1991), is to place obstacles between the parties forming the Mujahedeen. Khalil believes that this action has not broken the unity of the Mujahedeen but it has made it difficult to force unity the capture of Kabul. Zad ( 1991 ) also believes that the differences between the parties has been exploited by the West.

The main research methods the Islamic movements in Afghanistan used to assess the Effectiveness of their messages.

The importance of analysing the effectiveness of their messages , according to Zad (1991), is to find out the mistakes of the past in using the wrong channels to reach the recipients and correcting them by establishing or using other channels.

To do this analysis, two types of methods are employed; research and traditional methods. Both of these methods collect data which goes to the Committee of Research and Studies in the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Society and to the headquarters of the Central Committee in the Islamic Party (Khalise) and Afghanistan National Liberation Front for analysis.

The research method.

Research into effectiveness of messages involved examining the increase in the numbers of members in their parties, the increase in numbers attend activities and the increase in numbers of subscribers to their magazines. The Islamic Party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Society use other research methods, including the increase in numbers of subscribers to their newspapers world wide, the number of letters and telephone calls from readers of their newspapers, and numbers of letters and telephone calls from listeners to their broadcasts.

figures are also gathered about the circulation of each of the magazines. Particularly in other Muslim countries and the number of books that are re-printed and translated into other languages.

The Afghanistan National Liberation Front keep figures for the numbers of people attending their Mouled gathering. Enrolments of students in their school and the increased numbers of patients treated in their hospitals and clinics are used as an indications of effective communication. The results of the monthly report of Gallop polls institute of Afghanistan are also show the large parties that among the Afghan citizens are the Islamic parties.

Three parties, the Islamic Party (Hekmatyar), the Islamic Society and the Islamic Party (Khalise) regularly monitored the content of the government’s press. As well as the anti-Islamic press in Pakistan and Iran. They examine western broadcasting, press and magazines as a method in knowing their success in the military and political field in Afghanistan (Zad, 1991).

The traditional methods.

Traditional methods for knowing the effectiveness of their messages is personal communication with citizens in mosques. Two parties, the Islamic Party ( Hekmatyar ) and the Islamic Society use organizational communication with students unions, labour unions, farmer union and teacher unions as a method to know the reaction of the Afghans to their messages. The two parties with the Islamic Party (Khalise) analyse the effectiveness of their messages through reports from their representatives in the field, that are regularly discussed and through their Local Shur’a Council.

Audiences: Recipients of the Islamic movements messages in Kuwait.

We have to bear in mind that the two movements in Kuwait work under two names. They are the Organisation of Social Improvement or its founder, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the organisation of lhy^la Al Torath or its founder, the Salafi movement.

Again as in other cases the two movements first target audience is their members. The members of the Muslim Brotherhood according to Al Khatrash (1992) are the Islamic activists who promised to practise the objectives of the movement in their lives ,families and society. The members can be from different education and positions levels. They do not apply but they are chosen from the Islamic activists after some examinations on their sincerity and ability to work for the objectives of the movement and their secrecy to keep all the names and plans of the movement secret . While the organisation of social Improvement’ members are the Kuwaitees who are interested in working for social services in the Kuwaiti society and to improve the society Islamically, but not necessarily Islamic activists2.

The Organisation of lhy’a Al Torath ^ls members and the Salafi movements’ members are according to Al Oune (1992) those Kuwaitees who follows the Salafi Understanding of Islam and practise it in their lives3

Students in Kuwait University and high schools are another audience for the movements. Students at Kuwait university are reached by the Muslim Brothemood and the Salafi movement through their members in Kuwait National Students Union. The Muslim Brotherhood, have controlled the presidency of the Union since 1979 by winning every election. High school students are reached through the Youth Center of the Organisation of Social Improvement and through the Muslim Brotherhood members who teach in high schools. The Organisation of Ihy ^la Al Torath also sends its messages to students in high schools through its members who teach in the schools. The Muslim Brotherhood have been very active in education

through the teachers union ,which is led by the Muslim Brotherhood’s members during the 1980s and the 1990s.

The movements also send messages, according to Al Khatrash (1992) and Al Oune (1992) general messages to Muslims all over the World through their magazines and books encouraging them to follow Islam. They also send messages to the non Muslims communities though their distribution of translated books about Islam.

The movements also target the Kuwaiti government, trying to make it practise Islam, in two ways. The first way through their official organisation and the second way through their members in the National Assembly .According to Al khatrash (1992) there are some messages such as solutions for social and educational problems in the society send to the government through the Organisation of Social Improvement while other political and international messages are send to the government through the Muslim Brotherhood’s members in the national Assembly.

The Channels the Islamic movements in Kuwait use to send their messages:

The two movements,the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement, and their two organisation use a variety of communication channels to reach their audiences. In the contrast of Egypt and Afghanistan the legality of the two movements allow them to present their social and religious messages on national television and radio. Both organizations have made use of such Access to government media. However it is other communication channels that have been of greater importance to the movement.

The Organisation of Social Improvement:

The organisation uses two mass media outlets. Its weekly magazine Al Mojtam’a is an important mass media channel that the organisation uses. It was established in 1968 and concentrates on political, social and economic issues from the Islamic viewpoint. It is, according to Al Khatrash (1992), the voice of the Muslim Brotherhood of Kuwait..

The movement also has used films. In 1985 a film was produced by the Organisation, “The Return”. The film shot in Sudan, is about the African refugees who fled from their countries because of the drought. The film shows how the Muslim aid agencies helped them, especially the Committee of African Muslims that belongs to the Organisation of Social Improvement.

The Organisation, however concentrates on using traditional channels to reach people inside Kuwait and in the Muslim World. Publishing books and novels is one of the main channels used. The organisation commissions famous Muslim writers to write on specific political and social subjects to introduce the Islamic view. “The total number of books and novels that the Organisation had published up to 1987 is one million books”(AI Khatrash, 1992).

The organisation has published two kinds of poetry books; one of Islamic poetry from different historic ages, and the other of Islamic songs for youth. The songs have also been recorded on cassette and distributed throughout the whole Muslim world. The songs are about Jihad, Islamic morality and reactions to the aggression of the Western and the Eastern super powers. They also sing about Muslims’ problems in Afghanistan, Palestine, the Philippines, India and other areas.

Cassettes are also used heavily by the organisation to distribute the speeches of the famous Muslim scholars in Kuwait and in the Muslim World. The Organisation by using this channel helped to in create •star preachers” such as Al Qatan, Al Jamily and Al Ouadi who became well known in the Muslim World.

“The Friday speeches and lectures of these preachers have been distributed in Kuwait, the same day and throughout the Gulf countries in the same week”(Al Khatrash, 1992)

When the government banned some of the cassettes their distribution was increased. Some people record these cassettes in their houses and distributed them free to all their friends and neighbours.

The Organisation also uses videotapes. It use them as Al Khatrash (1992) described it in four ways. The first is to record lectures and some famous Friday speeches. Another way is documentary films particularly about international issues such as the situation of Muslims in Africa during the 1983 drought and about the conflict in Afghanistan and India. The third way is to produce videotapes for children similar to “Sesame Street” focusing on Islamic morals to educate them. The fourth way is to record plays that had been presented in the organisation ^ls theater. In a wealthy society where most houses have a video-player, the organisation has the ability to use this channel to a greater extent than in other Muslim countries. It was lead some members of the Muslim

Brotherhood to establish “The International Center for The Islamic Media” in order to produce more videotapes. This Cent?Y had produced many videotapes especially for children.

Pamphlets are also used by the Organisation. The organisation published many pamphlets that explained the organisation ^ls activities and its constitution. Using pamphlets helped the organisatjon in reaching more people, to collect Zaka from them to be distribute in Africa and Asia. During the Iraqi invasion underground pamphlets were distributed by the Muslim Brotherhood members in the Kuwaiti resistance ,according to Al Khatrash (1992), to keep high morale amongst Kuwaiti citizens and the Kuwaiti resistance.

The organisation of Social Improvements as well as the Muslim Brotherhood also uses different types of inter-personal communication channels to introduce their ideology to more recipients. The Organisation uses letters, facsimiles, telephones, computers, telegrams and telexes to send its messages to certain groups of recipients who have the same access. Al Khatrash (1992) disciplined the use of these channels using them to encourage or

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discourage the government of Kuwait and other Muslim governments on some discussions and policies. These channels are also used to get capital support from merchants and by members of the National Assembly to get the legal support on some political and social decisions that will be discussed in the National Assembly. They are also used by the Al Mojtam’a magazines to communicate with its reporters world wide. The same channels are aiso used by the African Muslims Committee, Zaka Committee and the Daw ^la Committee to communicate with their branches in Africa and Asia.

The Muslim Brotherhood use working units as the main source of transforming information, discussions and plans. The privacy that working units gives to the movements comes from the creation of these units. The members of the units are only those who faithfully accept the Muslim Brotherhood and its objectives and promise to keep all its secret matters. To spread its ideas to those who are active Islamically and might become members in the movement in the future, the Muslim Brotherhood uses visits as a personal channels to communicate with them. As an eastern society the Kuwaitees visit friends, relatives and neighbours a lot, compared with other societies according to Al Khatrash (1992). This characteristic of the Kuwaiti society gives the advantage to Muslim Brotherhood to use planned visits to educate and inform those Islamic activists in order to make them members in the future.

As a political movement the Muslim Brotherhood uses lobbying with businessmen, In a commercial society as Kuwait is important from two ways, their capital support for campaigners and their position and relationship with the government that takes into account the opinion of merchants in Kuwait because of their historic and present support to the Royal Family and the monarchy system.

As the Organisation of Social Improvement and the Muslim Brotherhood use organisational communication channels to reach specific audiences such as students and teachers. The Organisation has held several Islamic conferences on different issues. These conferences have been on issues such as “The Palestinian Q u e st i o n “, “Jihad in Afghanistan” and “The Islamic Constitution and how It should be practised”. The attainders of these conferences are mainly intellectuals and professionals.

The Organisation also uses its legality to hold public meetings to support or to stand against some political and social issues, such as the mixed education issue in Kuwait University during the 1970s. It also has used public meetings to support and collect donations for Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and Intifada in Palestine.

Entertainment and theater have also an important means of communication. The theater of the Organisation has produced plays on political and social issues. The plays have been popular in the Kuwaiti society and in the Gulf societies via the videotape. The theater is also use for the weekly lectures that the organisation held on different political, social and economical issues. The Organisation also holds annual cultural weeks with a variety of cultural and media events. Cultural activities have been organized by getting up centers. In 1974 “The Youth Center” was established for teenage students. The CentU has a large number of activities such as sports, educational, cultural, art, trips and boating. It provides an Islamic environment for teenagers.

The Friday speeches is again an important channel of communication. The daily prayers in the Mosque, the annual weekly religious lessons and the Friday speech are an important occasion to communicate on political or social issue. The role of Imams in a conservative society, such as Kuwait has been studied by the movement according to Al Khatrash (1992). Imams have a social role in solving family and neighbourhood problems before they go to courts or call in the police. The respect of educated Imams gives them great influence. The made the movement, according to Al Khatrash, provides to its Imams with up to date information on political, social and domestic problems, and works to promote their popularity by introducing them in Al Mojtam’a, distributing their cassettes and displaying large advertisements when one of them gives a lecture.

Control of the Kuwait National Students Union and the Teachers Union enables the movement to legally publish books, magazines and to hold camps and conferences under titles that served the objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood. It also enables the movement, as a result of some of the teachers union members working on committees within the education ministry, to influence the content of high school books according to Islam’s teachings.

Finally there is Dywahnyah. The Dywannyah is the guest salon which is found in every house in Kuwait. The word also means the gathering of the local community in different houses for tea after work to discuss local matters. This tradition has been practised in Kuwait for centuries even before there was electricity or any type of entertainment. People came together and entertained themselves and discussed their problems. The movement, according to Al Khatrash (1992), uses Dywannyahs to encourage the locals to support them. He stated that the movement’s campaign for representation in the National Assembly was based around the Dywannyah.

The Organisation of Ihy ^la Al Torath:

The organisatjon’s main mass media channel is its magazine “Al Forquan”. Although the organisation is registered as a legal organisation Al Forquan is not licensed by the government. Because of that Al Forquan is registered in Cyprus and enter Kuwait as a foreign magazine. Every issue is vetted by the ministry of Information. However following the Organisation involvement in the resistance against the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait the Emir of Kuwait is to allow Al Forquan to be printed in Kuwait as a foreign magazine (Al Oune, 1992). The magazine mainly focuses on Tawhid and Ibadat and sometimes deals with political issues about Muslims suffering in Africa and Asia.

The organisation also publish books.

“The organisation has published one million books in Arabic. It has also translated and published half a million books in languages such as English, French as well as Asian and African languages”(Al Oune, 1992).

It has also distributed thousands of cassettes. Cassettes concentrating on the right meaning of Tawhid have a big market in Najed in Saudi Arabia where the Salafi movement is popular.

The Salafi movement also uses Mosques as a channel to spread its ideas. Its Imams leads the prayer in many Mosques, giving Friday speeches and distributing free books in Mosques. The movement, according to Al Oune (1992), has held many public meetings to discuss some of the problems that face the Muslim World in Palistine ,Afghanistan and other African and Asian Muslim countries.

As a major Islamic movement in Kuwait the Salafi movement held many Dywannyahs in all parts of Kuwait city. With selective topics and organised discussion the movement introduces ideas and opinions to the locals. Dywannyahs are also use to get locals supports for programs presented in the National Assembly by the Salafi members of the Assembly.

The similarities and the differences between the Islamic movements in using mass and inter personal communication channels in Kuwait:

There many similarities between the two organisations. For example, the two organisations are registered as legal organisations and some of their members present some religious programmes in the national television and radio. The two organisations have magazines that are their main mass media channel. The difference between their magazines is that the Organisation of Social Improvement’s magazine is now registered as a Kuwaiti magazine while the magazine of the Organisation of lhy’a Al Torath is treated as a foreign magazine. The two organisations use publish books, pamphlets, and distribute cassettes of their speakers. They also used underground pamphlets during the Iraqi invasion. The two movements use visits as a channel to introduce their ideas and to get financial and political support. Mosques, public meetings, students union and Dywannyahs are used by both movements. The Organisation of Social Improvements has used channels such as organising conferences, demonstrations, and cultural weeks. It also established a youth center and uses its theater for weekly lectures and producing plays in distinction of the Organization of lhy’a Al Torath..

The main obstacles that faces the Islamic movements in Kuwait and Disseminating their messages:

Although the two movements according to Al Oune (1992) have good relationship with the Kuwaiti government,they still face many obstacles. Some of these obstacles come from the monarchical system others are financial and ideological. These obstacles result in the Islamic movements putting more on reliance alternative channels and interpersonal communication channels.

Political obstacles:

The main political obstacle that faces the two movements is the illegality of their undercover movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi movement. This illegality made them work under the umbrella of two social serves organizations, the Organisation of Social Improvement and the Organisation of lhy ^la Al Torath.

Government censorship over the media is one of the obstacles that faces the two movements. The government according to Al Khatrash (1992) have banned his movement’s magazine many times and for couples of weeks. Government censorship makes the editors of the movements’ magazines aware of openly writing their opinions on most political and economic problems. Another obstacle facing the movement is the government’s anti-Islamic propaganda. The government’s misuse of the word “fundamentalism” in covering news of other Islamic movements in the Muslim World on the national television and radio causes great problems. By showing them as “extremists” and “terrorists” the image of the movement has been greatly transited (Al Oune, 1992)

Such images can to some extent be countered by the appearance of some of the scholars of the Islamic movements on national television and radio. However, they are only allowed, according to Al Khatrash (1992), to speak on Ibadat and not about politics. The government has also banned many preachers of the two movements from speaking in Mosques. The government went further according to Al Oune (1992), when it banned cassettes and videotapes of these speeches from record shops. However enforcing such a ban has not been easy as tapes are simply distributed privately.

Financial obstacle:

In a wealthy country as Kuwait the Islamic movements do not face the financial problem. But according to Al Khatrash (1992), the Organisation of Social Improvements has many programmes such as publishing books and running the youth centet that cost a lot of many. Hence the importance of the efforts to raise donations.

Social obstacles:

The Islamic movements in Kuwait according to Al Khatrash (1992), face citizens’ lack of interest in politics. Al Oune (1992) notes that this lack of interest is usual in wealthy societies such as the Kuwaiti society . The lack of political interests means movements must use their activities to educate and to inform Kuwaiti citizens.

Ideological obstacles:

The two movements face anti-Islam ideological movements such as communists, socialists, secularists and nationalists. Although these ideological movements are small they according to Al Oune (1992), control most of the mass media channels in Kuwait. “They also the government’s tools in its propaganda against the Islamic movement” (Al Khatrash, 1992).

The main research methods the Islamic movements in Kuwait use to assess the effectiveness of their messages:

The two movements do yearly questionnaires and the result of these questionnaires are used to test the popularity of their movements (Al Khatrash, 1992 and Al Oune, 1992). The increased number of members in the two movements, and the increased numbers attending their activities are seen as a sign of their popularity. The increased numbers of Dywannyahs held as well as the increased number of subscribers to their magazines, letters and telephones call from the readers of their magazines are also signs, according to Al Khatrash (1992), of the growing success of their communication strategies. It also uses the increased numbers of people attending the movement’s demonstrations as another proof of the movements popularity.

The two movements also show the effectiveness of their messages through the numbers of books that they reprinted and translated into other languages.. They also show it through the increased numbers of people attending their public meetings. They also use the increased numbers of seats they obtained in the National Assembly as another sign of their popularity . The increased numbers of students in their schools and patients in their hospitals and clinics build by the movements in Africa an Asia are also according to Al Khatrash (1992) and Al Oune (1992) ,signs of their messages effectiveness.

Traditional methods:

Members and heads of each committee in the two movements are asked to find the effectiveness of the movements ‘ messages on the recipients whenever and wherever they meets them. Then each member and head of committee report his findings in the beginning of each annual meeting of the committees, in order to report them to the committees of research and studies in each movement.

The two movements found that their messages are affected through their members personal communication with recipients in Mosques and through their organizational communication with students and teachers unions. The Muslim Brotherhood found their messages effective according to Al Khatrash (1992) through reports discussed in the movement’s local Shou’ra Councils and in the general Shou’ra Council. It also found that through the results of the conferences that its organisation of Social Improvements held.

The propaganda of press of anti-Islamic movements in Kuwait and the Western broadcasting and press propaganda also prove the popularity of the Islamic movements according to Al Oune (1992), although they criticized the Islamic movements.

AUDIENCES: Recipients of the Islamic Movements in Pakistan.

As a democratic country, Pakistan provides the freedom of speech and publication to all the political parties and ideological movements. The only channels that are controlled by the government are television and radio stations. This freedom according to Ahmad (1991) allows the Islamic movements to participate fully in the political life of Pakistan.

The most important audience for the Islamic movements is their members according to Lacwi (1991) Hossain (1991) and Ahmad (1991). The members of the three movements come from different races, education background and linguistic communities. This combination of cultures, education levels and languages gives the three movements the ability to operate in rural and urban societies all over Pakistan compared with other national political parties such as Pakistan People Party which is based in Sind and Muhajer Party, that based in Karachi.

Although they address their messages firstly to their members, the three movements also concentrate on approaching students in their schools and universities. The Islamic Organization, according to Ahmad (1991) concentrate on student unions in universities as “gate through which they reach students in all universities”. Students in schools are also targetted by the Islamic Organization. It communicates with them through its members in the teacher’s union in primary and secondary schools.

The Organization of Ahlo Hadith identifies the students at Al Salafyah University as its main student audience. The Organization of Islam’s Ulama^l,also send their messages to students in general in schools and universities.

The Islamic Organization concentrates on other profésional groups and communicates with them through their unions. These include teachers, engineers, doctors and lawyers. The movement through its members in these unions tries to spread the movements ideas among those recipients. As well as trying to counter communist and secular influence in these unions.

The three movements send their messages to the Pakistan government and to the members of the National Assembly in order to get their support in changing anti-Islam laws such as usury banks.

The main channels the Islamic movements in Pakistan use to send their message.

This freedom enjoyed by the Islamic movements in Pakistan enables them to speak freely about their objectives. The three movements have their own political parties and members of parliament and participate in the formation of Pakistan’s politics. Also some of these movements have participated with other parties in forming some governments such as the Islamic Organization participation in the present government of Mr. Sharif.

The Islamic Organization.

The Islamic Organization publishes newspapers and magazines that focus on presenting its ideas and solutions to the present issues that faces Pakistan in particular and the Muslim World in general. Some of its members are also writers in many Pakistani newspapers and magazines presenting their movement’s views through these newspapers and magazines.

Although the Pakistani television and radio stations are owned and run by the government, some of the movements intellectuals members such as Moududi and Ahmad , are used to giving speeches and interviews on television and radio. Through their speeches and interviews they present their movements views on the Islamization of Pakistan which was the dream of many Pakistanis before independence. Some of the movement’s members are also start producing films that served the movement’s objectives such as “The Gift of Paroud” and “Khasmir Echo”.

To reach the intellectuals the movements established the

Institute of Politics Studies that published journals and books in Urdo, English and Arabic. These journals and books focus on politics, economic and education issues. It also establishes other institutes such as the Institute of Central Asia Studies that focuses on Muslim problems in central Asia, and Gallop Institute that focuses on the current political and military situations in Afghanistan and also focuses on Pakistan’s government’s policies. The two institutions publish books and journals that are published quarterly and monthly on different subjects about Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Another institute found by the Islamic Organization is Arabism House, where the movements study the Arab world from different politics thought, economic and social angles. This institution is also responsible for translating all the movements’ books into Arabic to make them available to Arab readers. The institute publishes a quarterly journal “Al Mansourah” in Arabic presenting in it the movement’s ideas and thought.

The Islamic Organization also publishes hundreds of novels and poetry written by Dr. Iqbel, Moududi and other famous writers from Pakistan and India. These novels and poetry focus mainly on the cause of the foundation of Pakistan as a full Islamic State. Some of this poetry is put into cassettes to reach larger audiences. In the mean time cassettes are use heavily by the Islamic Organization as an alternative mass media channel in a country where electricity is widely available. Video tapes are also used as a channel to explain Islam by recording some Islamic lectures and also shows the movements popularity by showing its gatherings and demonstrations.

The Islamic Organization concentrates on reaching the people through Mosques. The message in the mosques is reinforced by the local’s trust of their Imam who lead the prayers. Because of the Imam’s religious position their opinions are well respected, according to Ahmad (1991) among the people in the mosques. The Islamic Organization’s Imams also preach in streets and Bazars inviting people to mosques and to events organized by the Islamic Organization’s.

Conferences and lectures in universities are used as organizational communication channels to reach intellectuals. In them the movements’ speakers present their solutions to the problems that face Pakistan in political, social and economic terms (Ahmad, (1991). The movement also uses its members’ leadership of students, labours, doctors, farmers and lawyers unions to send messages to these recipients.

Election campaign and public meetings are also another two channels the movement explains in their programmes in moving Pakistan towards Islam. The movement also uses peace demonstrations such as “The Great Rally” of 1991 to explain its objectives and to encourage more people to joint the movement according to Ahmad (1991).

The Organization of Ahlo Hadith.

The Organization of Ahlo Hadith publishes newspaper and magazines to reach civil servants, students and intellectuals. It also publishes tens of books explaining the theory of Salfism in changing the society towards Islam.

The movement also records the speeches of some of its scholars in cassettes and distributes them widely, especially to those who cannot read. The use of this channel is effective

especially in the rural areas and has made some of the scholar’s name very famous.

As some of its members are elected the movement publishes many pamphlets introducing its programmes and objectives. The pamphlets are also used to get financial support from the local and from the Gulf states visiting where there are many similar Salfi movements.

Visiting is a form of personal communication used to spread the movement’s messages to specific targets. In the visits, according to Lacwi (1991), members of the movement call on their neighbours, schoolmates and others to introduce their objectives and invite them to join the movement.

Although the organization of the Ahlo Hadith uses some organizational communication channels such as mosques, conferences, public meetings, demonstrations, election campaign and lectures, it does not target specific recipients with these channels according to Lacwi (1991). Again the Mosque is central to this organization’s communication policy. The movement has succeeded, according to Lacwi (1991), in using mosques to build the movement’s support. It also used public meeting to introduce its opinions on specific issues such as the Gulf War and the situation in India. The movement also used, as other political parties do, demonstrations to show its strength in the Pakistan streets.

The Organization of Islam’s Ulama.

As a movement that has a history in Pakistan and before that in India, and as a movement that calls for the practise of Islam through Hanafi Sect that most Pakistani people follow, the movement has less need for communication channels, according to Hossain (1991).

The movement only uses magazines as its mass communication channel. It publishes books about the Hanafi Sect and about the prophet’s life as a channel to spread its idea of guiding the Pakistan societies towards Islam. The movement also uses cassettes as a channel to introduce its ideas to people especially those who cannot read. As a movement that depends on a charity, the Organization of Islam’s Ulama prints pamphlets explaining its programs and needs. The movement also uses pamphlets during the election campaign to explain its political programs.

The movement concentrates its communication efforts on organizational communication channels to reach its recipients according to Hossain (1991). The movement’s Imams in urban and rural mosques represent the movement and work to introduce the movement’s objectives. As the movement present itself as a tradition Hanafi Sect ordinary Pakistanis are easily attracted to it, as Hossain states;” this association has makes it eae y for these Imams to get more support without publicity”. Conferences and public meetings are also used as a communication channels to reach more recipients. They used to discuss social and political problems.

The similarities and differences between the Islamic movements in using the mass media and interpersonal communication channels in Pakistan.

The three movements that we have studied use similar types of mass communication channels such as publishing magazines, books and pamphlets. The Organization of Ahlo Hadith and the Islamic Organization also use newspapers as a mass communication channel to reach more people. Cassettes that contain speeches of their leaders and scholars are also used to reach people. The differences between the Islamic Organization and the other two organizations is the number of mass media channels it uses. The Islamic Organization uses television, radio, film, journals, novels, poetry and videotapes.

The three movements use similar interpersonal communication channels as letters facsimiles, telephones, telegrams, mosques, conferences, public meeting, demonstrations, election campaign and lectures. Some of these channels are used more frequently by the Islamic Organization than other movements. The Islamic Organization uses conferences in a professional way by inviting specific audiences and runs them in an academic way. While the other two organizations use them as events to gather people from different types of education and in a large numbers. Another difference in the use of letters, telephones, facsimiles and telegrams between the organization of Islam’s Ulama and the other two movements, when it used them for official communication with its branches and the government officials. While the other two movements use them to send reports to the media. Visits and lectures are use only by the Islamic Organization and the Organization of Ahlo Hadith only.

The main obstacles that face the Islamic movements in Pakistan and disseminating their messages.

Pakistan’s democratic system has helped the Islamic movements to spread their messages in a democratic atmosphere. This atmosphere also helped the different government in Pakistan in dealing with the Islamic movements by incorporating them in Pakistan’s democratic process, that uses democratic methods to suggest and to object to any law or government’s decision. There are however several obstacles that face the Islamic movements in playing their role in the democratic debate.

Political obstacles.

The three movements agree that the lack of mass media channels is the main political obstacle that they face. The shortage of newspapers and magazines gives advantage to secular and communist forces to spread their ideas through the print media (Ahmad, 1991). Another obstacle is government refusal to allow the Islamic movements to use national television and radio stations to spread their messages (Hossain, 1991).

The Islamic Organization has faced the banning of some of its magazines and newspaper particulary from entering other Muslim countries ( Ahmad, 1991 ).

Social and financial obstacles.

Pakistan, as we mentioned in the third chapter, has one of the highest rates of illiteracy in Asia. The three movements agree that illiteracy is one of the main obstacles that they face when they send their messages (Lacwi; 1991). This obstacle made the three movements use more oral communication channels as mosques, public meetings, conferences and lectures to educate their recipients.

The wide use of these channels requires a lot of manpower to organize these activities in a different part of Pakistan. It also needs a lot of money to run such activities (Ahmad; 1991).ln a poor country such as Pakistan where the Islamic movements’ main resources are donations and membership fees the lack of capital, according to Hussain (1991), is their biggest obstacle. This financial obstacle according to Ahmad (1991), has caused delays to the movement’s projects and publications.

Ideological obstacles.

According to Hussain (1991) “anti-Islam movements are well financed and have more media outlets than the Islamic movements primarily because of their alliance with their masters, in the East and the West, who have supported them”.

These anti-Islam movements, according to Ahmad (1991), use the name of Islam, particularly during the elections campaign in their slogans such as the Islamic Socialism adopted by Butto in the 1970s in order to gain the support of the illiterates in the rural areas. According to Lacwi (1991), despite ideological differences, the anti-Islamic forces all join against the Islamic movements and united to block the way for the Islamic movements from coming to power.

Another ideological obstacle facing the three movements is the Western propaganda against the Islamic movements in Pakistan

through the Western media ( Ahmad, 1991). The Western media label them, according to Hussain (1991), radical and fundamentalist.

Lacwi (1991) be;ieves that “the Western propaganda has been counter productive. It simply has gain the Islamic movements a large number of members who see in the Islamic movements as their representing identity.”

The main research methods the Islamic movements in Pakistan use to assess the effectiveness of their messages.

Knowledge of the effectiveness and impact of the message according to Ahmad (1991), is important for any movement particularly to assess its popularity. To know the effectiveness of their messages they use two types of methods; research and traditional. The Islamic Organization sends all the data to the different institutions that it has established to analyse them. These institutions are full of specialist professors in politics, economics, social and education. The data that is collected through traditional methods is sent to the same institutions through the movement’s headquarters.

The other two movements collect both research and traditional methods through their headquarters and analyse also by the head committee of the movements.

The Research Method.

The Islamic Organization does a yearly questionnaire to review its policies and status. This questionnaire is done by the Gallop institute, one of the movements institutions. the results of this questionnaire according to Ahmad (1991) shows public acceptance to the movement’s policy and increased support to the movement objectives.

The three movements shows the effectiveness of their messages by the increased numbers of seats that they obtained in the National Assembly. They also proved the acceptance of their

messages with the increased numbers of members and the increased numbers attending their activities.

Another method they use, is to measure the numbers of subscribes to their magazines and for the Islamic Organization to its newspaper. The number of letters and telephones calls from readers of their magazines. Also provide a measure of the effectiveness of their messages.

The traditional method.

The three movements use similar traditional methods to ascertain the effectiveness of their messages, including personal communication between the movements’ Imams and people in mosques.

Three movements receive reports from their General Shu ^lra ^lCouncils and for the Islamic Organization through the Local Shu ^lra ^lCouncils. According to Ahmad (1991),they also monitor what the opposition press writes about their movements.

AUDIENCES: Recipients of the Islamic movements in Turkey.

We should bear in mind before we discuss the audience of the Islamic movements in Turkey, that only one of the three movements is registered as a political party; the Welfare party. While the Nursi and the Sufi movements are illegal movements and work through charity organizations.

The three movements first recipients are their members who registered in the Welfare party while with the other two movements they are follower who accept the objectives of the movements and work with the leader of the movements to achieve them. again the Turkish Islamic movements target students.

They send messages to students through their members in students unions in the universities. The messages to students in high schools goes through the teachers, who belong to these movements

and through the religious schools that the movements have established.

Farmers, labours, engineers, doctors, teachers and lawyers are also categorized as separate recipients and the two movements send messages to them through their members who run some of the unions of these groups.

The three movements try to influence the government and the members of the National Assembly. For the Welfare party the messages go directly to the government and through the party’s members in the National Assembly. The other two movements, send their message to the government indirectly. They use their members in the National Assembly who have been elected under the umbrella of the Right Bath and the Motherland Party.

Some of the Welfare party’s members and the Nursi movements members have been jailed at different times. Because of this experience the two movements categorize prisoners as one of their recipient groups. Through the members of the movements in prison the two movements spread their ideas among politicians who joined them and among other prisoners.

As an ideological movements the three movements send general messages to the Turkish citizens in general and to the Muslims all over the world encouraging them to follow their methods, Sufism, Nursims and the method of the Welfare Party. They also target with their massages the anti-Islam movements such as secularist, nationalist, communist and socialist movements.

The main channels that the Islamic movements in Turkey use to send their messages.

In chapter four we mentioned that the Turkish government restrictions on public preaching about Islamic political and social theories. These restrictions have resulted in the Islamic movements trying to find alternative mass media channels and interpersonal communication channels to reach their target audiences.

The Nursi Movement.

Because of the illegality of the Nursi movement the movement works under the umbrella of the Right Bath Party. The first Nursi group promoted its messages in Turkey with its newspaper ^IYani Asia’. This newspaper remains the man mass media communication channel that this group spread its ideas through.

On 12th September 1980, a new regime closed the newspaper and the movement established another one called ‘New Generation’. It is also closed after a few months and the movement also establishes the third newspaper called ‘Photography’. The third newspaper was also closed on 1st October 1983, but the movement managed to republish New Generation on the 5th November 1983.

After the differences between some of the Yani Asia group leaders in 1990 a new newspaper was established for the Nursi movement called “New Asia”. Although they have separated they still according to Nursi movement representative (1991) share the same interest. The Yani Asia group also have a magazine called ‘Bridge’ that also presents its ideology of Said Nursi in politics and social life.

The second main group of Nursi movement under its leader, Fethullah Gullar, has its own newspaper “Zaman”. The newspaper printed in Uzbakistan, Turkomanistan, Balgaria, Kazakistana and Azrabigun in the same day. It prints, according to Ozgan (1992), three hundred and thirty thousand copies in these countries which make it the largest daily Islamic newspaper. In the mean time this group also has its magazines “Sizinti” also famous in Turkey with its focus on the Nursi’s objectives.

Two other magazines that belong to the Nursi movements in general are “Zafer” and “Sur” which only concentrate on belief, thought and brotherhood. According to the Nursi movement’s representative (1991) the two magazines are not involved in politics and are written in an academic way, and they address the modern humanity and show ways of salvation through belief. This makes their main recipients targets the intellectuals.

“Daw’a” magazines is also a magazines that of the Nursi movement that concentrated only on the explanation and the description of Nursi ^ls letters. The magazines belong to one of the Nursi group called Madzahrah.

The Gullar group use another mass media channel to spread their messages when Zaman newspaper started a satellite television service to Azrabigan twice weekly in 1992 and will extend the service to cover central Asia in the near further with their —1992). But one -of the -movement’s- main channels is the publication of Said Nursi’s letters and books. These letters and books, according to the Nursi representative (1991), are the link between the movement and it recipients, because according to him these are not another set of books but a way of understanding the meaning of Islam.

Cassettes that contain the speeches of some of the movement’s scholars are also according to Nursi representative (1991) an effective channel. The use of these channels makes some of the movement’s scholars very famous in the Turkish society.

The Nursi movement uses pamphlets during the elections to spread its ideas of moving the Turkish society towards Islam. The pamphlets are usually signed by the name of the member who wants to be elected and not with the name of the movement. The pamphlet channel is also used to get financial support from the local to run the Islamic schools and to build Mosques and is also signed with the schools and Mosques’ names.

Working Units is also the main channel that the movement uses to spread its ideas. By organized visits to its recipients, the active members of the movement, present the ideology of Said Nursi in the improvement of the society and keep their recipient in touch with the movement through the movement’s books, newspaper and magazines.

All the movement internal communication according to the Nursi representative (1991) goes through the working units. Mosques that have been built by the movement and those which some of the movement’s members led the prayers in them, are the main channels that the Nursi use to spread their messages. The Imams of these Mosques took the opportunity to teach Islam as a belief and how it could change the people’s life without involving politics.

The Welfare Party.

As a legal political party, the Welfare party can use all -channels of communication -that the other political parties uses. This legality allows to the party to send its messages through the national television and radio. Also as a famous politician Arbakan’s speeches are usually quote in television and radio.

In the mean time when the party was in office in coalition with the Justice Party in 1970s the party had the opportunity to use the apparatus of the state to express its opinions. Milli Gazit is the party’s newspaper although it is registered as an independence newspaper ( Welfare representative; 1991). The independence of the newspaper allowed it continue to be published during the coup of 1 980.

Through the newspaper, the party present its ideas and criticises government’s policy and, according to Welfare party representative (1991), counters the propaganda of anti-Islam movements by showing their faults.

The party also uses many magazines such as Yornge and Ribat. These magazines are also independent from the party but call for the same objectives. In these magazines, according to the Welfare representative (1991),

“The party’s writers use their skills in explaining the importance of Turkey belonging to the Muslim World than being part of Christian Europe. They argue in favour

of the benefits that Turkey could gain if it was part of the Muslim World. The magazines also tells its readers about the golden ages of the Ottoman Caliphat. “

Some of the party’s members have established many publishing houses. The objectives of these houses according to Welfare Party representative, are to publish Islamic books, novels and poetry. The flood of these books, according to him, will replace the secular and communist books and make the Islamic thought readily availble to the public. These publishing houses have also translated most of the books of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Organization (in Pakistan) into Turkish language.

These houses also published journals specialising in politics, social and economics topics from an Islamic point of view as ‘Foreign Policy’. These journals main target, according to the Welfare representative (1991), are the intellectuals who mainly secular and nationalist.

Cassettes are also used as a channel to attract the youth with Islamic songs. They also contain the speeches of the party’s Imam and political leaders. The di stribution of cassettes, especially in the rural areas, was gained the party a solid base in the Turkish rural, according to the Welfare party representative (1991).

Videotapes are another important means the party has used to attract the youth. Some of its members have established cartoon production companies. These companies specialise in Islamic stories and in Turkish cultural stories. The objective of these channels is;

“to rebuild the Islamic identity amongst Turkish youth and children through cartoons. The cartoon industry has been occupied by Western morals and culture and cartoon promoting Islamic messages are regarded as rtal in reaching children ” the Welfare Party representative (1991).

The party also uses the videotapes channel for covering its political and social activities and distributes them to its branches to show them all over Turkey. The aim as the Welfare party representatives see it, is to show the party’s supporters the strength of the party and what the party is doing for them. He gave the example of the festival that the party held on the anniversary of the Muslim victory against the Bezinties army which benefited the Muslims in the City of Istanbul. The attendance of that festival was over a hundred thousand. Videotapes of the festival were shown all over Turkey.

The Welfare Party do not only rely on modern mass media but also uses more interpersonal channels to be sure that its messages are widely and correctly received, and to gain more support from those who believe in the parties values and objectives. The Working Unit is the channel which responsible to do this job. Members of these units make organized visits to their neighbours, relatives, classmates and workmates and discuss with them the party’s objectives and invite them to join the party.

The working units are also important for internal communication. All such communication is done through its working units because of, according to Welfare Party representative (1991), the government’s restriction against any political party that works against the Turkish secular constitution.

The party also use Mosques’ Imams who are members of the party to use their Mosques to send its messages to the public. They also fulfil the party’s objectives in spreading the meaning of Islam among the locals whom the party counted as supporters when they become true Muslims. Conferences are also another channel which the party use to attract Turkish intellectuals. The party has, according to the Welfare party representative (1991), the most educated members in every area of knowledge compared to the other political parties. Such a reputation brings more respect from university professors and intellectuals.to the party’s conferences. The party is sincere about publishing the results of economic and

industrial conferences that it holds to get more support from the intellectuals for its economic programmes.

Public meetings also benefit the party. In these meeting the party provides a platform for criticie^vgovernment’s policy of pushing too fast to go into Europe while Europe refuses of Turkey any concessions. The party also remind the Turks in these meeting of their history by showing the Turks what they have achitved when they are true Muslims. Demonstrations also help to “light up” the Islamic nation-hood in the public. In the mid 1991 the party used demonstrations as a mechanism to force the government to open ‘Aya Sufia’, the historic Mosques that Attartuk changed to a museum, for the public to pray in.

The Sufi Movement.

As an illegal movement the Sufi movement works under the umbrella of Motherland Party and the Right Bath Party. But it has its own channels of communication. The main mass media channel is its newspaper Turkey that sells two hundred and fifty thousand copies daily. This newspaper belong to the Nuqshapandi Sufi group headed by Isick. It supported the Motherland Party and after the party’s defeat in the last election it continued to support Ozal’s policies.

The Nuqshapandi group also has a magazine called Alton that was established by a group of Nuqshapandi ^ls called the Erenkoy group. The magazines, concentrated according to Sufi movement representative (1991) on Ibadat and belief. The magazine also supports the Motherland Party and President Ozal policies.

The second main Sufi group called Kadiriah also has two magazines, lcmal and Ogul. The magazines support the Right Bath Party. The two magazines, according to the Sufi movement representative (1991), talk about the values of Sufism and its philosophy. They also support the present government policies.

The movement also uses journals that focus on social change. It also publishes the Sufism books and distributes them in a cheap

rates to reach more people. As the other Sufi movements in the Muslim World, the movement publishes poetry about prophet Muhammad and his family to be sang at the Mouled gatherings. Cassettes are also use to spread the Sufism ideology by recording the Mouled and distributing them cheaply. The movement has organized many Mouled gatherings in a different parts of Turkey. In these gathering the movements’ scholars teaches the autobiography of prophet Muhammad and sing poetry that talk about him. They also teach Sufism ideology and encourage their members to spread the messages to their neighbours and relatives.

The movement uses Mosques through its imams to spread the Sufism ideology. It also built ten mosques and established in most of them schools to teach the Qur’an.

During the election campaign the movements representatives run the National Assembly under the Motherland Party and mainly follows its politic and social programs (Sufi movement’s representative; 1991). The movement’s coalition with the Motherland Party in elections helped the Sufi voice to gain more strength in government circles.

The similarities and the differences between the Islamic movements in using mass and interpersonal channels in Turkey.

All three movements use newspaper and magazines as their main media channels to spread their messages. The Welfare Party as a legal organization uses national television and radio during the election campaign to present its programs. Books and journals are another channels that all movements have use to spread their messages. Only one, the Nursi group, has started satellite broadcasting to spread their messages.

Cassettes are also a common channel that is used by the three movements, but the contents of the Sufi tapes is a record of their Mouled gathering and for the other two movements speeches of their imams. Pamphlets are use by the Welfare Party to introduce itself

as a legal political party, while the other two movements use them to get fund for their schools and Mosques.

The Welfare Party publishes novels and Islamic poetry, using them to remind the Turks about their Islamic past while the Sufi movement publishes only the poetry relating to the life of prophet Muhammad . Videotapes are used by the Welfare Party as a channel to reach young people through cartoons.

The Nursi and the Welfare Party use Working Units as an interpersonal channel to spread their ideas. The Welfare Party has other interpersonal channels such as conferences, public meetings, and demonstrations.

Mosques are the most common channel of communication for all the three movements. Election campaigns are usedby the Nursi and Sufi movements to present their political programs through their representatives. While for the Welfare Party elections are to present itself as party. The Sufi movement is the only one that use Mouled gathering to spread its messages,

The main obstacles that faces the Islamic movements in Turkey.

The Islamic movements in Turkey, oprate under a democratic and secular state that does not allow constitutionally any discussion about Islam as a political and social system that could be practised in Turkey. This strange understanding of democracy is not been seen in any country in the world, even in the Western countries that practised democracy. There are a number of obstacles that faces these movements.

Political obstacles.

The secular constitution has caused the Islamic movements to work under many names and titles. Sometimes under a nationalist party, other under right wing parties and only in these case of Welfare Party as an Islamic Party with nationalist leans J The Nursi groups voted mainly for the Right Bath Party while the Sufi movements voted for the Motherland Party in order to get some of their members to the National Assembly.

Although the three movements have members in the National Assembly it does not mean according to the Welfare Party representative (1991), that they can speak about the improvement of the Turkish society and government according to the Islamic principles.

The government since Attartuk ^ls time has used anti-Islam propaganda on the national televisions and radio. This propaganda accuse the Islamic movements, according to Nursi representative (1 991), of a backward belief and less civilised thoughts, while Arbakan told the National Assembly members that fifty percent of the Assembly’s members who hold Ph.D. degrees are those whom the government calls backward.

The movements faces another political obstacles from the government censorship. This censorship caused the closure of Y ani Asia during the 1980 Military Coup, New Generation on 12th September 1980 and Photography on 1st October 1983. Censorship is an obstacle for all Islamists writers. They have to find the right words to avoid the censorship seizure. Using symbols and nationalism term according to Welfare Party representative (1991) become the only way for the writers to express their ideas when they talk about the need for Islam in Turkey.

The government also refused to allow the Islamic movements’ Imams to appear in the national television and to speak on national radio. As a result the movements have started to establish their own television stations to spread their messages. The government also banned some of the movements’ Imams from preaching in the Mosques and banned their cassettes when they presented Islamic opinion on some aspect of Turkey’s political affairs.

Financial obstacle

The three movements rely for their financial resources on membership fees and charity. This dependency makes the programmes of these movements, according to their representatives, slow and less than what they planned. The lack of capital only allows them to print a minimum number of newspaper and magazines. This lack of resources, according to the Welfare Party representative (1991), gives the upper hand to the anti-Islam movements who gain much support from the west.

Ideological obstacles.

The three movements’ main ideological obstacle is the secularism of the governments and some political parties. The government’s adaptation of secularism has had created influence in the Turkish media and the education system in school and universities. Anti-Islam movements presented in the Turkish media while no Islamic movement could have access to them.

The main research methods the Islamic movements in Turkey use to assess the Effectiveness of their messages.

The Islamic movements in Turkey study the effectiveness of the messages they send to measure their popularity. The Welfare Party has its research and studies committee that is responsible for doing yearly questionnaire about the party’s policies, activities and plans to get feedback from the party’s recipients. The committee is also analysises data that collected is through traditional methods. (The Welfare representative; 1991). The other two movements collect their research data through their newspaper and magazines.

The research method.

The three movements claim they are very popular and their messages are effective in the Turkish society. The increase in number of memberships of their movements and the increased attendance of their activities as seen as proof of their popularity.

They have also also increase the numbers of seats they obtained in the National Assembly.

The increased number of subscribers to their newspapers and magazines is another signs of their popularity. Said Nursi’s letters have been translated to many European and Asian languages, according to Nursi representative (1991), and this shows the popularity of the movement not only in Turkey but also in other countries.

The Welfare Party shows how popular it is, according to its representative (1991) through the increased number of people attending their demonstration and public meetings. While the Sufi movement show their popularity, according to its representative (1 991), through the increased numbers of people attending its Mouled gatherings. The two movements, the Nursi and the Welfare Party have also won many unions presidency which again is a proof of their effective messages.

The traditional method.

Through the reports of the three movements members to their headquarters about their personal communication with the movements recipients in mosques and in the field the three movements found according to their representatives (1991) that their messages reached their recipients effectively. Two movements, the Nursi and the Welfare Party proved their popularity through the reports that they received about their organizational communication with the students, labours, farmers, doctors, lawyers, engineers and teachers unions from their members in these unions.

The Welfare Party found through reports in its local Shou’ra Councils and it general Shou ^lra Council that the party’s policies and programs are accepted by the party’s recipients according to the party representative (1991). He also proved the party’s popularity through the studies that been discussed in the party’s conferences.

The three movements use what the opposition’s press and the anti-Islamic movements’ press wrote about the Islamic movements success in affecting the Turkish society with their ideas as an evidence from others to the effectiveness of the movements messages. What western broadcast and press wrote about the Nursi and the Welfare Party success in Turkey is also use, according to the Nursi and Welfare Party representative (1991), as a proof to these two movements popularity although they are presented in the Western broadcast and press as an extremist.

Conclusion

This chapter has studied the communication policies that the Islamic movements use to send their messages. The Islamic movements divide their audience into a number of key groups. The purpose is to send the right message to the right audience. The study show the audiance of the Islamic movements as mainly students, and profishinals. In the main time the movements also targeted members of Parliamens and government ministers in their countries.

We found that there is a little use of mass media in Egypt, Kuwait and Turkey. While in Afghanistan and Pakistan the mass media was used effectively. The reason for that is the political systems. In Pakistan where democracy is practised the Islamic movements took full advantage to use all means of mass media. In Afghanistan the Mujahideen set up their own radio stations and printed tens of local and international newspapers in different languages. But these chances were not applicable for the Islamic movements in the other three countries because of governments’ refusal to allow them to use these kinds of mass channels to spread their ideas.

Although some of the Islamic movements succeeded in using mass media in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they all face governments’ restrictions and censorship. This censorship tied their hands from presenting their political opinions upon issues that their governments want them not to talk about.

To resist the governments’ restrictions on using mass media the Islamic movements succeeded in greater use of alternative and traditional communication channels. Cassettes, video-tapes and publishing books are the main channels the Islamic movements use to avoid governments’ restriction. The wide use of these channels seen as one writer noted “an ideological revolution in the Muslim world” (Yaken; 1986).

Speeches of the Islamic movements leaders and Imams are recorded and distributed in the same week and some of these speeches distributed internationally to reach Muslims all over the world. The Islamic movements publish millions of books about Islam and its political system and social order. Some of these books were translated into more than thirty languages.

Mosques are the basis for the Islamic movements and it is difficult for government to restrict the Islamic movements from using them to spread their ideas. Through Friday speak and religious lessons the Islamic movements Imams explain Islamic opinion on political and social issues. The respect granted by Muslim society to Imams has helped the Islamic movements in using the positions of Imams to get public support.

Interpersonal communication has also been widely used by the Islamic movements such as visits and Dywannyah. The aims of the interpersonal communication the Islamic movements use is to send the right message to the right person. Because of that the Islamic movements send different messages to different audiences. The result of this communication should build cohesion among the members of these movements and their audiences.

The Interpersonal communication is also uses by all the Islamic movements for internal communication within each movement. The working units is the main channel for internal communication in the illegal movements. While for the legal movements letters and other means of interpersonal communication are use.

There are many obstacles that faces the Islamic movements while they sending their messages. These obstacles are mainly political, for the Islamic movements in Egypt, Kuwait and Turkey. While in Afghanistan and Pakistan illitracy is the main obstacle that face the Islamic movements. All the Islamic movements in the five countries are facing a financial obstacle to fund the programmes and they also face other ideological movements that have more media channels than what they have.

In our study we also found that Islam as well as the Islamic movements have been misjudged in the West because of the historic conflicts between Islam and the Muslim world in one side and Christianity and the Western world from the other side. During the conflicts between the two religions and the two civilisations the West has created stereotypes of Islam and Muslims from the Middle Ages, through the Crusades and the Orientalist period and up to these days, emphasising the threat of Islam and the fundamentalists Islamic movements.

Islamic movements in Muslim countries call for the return of Islam as a system of life. They believe that the Islamic political system and the Islamic social order were practiced perfectly during the presidency of prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliph’as Then there were errors during the Omay’a, the Aba’sy and the Ottoman Caliphat that led to the collapse of the Caliphat system in 1 924 and the devision of the Muslim world. The governments of the new states ruled their countries without the Islamic Shari’ah. They become secular governments using different political systems to rule their people, but none using the Islamic political order. Secularism and political deviation are reasons behind the Islamic movements’ call for a return to Islam.

The history of the sixteen movements of our study shows that they were established and operate as any other social movements. Besides lobbying for political change they act as a sisocial and welfare services to their members while have no form or political structure, mainly as a result of having to work in a closed and restricted environment, they provide many services to followers and have a loose, decentralised organization. Governments in Egypt, Afghanistan, Kuwait and Turkey do not allow some of these movements to openly practice as a social movements which means some of these movements work underground. The only country that of our study that allowes the Islamic movements to work in open is Pakistan.

The freedom of speech for the legal Islamic movements in our study permits these movements to use constitutional and official channels to express their opinions. They can, forexample, establish political parties or social organizations as the case of the Islamic movements in Pakistan. On the other side where governments abuse the freedom of these movements by jailing their members and suppressing every move of these movements we found that these movements used all kinds of organizations to present their opinions, such as using umbrellas organizations to work under their names as with the Islamic movements in Kuwait or starting a war with the government as with the Islamic movements Afghanistan. The lack of freedom is also responsible for the extremity of some acts of the Islamic Organisation in Egypt. They are a responce to the government’s continuous physical and media attacks against them since 1 979.

The media has played a significant role in the rise of the Islamic movements. The Islamic movements’ use of all kinds of communications channels to send their messages to their audiences. Some have used satellites televisions channels, television, radio, newspapers, magazines and films to spread their ideas. Others have created alternatives communication channels such as cassettes, VCRs and underground pamphlets. Those who used alternative communication channels were the movements that have no legal statue. All the sixteen movements use personal communication channel not only to spread their ideas, but also to convince the Muslim activists to enrol jn their movements. But most significant has been the role of traditional communication channels, the Mosques, the Friday speaches, community visits and meetings, poetry and novels. Dericet access to the means of modern communication by the state, lack of funds and inadequate expertise Islamic movements have fallen back on traditional media. In modern ages these means of communication have proven effective.

¹when we wrote this, but they now control all Afghanistan ²see chapter Four for more details.

³see chapter Four for more details.

CONCLUSION

Discussion of the findings:

our survey of the Islamic movements objectives and nature and the media channels that they use to send their messages to their recipients and the obstacles that faces their messages is summarized in the concluding remains of this chapter.

Objectives:

In chapter four we noted that there are many similarities between the objectives of the Islamic movements. But all the movements have the objective of practicing Shar’ah in their countries as their main objective. The Islamic party (Hekmatyar) stated that “the party’s main objective is to present Islam as a system of life in politics,social matter sand thoughts” ( Zad, 1 991 ). According to Lacwi (1991) the main objective is to run Pakistan with the Islamic system and make Islam supreme in it.

The nature of the Islamic movements:

When we studied the nature of each Islamic movement of our study in chapter four, we found that they had been established as public religious social movements and most of them still practice as a public movement. The other secret movements became secret when the governments of their countries banned them from working in public.

Although the Islamic movements nature has been shown by the media of their government as an extremist and violent movement that wants to force people to accept Islam, we found in chapter four that the nature of these movements is peaceful, religious social movement. We also found the movements that have been shown as extremist are those which their governments have jailed and killed some of their members.

Media and the rise of the Islamic movements:

In chapter six when we discussed the mass media channels that the Islamic movements used, we found that all movements are willing to use them as much as they could. It means, according to one of the Islamic movement leaders, that the Islamic movements have nothing to hide, all their objectives are known to the government and to the public, and they are ready to use all types of mass media channels to send their messages.(AI Hodibi, 1991).

Sufism in Egypt through their access to the government uses national television and radio station to present their messages. They also use this access to write in all famous Egyptian newspapers as Al Akhbar and Al Ahram (Taftazani, 1991). The movement has also its own magazine. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been banned from publishing its magazine the movement found others doors to present its own ideas through the Alsha’b newspaper of the Liberal Party and the Al Wafd newspaper of Wafd Party.

Al Shari’ah Society is also banned from publishing its own magazine Al letisam, but the opposition’s newspaper as Al Sha’b and Al Wafd also present its ideas (Faid, 1991). While the Islamic Organisation has no mass media channel in Egypt, it has a magazine published in Pakistan and smuggled into Egypt.

The picture in Afghanistan is totally different. Mujahideen used all kinds of mass media channels except television before the collapse of the communist government. But after their victory, they now use the national television and radio stations to present their ideas (Zad,1991 , Khalil, 1991). The only movement that lacked mass media channels during the war was the Afghanistan National Liberation front because of lack of capital (Rohani,1991).

In Kuwait, the Islamic movements as a social movement use the national television and radio to send their messages (Alkatrash,1991 and Al Oune, 1991 ). They both have magazines and

the Organization of Social Improvement produced its first film in 1 985.

The Islamic Organisation in Pakistan publishes many newspapers and magazines in different languages and some of the movements intellectuals are invited to broadcast on national television and radio (Ahmed, 1 991). Also some of the movements members have produced films. The other two movements published newspapers and magazines ‘and some of their scholars give speeches on national television and radio. (Lacwi,1 991 and Hossain, 1 991).

The Nursi movement in Turkey • n Turke used many kinds of mass media channels from publishing newspapers and magazines to using satellite television channels (Ozgan, 1 992.). The Welfare Party uses national television and radio during elections to present its ideas. It also uses its newspaper Milli Gazit and magazines to communicate (the Welfare representative, 1991 ). Sufi movements have many newspapers and magazines that the movements’ ideas represent through them.

Thus; the Islamic movements use all kinds of mass media channels to present their ideas when the government allowes them.

However governments have banned the Islamic movements from using many mass media channels as a result the Islamic movements have used alternative or small media channels as publishing books, journals, pamphlets and underground pamphlets. They also produced cassettes and video tapes that contain speeches and Islamic education programmes.

Their success in using these channels has enabled them to continue their communication with their recipients without relying only on television, radio, newspapers, magazines and films. For example the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt succeeded in creating the revolution of the Islamic books and cassettes in the 1970’s and the 1980’s. (Al Hodibi, 1 991) It also published many journals and poetry that focus on Islam as a system of life. The movement also used underground pamphlets to present its opinions because of the illegality of the movement.

Sufism also use publishing books of Sufism ideology and poetry of the famous Sufi poets as another kinds of communication channels. Al Shari’ah Society also uses its legality to publish hundreds of books and distributing cassettes of famous speakers. (Faid,1 991 .) While the Islamic Organisation uses underground pamphlets successfully to avoid government censorship.

In Afghanistan, the Islamic party (Hekmatyar) and the Islamic Society beside their successful use of mass media channels as radio, newspapers and magazines, also use many alternative communication channels. They published hundreds of thousands of school books and Islamic books to raise a new Afghan generation in an understanding.of Islam (Zad,1991 and Khalil, 1 991) They also publish journals, poetry and inside cities under the control of the communist government, they used to publish underground pamphlets. They, with the other two parties, the Islamic party (Khalise), and Afghanistan National Liberation Front, use cassettes containing speeches of Muslim scholars and produced documentary video tapes (Khalise,1991 and Rohani,1991)

The two movements in Kuwait published more than two million books and novels in different languages. They also were responsible for the Islamic books and cassettes revolution in the Gulf countries.(Alkhatrash,1 992 and Al Oune,1992)

The Islamic organisation in Pakistan is famous for the number of books it has printed and translated. The books of Muddudi and Dr. Iqba has been translated into more than twenty languages.(Ahmad, 1991). It was also the only movement in Pakistan that produces academic journals in many areas and many languages. The movement with the other two movements, the Organisation of Ahlo Hadith and the organisation of Islam’s Ulama use cassettes to deliver their message (Lacwi,1991 and Hossian, 1991).

In Turkey where the Nursi and Sufi movements, both illegal, publish hundreds of books and letters of said Nursi (the Nursi movement representative, 1 991). They also use their members publication houses, as do the Welfare Party, to publish more books and journals about Islamic teaching and morals. The three movements also use cassettes and produce video-tapes to reach more recipients.

Because the governments ban the Islamic movements from using some of the mass media channels such as television and radio, the Islamic movements have succeeded in creating alternative media channels that helped them in spreading their messages such as the revolution of the Islamic books and cassettes in the last decade. Their reliange on small and alternative media indicates the effectiveness of political communication through these channels.

Inter-personal communication channels are also used by the Islamic movements. We found that the main channel that the illegal movement use for internal communication within the movement is the Working Units. For example the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, used these units to transfer messages between the committees of the movement.(Al Hodibi, 1991)

In Kuwait the Muslim Brotherhood, although they use the Organisation of Social Improvements for their public activities, they use the working units to attract more activists to become members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The working units are also used by the head-quarters of the movement to transfer its plans and orders to its members. The working units showed their value during the Iraqi invasion of 1990, when these units transferred all types of information without being discovered by the Iraqis.(Al Khatrash,1 992)

The Nursi movement in Turkey has survived since 1 924 because of the working units who took on their shoulder the responsibility to rewrite the letters of Said Nursi with their

handwriting and distribute them secretly. The working units is also the main channel that the movement uses to transfer the internal messages within the movement according to the Nursi movement representative (1 991).

Thus; the Working Units of the illegal Islamic movements are the best channels for the internal communication within these movements, because of the secrecy of these units.

The other personal communication channels that the Islamic Movement uses are letters, facsimiles, telephones, telegrams and telex are used in two ways. The legal Islamic movements use them for internal communication within their movements and to send reports to the worldwide media.

As we found in our study of personal communication in this chapter that in Egypt Sufism, according to Tafftazani (1991), and Alshari’ah Society, according to Faid (1 991 ), use these channels to send messages to their branches and for their official use. While the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic organisation uses these channels to send their messages world-wide through the office of the Muslim Brotherhood ex-magazine, Al Daw’a and through the branches of the Islamic organisation in Pakistan and the United States (Al Hodibi; 1 991 , and Kassem; 1 991)

In Afghanistan, because the four Islamic movements lived in exile their main use of these channels has been to update the worldwide media about the situation in Afghanistan and to communicate with their branches in the refugee camps in different parts of Pakistan and Iran (Zad;1 991). In Kuwait the two organisations uses these channels to communicate with their branches and through their magazines they communicate with the worldwide media (Al Khatrash; 1991 , and Al Oune;1 991)

The Islamic movements in Pakistan use these channels in the same ways that the Islamic movements in Afghanistan and Kuwait use them. While in Turkey the Nursi movement and the Sufi movements only use these channels, to communicate with the worldwide media. In the main time the Welfare party use these channels for its official uses and to send messages to the Turkish and world media (The Welfare party representative; 1 991 )

Letters, facsimiles, telephones, telegrams and telex as personal communication channels are used for internal communication between the headquarters of the movements and their branches and also for sending reports to the worldwide media.

Most significant.was the role of Mosques as a channel of communication used by the Islamic movements. The study found that the movements work through political parties, social services or religious organisations, the Mosque is the basis of their communication with their followers and suporters.

The role of Mosques as a communication channel comes from the five times dayly prayer meeting, the Friday speech and the respect granted to mams in the Muslim society. The Imams who belong to the Islamic movements are different from the other Imams, from the point of their qualifications, education and more importantly, the political, economic and social events that they speak about (Ahmad, 1 991)

In Egypt the four movements rely on their Imams to build trust with their communities and spread the messages of the movements (Faid; 1991). The Imams also, as Kassem (1 991) described their role hold open classes in their Mosques to educate people about Islam.

The Islamic movements in Afghanistan used Mosques in the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran to update the refugees about the war and to discuss events and issues (Zad; 1991 ). Mosques also play a major role in the war against illiteracy in Afghanistan, as Khalise (1991) stated.

In Kuwait the Islamic movements succeeded in creating star

Friday speakers. The Mosques are full during the Friday speech and

people pray on the nearby streets to listen to their speeches (Al Khatrash; 1 991). The Imams in Pakistan are also given such adulation.

Thus; Mosques have acted as a vital channel of communication for all types of Islamic movements.

We also found in our study conferences and public meetings played an important part in the Islamic movements’ communication efforts. But they are primarly used by the legal Islamic movements. In Egypt Sufism and Al Shari’ah Society uses these channels. The four Islamic movements in Afghanistan held tens of conferences and public meetings in the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran (Khalil; 1991). The Islamic movements in Pakistan through their political parties held conferences and public meetings to discuss internal Pakistan issues and international issues (Hossian; 1991 ). In Kuwait the two Islamic movements used their legal organizations to hold conferences and public meetings to discuss social and political issues (Al Oune; 1992). While in Turkey the only movement that uses these channels is the Welfar party because of its legality, and ability of operate openly.

Because of the illegality of some Islamic movements in ouc

study we found that these movements, use unions of students, teachers, engineers, medics, farmers, labourers and lawyers as channels to introduce their ideas to these kinds of recipients. Movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic organization in Egypt resorting to using such unions when the Egyptian government ban them from working in public. Through their members they use unions magazines and journals to spread their messages. (Kassem; 1 991 ).

The Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait and the Salafi movements as illegal movements also use the student and teacher unions to send their messages particularly through organizing conferences, through these unions. (Al Khatrash; 1991). In Turkey, the Nursi movement through its members in students, medical, engineers, lawyers, farmers and labourers unions use these unions’ channels of communication to spread Said Nursi’s ideology (the Nursi movement representative; 1 991 ).

Thus; the illegal Islamic movements use unions of students, teachers, labourers, farmers, engineers, lawyers and medics, through their members in these unions, as a channel to spread their messages to these kinds of recipients

Finally, we found that the main obstacles are the political and the financial obstacles. Political obstacles included the illegality of many Islamic movements and the anti-Islamic policies that governments in the five countries use against these movements. The ban on media channels and the ban on some speakers of the Islamic movement are another obstacle.

We also found that the financial obstacle is another main obstacle that the Islamic movements face. The Islamic movement’s social programs are very large programs, such as building schools and hospitals, that need large capital investment, while they rely on donations. In Egypt, Sufism and Al Shari’ah Society, the main obstacle is more financial than political because of their legality (Tafftazani; 1991), while the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic organization face the two obstacles in egual proporations.

In Afghanistan the financial obstacle is the major one because of the large number of refugees and Mujahideen ^ls needs to buy more weapons (Khalise; 1991). In Kuwait the political and the financial obstacles are on the same level as Al Oune (1992) sees it. On one hand the two movements are working under other names because of their illegality and on the other hand the large aid program of the two movements for Muslim in Africa and Asia create a need for more capital to continue funding these programs (AIKhatrash; 1992).

The Islamic movements in Pakistan are faced with financial obstacles more than political ones because of the democratic system in Pakistan (Ahmad; 1991). In a poor country such as Pakistan with its huge population, the Islamic movements concentrate more on social programs to limit illiteracy and sickness which needs more capital (Hossain; 1 991 ) In Turkey the Nursi and Sufi movements are illegal movements and most of the time the Welfar party, although it is legal, could not talk about Islam or against secularism. (the Welfar party representative; 1 991 ). The three movements also face the financial obstacles of building more Islamic schools and Mosques. (the Nursi movement’s representative; 1991).

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Lectures

Gilani,l. Lecture in Galop Institute of Pakistan, Islamabad,September, 1987

CONCLUSION

308

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131

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PHD theses :THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION IN THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN THE MUSLIM WORLD : WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, KUWAIT, PAKISTAN AND TURKEY 1993 University of Wales UK

INTRODUCTION:

Statement of the problem:

The Study Case•

The purpose of the study:

The scope of the study:

Hypothesis:

The organisation of the study:

POLITICAL ΙΝ EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, κυν,ΙΑιτ,

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POLITICAL ΙΝ EGYPT, AFGHANISTAN, κυν,ΙΑιτ,

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كتاب رسالة الماجستير برامج الأحاديث الدينية التلفازية

الحماية الذاتية لمجتمعاتنا المسلمة من البث التلفازي الغربي المباشر باللغات المحليةبحث نشر عام 1417 الموافق 1977

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